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Introduction
In the last decade much effort has been devoted to enrich the standard approach to modeling
economic behavior. Field evidence, economic experiments and established results in other
disciplines of social sciences, spurred a large debate among economists on topics which
are commonly labeled as behavioral economics. The contributions to the discussion have
been both empirical and theoretical. In the latter case, the need to explain the observed
behavior of economic agents, triggered the proposal of behavioral models aimed to capture
what is left unexplained by the standard model of rational choice, adapting the analysis of
trade-offs to contexts where expectations and preferences may not be shaped consistently
with the conventional assumptions.
From the point of view of the scientific method, the observation of empirical regularities
which are difficult to reconcile with the standard theory have been the main motivation for
the proposal of extensions. In this respect however, three observations can be made. First,
from a theoretical point of view it is still missing a unified framework to analyze devia-
tions from the so called perfectly rational behaviour and the vast majority of models which
have been proposed are designed ad-hoc to explain the observed phenomenons in particular
contexts. Second, given the previous point, also the empirical analysis, especially when it
deals with field data as opposed to laboratory experiments, finds some difficulties in show-
ing uncontroversially that behind these deviations there is indeed the proposed explanation
and not some other competing ones. Third, even when behavior is shaped accordingly to
the proposed theory, it is not always clear which are the implication of these findings in
terms of the general theory of economic behavior. This last point is related crucially to the
fact that very often deviations from rational behavior are considered as biases, meaning that
they are departures from the the prescriptions of the rational model. This poses an straight-
forward question: once established the existence and the relevance of a bias, how stable, or
persistent, is it? Economists recognize that most of the strength of the standard paradigm of
rational economic choice is based on two considerations: the normative aspect of the theory
and the idea that rationality arises with experience and as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, it
is fundamental, in proposing a behavioral assumption to explain a particular phenomenon,
to evaluate its empirical relevance and to understand its theoretical implications. These
fundamental issues, which are at the basis of the process of construction, enlargement and
revision of any paradigm in science, motivate our analysis.
In the first two chapters we conduct an inquiry aimed to test a behavioral model of
choice. To address the first issue we raised, namely the relevance of the bias, we test some
implications of both the rational and the behavioral model with a rich dataset built on this
purpose. The environment we study is a subscription market for sport activity (i.e. a gym-
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nasium) and we are interested in analyzing the choice behavior of users both from a static
and a dynamic perspective, in order to address also the third issue we have highlighted: the
persistence of the bias.
One of the main difficulties in the analysis is given by what we have listed has the second
issue: the need to distinguishing among alternative explanations for the observed behaviour.
In our, as in many other contexts, this is due to fact that behind choices and outcomes
there can be many different decision processes (and each one of them can be explained
by a different behavioral theory) which are observationally equivalent. To overcome this
problem, we perform an extensive empirical investigation which relies not only on the data
on choice and consumption but also contemplates to recover crucial information through
surveys, laboratory experiments (performed online) and a field experiment.
The first chapter starts contrasting the rational expectation model of choice with a model
based on two assumptions: firstly, that agents are subjected to self control costs in being
stick to their investment plan (exercising in the gymnasium is considered an investment
activity in future health since benefits are delayed in time while costs are anticipated) and
secondly that they may be partially unaware of this costs. Based on these two assumptions
we propose a behavioral model of overconfidence and we derive predictions on choice
behavior especially in relation with foreseeable costs that we are able to quantify in the
empirical analysis. This allows us to contrast the predictions of the rational model of choice
with those of the behavioral one. Then we quantify, both from a static and a dynamic
perspective, the role of expectations in determining the contractual choice of agents. In
this respect we go one step further the current research which has focused mainly on the
presence of the bias without answering to the question of whether it is transitory or not.
We find that a relevant share of the population of users tend to behave accordingly to the
behavioral model and, more importantly, they tend to adjust their expectations, and their
choices, very slowly if not at all. These findings have relevant implications since we show
that overconfidence is a persistent bias in the perception of own performance, leading to
inefficient choices and possibly underinvestment.
Another contribution we make to the literature is to show the relationship between cog-
nitive skills and the observed behavior. As highlighted by the recent literature which inves-
tigates the role of cognition in shaping preferences and influencing the decision processes,
we find significant relationships between these cognitive characteristics and both the eco-
nomic choices and beliefs we observe in our economic context.
The second chapter is motivated by the first one since we test the possibility to help
agents in investing in their activity. We achieve this goal providing two types of informa-
tion: reminding the availability of the activity and providing information about their actual
performance. Moreover, we extend the model based on overconfidence incorporating two
viii
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elements which are likely to affect behavior on our context: limited attention and mental
accounting. To test our predictions we conduct a field experiment where randomized groups
of users are assigned respectively to an informational treatment (i.e. they receive reminders
and feedbacks) and to the control treatment (i.e. they do not receive any information as
regular users in the gymnasium).
The first contribution of this work is to show the positive and significant effect of re-
minders on the number of visits. In particular, we show two effects: first, an aggregate effect
on monthly visits which increase by 11% on average and 25% if we consider the group of
users which was displaying the lower monthly attendance before the start of the treatment;
second, we quantify the immediate effect of reminders, showing that the probability of ob-
serving a visit in the 24 hours after receiving the reminder increases by 8 percentage points.
The result on the aggregate attendance is important since it is comparable in size with the
ones obtained in other studies where monetary incentives to exercise have been provided.
Moreover, we show that when users also look at the content of feedbacks, they tend to
perform even better than with reminders only.
The second main contribution of this work is to highlight the relevance of inattention
and mental accounting in influencing economic behavior. We show that reminders are able
to induce higher attendance because they make consumers more attentive. Moreover, we
highlight that their effect is non constant over the month and in particular it becomes very
small when the account (defined as the difference between the price paid by the user and one
associate the best alternative in the menu) switches from red to black. These two elements
are not novel in the literature (especially in psychology) but our study can be considered
one of the first to provide a robust evidence in support of their importance in economics.
In the third chapter we investigate the relationship between both cognitive skills and
personality traits and two fundamental elements of the preferences of individuals: the risk
attitude and the degree of impatience. The methodology we follow consists in setting a
controlled environment, an online experiment, where participants have to make economic
choices. We employ a standard laboratory design for the elicitation of these two economic
parameters so choices are incentive compatible and rewarded through real payments. Par-
ticipants also go through standard tests borrowed from the psychological literature in order
to recover information on cognitive skills and personality.
Our findings confirm what have been highlighted both by the psychological and eco-
nomic literature when more complex outcomes have been considered, such as labor status,
life expectancy, the development of unhealthy habits etc. With respect to cognitive skills,
we confirm the positive association of general IQ measures with the propensity to take
higher level of risk. Moreover, we highlight an interesting relationship between numeracy
skills and risk neutrality. The latter finding, which is strongly significant from a statistical
ix
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point of view, demonstrates what seminal studies in economics have shown in recent years.
Cognitive skills are also associated with a higher preference for delayed, but larger, gratifi-
cations, meaning greater patience. However, this characteristic of individual preferences is
shown too be associated to personality traits and in particular to neurocitism (or emotional
stability), which is the trait defined as the degree to which a person tend to experience an-
griness, anxiety and in general perceives the world as threatening. Consistently with the
psychological literature, we find that economic choices of participants are affected by this
characteristic of their personality in a sizable way.
This study makes also two contributions to the experimental literature. First, we show
that online experiments can be a reliable alternative to laboratory ones, suggesting them
as a valuable option especially when the experimenter needs to overcome the usual lim-
itations of laboratory experiments, in particular the restricted number of participants and
the problem of their homogeneity in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. Second,
we highlight the importance of controlling for certain individual characteristics which are
likely to affect behavior in experiments. In particular, we focus on the impulsivity of par-
ticipants in performing their task, since it can be the cause of frequently observed paths in
behavior which are otherwise difficult to explain and produce noise in the data.
The fourth chapter investigates the effect of different incentive schemes on schooling
achievement hence making a bridge between the literature in personnel economics on in-
centives and the growing economic literature on education. We run a field experiment in
an undergraduate class at the University of Bologna assigning randomly students to incen-
tive schemes which differ in terms of how they reward the academic performance. Three
schemes are considered: a tournament one that fosters competition between coupled stu-
dents, a baseline scheme such that each student is rewarded on the basis of his own per-
formance and a cooperative scheme which incentivizes, through joint rewarding, students
to cooperate. These schemes are also analyzed in a formal model and we compare the
theoretical predictions with the actual data coming from the experiment.
Consistently with the model, we find that the effort exerted by students in the compet-
itive scheme proves to be higher than in the other two treatments. However, also a strong
gender effect emerges and we show that the effect of competition is entirely driven by male
students while female do not display any significant difference across schemes. Finally, the
size of the effect we induced in the competitive treatment is comparable with the recent
studies which incentivized schooling performance through monetary incentives.
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Chapter 1
Stable naive and math sophisticated,
a detailed field study on
overconfidence
abstract
Evidence suggests that people experience self control problems and a large body of theoret-
ical literature has modeled overconfidence on future behaviour. To assess empirically these
models we analyze data on contractual choices and attendance to a gymnasium and perform
experiments on the same population. The rational choice model is rejected as a comprehen-
sive explanation of observed behaviour while a clear field evidence of users with optimistic
beliefs on future behaviour emerges in the data. Following the categorization proposed in
the literature on self control, we find that the population is mostly divided between naive
and rational users, while sophisticated users are a small minority. We analyze the role of
experience in changing behaviour and beliefs of users and we find that it plays a little role
in improving expectations on future behaviour and optimality of choices. Finally, we run
some standard tests to elicit cognitive and non cognitive traits on the same users and we find
that naive users perform poorly in the cognitive test designed to measure numeracy skills.
Moreover, the data show a significant positive relation between an important personality
trait, conscientiousness, and the ability to stick to plans.
JEL codes: D12, D81, D91
Keywords: overconfidence, empirical analysis, experience, cognitive skills
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1.1 Introduction
In many environments agents experience difficulties to stick to planned decisions. More-
over, when they have to choose between different plans of consumption, evidence shows
that very often the expense is not minimized when compared to some available alternatives.
Examples of this finding are reported in Heidhues and Köszegi (2010), Grubb (2009) and
Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) who bring evidence respectively on the credit card
market, the telephone market and the sport industry. Together with the accumulation of ev-
idence a number of models on overconfidence and self control have been proposed such as
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), and to derive predictions
for the market outcome, as in Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004). So far the literature has
been very active in proposing models to rationalize this behaviour but clear field evidence
on the presence of self control problems is still limited. The aim of our work is to fill this
gap.
As in the case of Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) (hereafter DVM) we focus on the
sport industry and we analyze data provided by a gymnasium of the University of Bologna.
This market is generally characterized by a simple contract schedule: users can exercise
buying a ticket for each visit (i.e. pay as you go) or they can pay in advance a fee that allows
them to attend at zero cost until the expiration date (i.e. flat contracts). Despite the simple
contract options available, this environment is rich enough to make the economic problem
of choice interesting since users must plan in advance their future activity and coherently
select their contract. The data we analyze encompass the whole list of contracts bought
by 1500 users from January 2008 to August 2010 and the visits to the gym for the entire
period. We complement the data on contractual choice and attendance with information on
preferences, beliefs, cognitive abilities, personality traits and demographics for a relevant
subsample of the population under analysis. To gather these information users participated
in payed experiments and filled a detailed survey. Since users are students, we have also
access to information on academic background and performance.
Our environment, as those cited above, is characterized by a relevant share of users
incurring in high costs for exercising. This means that, given their ex post attendance, the
price payed is greater than under some available alternatives. In particular, as in DVM,
users buy too frequently flat contracts and then attend too few with respect to the number
of visits that makes this type of contract less costly than attending the gym on a pay as you
go basis.
This finding is compatible with many models of choice. The first candidate we must
consider is the model of rational choice among contracts with correct beliefs on future at-
tendance where a high cost for exercising is determined by unexpected shocks which affect
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users at random. In other words, agents form correct expectations on future attendance
taking into account the relevant factors that will affect it and coherently select the contract
that minimizes the total expense. Whenever the ex post attendance is not coherent with the
choice, this is due to unforeseeable contingencies. We label agents who behave accordingly
to this model as rational users. The leading alternative explanation has been proposed by
the literature on self control and assumes that users are characterized by self control costs
that arise at the moment of exercising. So far however, we still miss a field study that clar-
ifies whether users are aware of their self control problems, i.e. they are sophisticated, and
choose flat contracts even if they are able to forecast their future number of visits (to buy a
contract that fosters attendance and so allows to reach a desired level of monthly visits) or
if they are naive in the sense that contractual choices are simply based on a wrong belief.
We begin our empirical analysis verifying whether the population of users we observe
is composed entirely by rational users. To address this point we exploit information on
elements that affect the every day decision to exercise such as the distance from home to
the gym and predictable future weather conditions like the temperature. Rational agents
that form a correct expectation on future attendance should anticipate these elements at the
moment of signing the contract and sort consistently in the menu of contracts. From an
ex-ante perspective, users should be less likely to sign flat contracts when predictable costs
are high, due to lower expected attendance, and no systematic relation should emerge ex-
post between these costs and the probability that the contract chosen by the users results to
be more expensive than some alternative. Contrary to the prediction of the rational sorting
model, we find both a positive relation between distance and the probability of signing
flat contracts and a strongly significant positive relation between predictable costs and the
probability of incurring in high costs for exercising.
Once discarded the rational choice model as a comprehensive explanation for the ob-
served behaviour, we identify the different types of users in the population using data on
expectations about future attendance and the contractual choices they make. A crucial point
of the self control model in case of naivete is the presence of wrong beliefs. On one side,
naive users are too optimistic about future attendance and select contracts that imply a high
number of visits. On the other side, rational and sophisticated users are able to forecast
future attendance and their contractual choices respond to different aims. Rational users
do not suffer any self control cost. Sophisticated users buy contracts that foster attendance
even if they are incurring in high costs for exercising (to overcome self control issues).
The data show that a large share of users are too optimistic about their future behaviour.
Comparing expectations with actual attendance, we see that the size of the forecast error
is positive and amount roughly to 30% of the expected number of visits. This means that
on average a user who expects to visit the gym ten times in a month actually attends seven
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times. Combining the information on expectations with the contractual choice we identify
to which group a user belongs to. The population is mainly composed by naive and rational
users, while sophisticated users are a small minority. This result improves the analysis of
DMV who illustrate that their evidence is compatible with an heterogeneous population of
users but do not characterize the groups of users and their relative size.
We also test whether other explanations are compatible with observed behaviour. In
particular we consider the pressure of the staff to select flat contracts and the role of risk
aversion. We find that only the former has some importance. Users who declare to ask for
suggestions from the staff then select flat contracts. However, this holds only for users at
the very first experience and they account for a very small fraction of the whole population
of users. With respect to risk aversion, the reason for selecting flat contracts would rely on
the fact that they imply no variance in the cost of exercising while the pay as you go system
can be ex post much more expensive. However, we do not find any empirical support for
this claim.
Having determined the composition of the population, we address the role of expe-
rience. Do expectations improve with the accumulation of experience? Do naive users
become sophisticated? We find that experience plays very little role. Beliefs on future
attendance do not improve significantly with experience and users who are paying a high
price for exercising at a certain point in time are likely to do so later. This completes our
picture. The vast majority of naive users we find in the data are not inexperienced users who
after the first spell either quit or become sophisticated, but reflects instead the presence of
stable types in the population. This finding is in line with Agravwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and
Laisbon (2008) who analyze the learning process in the credit card market. Moreover, our
claim is strengthened by a result on the perception of past attendance. We find that users
who are too optimistic about the future display a significant positive bias in the evaluation
of past performance.
We conclude analyzing the relationship between types of users previously determined
and both cognitive abilities and personality traits. Here we try to answer the following ques-
tions. Who are the naive users? What are their characteristics, cognitive and personality
traits? We rely on standard tests and questions taken from the psychological literature and
employed in economic studies such as in Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010). We
find that rational and sophisticated users are characterized by higher cognitive skills, in par-
ticular those related to numeracy. This is in line with Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006)
and the literature on the role of cognitive abilities in determining economic outcomes. With
respect to personality traits, we find that users who are overconfident on future behaviour
have also a lower score in the personality trait which is related with the degree to which a
person is able to stick to plans, namely conscientiousness. This finding contributes to the
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literature on the role of cognitive abilities and personality traits in determining economic
outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 1.2 we propose a simple model of self
control and we derive implications on rational sorting in our context. In section 1.3 the
data are present and we describe the activities we have designed to elicit preferences and
expectations. In section 1.4 is it performed the first part of the empirical analysis, testing the
rational sorting model and identifying types of users. In section 1.5 we discuss the stability
of types over time and the effect of experience on behaviour and beliefs. In section 1.6 we
relate types with both cognitive and personality traits. We conclude in section 1.7 where we
highlight the main results, the implications and possible improvements.
1.2 A simple Model
An user is willing to enter a subscription market where she can repeatedly buy an investment
good which, at any consumption, involves an immediate non-monetary cost c and a delayed
benefit b. For example, exercising in a gym, the user pays upfront the cost of going to the
gym and the physical cost for exercising, whilst the benefit of better health and strength
are postponed. Similarly, the decision to quit smoking, change alimentary habits toward
a more healthy diet or save according to a specific plan can be considered examples of
investment goods. For the sake of concreteness, in the sequel we will refer to consumption
as exercising in a gym.
As it is often the case, the user can choose from a menu of alternative payment schemes
or contracts with different properties. A flat contract of length x contemplates a fixed fee Lx
to be paid upfront and then the user can exercise at any time for the next x periods with no
additional costs. A pay-per-visit (PPV) contract involves no fix fee but requires the payment
of a price p at any consumption date. Finally, a carnet for x consumptions contemplates an
upfront payment of Cx and allows to exercise for x times with no additional price, at any
future date. The last contract option is not present in DVM who study an environment
where only the first two contracts are available. In our case instead this contract must be
considered since the gym provides it in the menu.
To simplify exposition we make the following assumptions. At date t = 0 the user
decides whether to buy a contract that requires an upfront payment. At any future date
t ∈ {1, 2} she decides whether to consume or not and at the beginning of period t she
learns the realization of the stochastic cost c ∈ {c, c}, with γ and 1 − γ being respectively
the probability of c and c. At the end of period t she obtains the (delayed) benefit b. The
user knows about the presence of future costs of exercising and realizations of cost are IID
across periods. Being δ the discount factor, the decision of whether consuming or not at
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any t is taken considering the net present value of consumption −c + δb − p where c is
the observed realization of the cost of date t and p is the monetary cost of the visit, which
is zero with a flat contract or a carnet and it is instead p with a PPV. To make the analysis
interesting we assume that that:
−c+ δb > 0 > −c+ δb− p and − c+ δb− p > 0 (1.1)
so that, when the realized cost is low, the user consumes independently of the contract
chosen at t = 0 and, when instead the cost realization is high, she only consumes when she
has signed in t = 0 either a flat contract or a carnet.
The contract choice in t = 0 is a bit more complicate since the user has to anticipate
her future attendance in the gym. Since there are only two periods of possible consumption
here we consider only a flat contract that lasts 2 periods (i.e. x = 2) and a carnet with
1 period of consumption available. In this case where only two consumption periods are
available the difference between a PPV and a carnet is given by the fact that the latter is
paid upfront while the former only at the moment of exercising.
Equation (1.2) expresses the condition under which a user prefers a flat contract with
respect to the PPV. In this case L2 must be lower than the expected payment under the pay
as you go plus the value of the extra-visit that the flat contract induces in case of high cost:
L2
δ(1 + δ)
< pγ + (1− γ)(−c+ δb) (1.2)
Using the fact that (δb− c) < p the following result holds:
Result 1 Given assumption (1.1) the choice of the user is such that if the flat contract is
preferred to using a PPV then:
L2
δ(1 + δ)
< p (1.3)
An user who chooses the flat contract expects to attend a number of times such that the cost
of a single visit (the l.h.s. in (1.3)) is lower than the cost under the pay as you go.
Another useful comparison is between the carnet and the PPV. In this case we have that
the former is preferred to the latter if the following condition holds:
C1
δ
< pγ + (1− γ)(−c+ δb) (1.4)
Exploiting again the condition (δb− c) < p then the following result holds:
Result 2 Given assumption (1.1) the choice of the user is such that if the carnet is preferred
to using a PPV then:
C1
δ
< p (1.5)
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Also in this case the actual cost of the visits with the carnet (the l.h.s. in (1.5)) must be at a
lower price with respect to the single entrance with the pay as you go1.
The last comparison is between a flat contract spanning two periods and a carnet fol-
lowed by a PPV. Following the same reasoning as above:
Result 3 Given assumption (1.1) if the flat contract is preferred to using a carnet, plus
possibly a PPV then:
L2 − C1
δ2
< p (1.6)
Equation (1.6) shows that the flat contract is preferred to the carnet when the price differ-
ence is lower with respect to the price to attend implied by the carnet in the second period2.
Self control costs. So far we have assumed that the user consistently evaluates at any
date t the net benefit of consumption of any future date. The economic and psychology
literature has illustrated both empirically and theoretically that this may not be the case. In
particular, here we are interested in introducing the possibility that although at date t = 0
the benefit of consumption at any future date t > 0 is [−E(c) + δb]δt (net of any price she
may have to pay at date t depending on the chosen contract), when the consumer reaches
date t she realizes that the actual benefit is lower and equal to −E(c) + δb− k where k is a
non negative scalar. A first possible interpretation of k is that the discount rate of the close
future is higher than the discount rate of the distant future, as it has been emphasized by the
literature on hyperbolic discounting. In particular, we may have that at t the actual value of
the benefit that accrues at the end of the period is not δb but βδb so that k = (1 − β)δb.
Alternatively, the literature on temptation has pointed out that in many real situations users
assign different utility to the same consumption bundle depending on the state in which the
evaluation takes place. In our simple environment, when reaching date t the consumer may
realize that she can opt for a previously unforeseen and tempting alternative to consumption
(i.e. watching the TV instead of exercising at the gym) with value k (so that exercising will
be undertaken only if better than watching the TV, i.e. −E(c) + δb > k). Users who
completely ignore the fact that they will face this additional cost k for consumption at the
1It is worthy to notice that the carnet is also characterized by flexibility. Consider the decision to attend in
t = 1when the cost is known. Here the user can exploit the possibility to postpone the entrance in the following
period when the realization of cost c is high. The payoffs are the following: −c+ δb+ δγ(−c− p+ δb) if she
uses the carnet in t = 1 and buys the PPV in the second period while δ[γ(−c+ δb)+ (1− γ)(−c+ δb)] is the
payoff in case of not going and preserve the carnet for the next period. Comparing the two payoffs, it is easy
to see that the user is better off not going to the gym in t = 1 when she observes high costs to exercise. The
reason for this derives from the fact that in t = 2 the user will face low costs of attendance with probability γ
and this makes the expected utility of exercising in the following period higher with respect to do it in t = 1.
2Conversely, if the discount in the first period entrance provided by the carnet is high enough, then the user
is better off choosing this option and then paying the single entrance ticket in t = 2.
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date of consumption have been indicated in the literature as naive (e.g. see O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 2001, or Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006). Those instead who are able to recognize at
date t = 0 that they will face an additional cost kˆ < k are partially naive and finally those
with a kˆ = k fully anticipate this future issue and have been indicated as sophisticated
users.
To make the analysis interesting, we will assume in the following that:
−c+ δb− k < 0 < −c+ δb− k (1.7)
In this case a naive user may choose the flat contract anticipating an optimistic high atten-
dance. This is because she expects to exercise both with low and high cost c but, due to k,
only low costs will induce a visit to the gym. This user would be better off by consuming
with a PPV only when the cost realization is low if the following condition on costs and
benefit is satisfied:
−c+ δb− p− k > 0 (1.8)
When instead (1.8) is reversed, then a user is not willing to attend when she has to pay
the price p at the moment of exercising. In this case a sophisticated user in t = 0 foresees
her problem of self control and consciously buys a flat contract or a carnet to commit to
attend in t = 1 or t = 2, at least when the cost realization is c. This may determine,
depending on the cost realizations in the two periods, a higher per visit cost with respect to
the PPV which is, however, expected by sophisticated users.
Foreseeable costs and contract choice. We proceed examining in more details the
role of costs in determining the choice in the menu and the subsequent observed price per
visit. Suppose users are heterogeneous in some additional dimension of costs. One example
can be their location in the neighborhood of the gym, determining different costs to attend
due to different distances to reach the facility (we refer to distance as d).
In a population of rational users the effect of distance on choice is to decrease the share
of users willing to buy flat contracts with respect to PPV. This is due to the reduction in the
number of expected visits which makes the PPV more convenient.
However, this relation may be reversed when naive and sophisticated users are present
in the population. Consider first the case of naive users. When distance is such that:
−c− d+ δb− k < 0 < −c− d+ δb− k and − c− d+ δb− p− k > 0 (1.9)
then users who choose the PPV attend ex-post. However, when the distance increases
enough to determine the following condition:
−c− d+ δb− k < 0 < −c− d+ δb− k and − c− d+ δb− p− k < 0 (1.10)
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then naive users who think ex-ante to attend with PPV do not show up in the gym ex-post.
This means, in terms of observed choice and per visit price, observing a negative relation
between distance and the share of PPV sold by the gym and at the same time a positive
relation between price per visit and distance due to the low ex-post attendance of naive
users who purchased flat contracts.
In the same way, under (1.10), sophisticated users who realize that the flat contract is
the only way to commit to exercise, will not buy PPV when the distance is too large and
attend ex-post at a high per visit price. These observations lead to the following testable
implication:
Result 4 In a population of rational users, a negative relation between distance and the
proportion of flat contract must emerge. On the contrary, when users with self control costs
are present in the population, the share of PPV may decrease. Ex-post, since naive and
sophisticated users are observed only when they purchase flat contract, a positive relation
between distance and high per-visit cost should emerge.
Summarizing, the starting point of our empirical investigation is twofold. First, we
discuss how choice is affected by foreseeable costs. Second, we test how these costs affect
the ex-post price to attend. The prediction of the choice model we derived says that choices
made by a population of rational users are characterized by a negative relation between
elements affecting the cost of attending the gym and the share of flat contract signed with
respect to PPV. On the contrary, in a heterogeneous population of users, this relation may
be reversed. At the same time, in the latter case, we expect to find a positive relation
between these underestimated cost factors and a high per visit price for attending evaluated
considering the ex-post attendance. On the contrary, under the rational model, a systematic
relation of this kind should not emerge. A high per visit cost to attend, labeled for simplicity
“loss”, derives from Results 1, Result 2 and Result 3 stated above. Hence, to compute this
loss associated to a contract, we compare the observed price to attend with the price implied
by the alternative as the predictions of the choice models suggest.
1.3 Data
Data come from the records of a gymnasium owned by a sport association for university
students in Bologna (Italy). This gym is not strictly reserved to students but they are the
vast majority of costumers since the association has the objective to promote sport activities
among university students. Our analysis focuses on this subsample. In general, fees are
30% lower with respect to non student gyms but are still relevant for a student. Indeed, the
typical monthly disposable income of a student is around 200 euro net of the cost of board
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and lodging3 so the cost of the monthly contract amounts to 22% of this budget.
Our dataset ranges from January 2008 to July 2010. Overall, we have information on
all the contracts signed and on the sport activity of 2330 users attending the gym in this
time span. However, the empirical analysis is performed on a subsample of the whole pop-
ulation exercising in the gym. In particular, we exclude: users for whom it was not possible
to recover the distance between the gym and their home4; users who bought contracts for
specific courses since they are not suitable for computing a loss (see note 5); those who
lost the electronic key and have some periods of unrecorded attendance. We end up with a
sample of contractual choices made by 1535 users. Moreover, since the data on attendance
are available from January 2008 but contractual choices have been recorded since Septem-
ber 2007, the analysis of contractual choice is performed on a slightly larger sample which
includes also these contracts. For a summary of the variables employed in the whole section
see appendix 1.8.
The menu of contracts. The gym offers a menu of contracts with single tickets, a set of
flat contracts with different durations and two carnet of single tickets5. Flat contracts last
for: one, two three, six months (available only in 2008) and there is a contract that lasts
for the entire academic year (from 1st of September to 31th of July). A last flat contract
available in the menu is the “1 euro per day promotion” which gives the right to access
the gym from the date of sign to 31st of July at a price of 1 euro per day6. In 2009 this
option was available only in summer months (from June to July 2009) while in the 2010
from November onward. Table 1.1 reports the prices of the different contracts for year
2010, together with the volume sold and the relative frequency (in the whole sample) and
the average number of monthly visits attended by users.
After the expiration of any contract there is no automatic renewal. This makes our
environment different from the one in DVM where monthly contracts are renewed automat-
ically. The most important difference is that upon expiration users can adjust their contract
on future expected consumption since they must explicitly choose a new contract.
Attendance. Each user has an electronic key to access the gym. To get in, the user must
3This figure is obtained through a survey filled by the students in the gym. More information in the appendix.
4The number of cases is limited and it amounts to less than 4% of the population.
5The actual menu is richer, with contracts for specific courses (like yoga, spinning, gymnastic for injured
persons, karate etc.) and some promotions. In the former case only one option is available so we cannot use
these contracts to evaluate the optimality of observed choices. Promotions will be instead used.
6As an example, if a user signs the contract the 3rd of June, then the cost is 59 euro (28 days in June and 31
in July).
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Table 1.1: Attendance by contract category and prices (year 2010)
Type of contract Price (C) No. Rel. freq. Mean visits Conf. int.
(monthly)
Single entrance 6,00 548 8.8% – –
Carnet (10 visits) 50,00
184 3.0% 1.67 [1.49,1.84]
Carnet (20 visits) 90,00
One month 45,00 3918 63.1% 7.88 [7.73,8.02]
Two months 85,00 308 5.0% 7.30 [6.79,7.82]
Three months 118,00 518 8.3% 6.61 [6.26,6.97]
Academic flat 270,00 58 0.9% 6.74 [5.75,7.74]
Flat 1 euro promotion – 281 4.5% 6.65 [6.19,7.10]
Specific contracts – 384 6.2% 5.47 [5.07,5.87]
a. Pooled average attendance of carnet is reported.
b. Price of promotions depend on the moment of signing.
c. Specific contracts have different prices.
plug the key in an electronic device and a member of the staff at the reception regularly
monitors the output on the screen of a computer7. Those who decide to buy a single visit
ticket have to provide to the receptionist the university badge and pay cash.
Average attendance for each contract category is reported in table 1.1 which shows that
the attendance is higher with flat contracts than with carnet and among flat contracts it
decreases with contract length.
Other variables. One key variable that we will use is the distance between the gym and
the user’s home. To recover this measure we employed an application provided by Google
Maps which computes the linear distance between two addresses. As table 1.13 shows,
90% of the users is less than 3km far from the gym
Information on weather conditions are provided by the regional authority for environ-
mental monitoring, which collects hourly data on precipitation and temperature.
Information on academic history of users is provided by the University of Bologna.
Anonymous data include the school, the list of passed exams with their standardized grades8
7The monitoring of the entrance is in the interest of the owners of the gym. In our case the facility is
not directly managed by the university association because a private shareholder of the facility is in charge of
managing it.
8More precisely, we have information on the mean grade and the standard deviation of grades (up to four
years) for each exam undertaken by the users in our sample. With such information we can compute the
performance as a relative measure taking the standard ratio marki,j−µj
σj
where marki,j is the mark of agent i
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and the date at which the exam has been undertaken. From this data we construct two
variables: the average standardized mark of the user in her academic carrier and an index
that accounts for the timing of the exams. The latter measure is particularly interesting
because it tells how an user is able to stick to his academic commitment. In the Italian
university system a student can postpone or retake an exam and only the passed exams are
recorded. Finally, for each academic year, whether an user receives financial aid from the
university. The provision of financial aid is granted on a wealth basis conditional on a given
average mark and the amount of the grant varies from a small reduction of the tuition fees
to the complete exemption or to a subsidy for studying. The information we have is related
to the aid provided for the economic status of the user.
Experimental data. To collect information on preferences, expectations and traits, we
implemented some web based activities that have been administered among the users of
the gym in 2009 and 2010. These activities include: a general survey on sport activity,
a test focused on cognitive and personality traits, an online experiments on risk and time
preferences. Users have been paid for participation from 5 up to 85 euro (see the appendix
for more details). The number of users who participated is 405 (65% of the typical active
cohort in the gym)9.
Through the survey on sport activity we gather information on elements that influence
contractual choice and attendance. Among other questions we ask about i) the motivations
for exercising; ii) the perception of the past performance; iii) the expectation on future
attendance; iv) the perceived characteristics of the contract options available in the menu.
The survey also includes some questions on socio demographic characteristics. We asked
for example about the monthly budget, if the user is working and in case of positive answer,
the type of job.
Measures on cognitive and non-cognitive traits are obtained through standardized test
and questions. We employ a symbolic test as the one performed by Lang, Weiss, Stocker,
and Rosenbladt (2007) to have a measure of computational speed (which is known to be
strongly correlated with IQ). To evaluate the skills of users in doing calculations we also ask
them to answer a set of questions designed for this purpose (see the appendix for details).
Measures of non-cognitive traits are obtained through a set of standard questions. We
in the course j and µj , σj are the mean and standard deviation of marks in course j. In the Italian system a
student is supposed to collect 60 academic credits per year and each exam has an associated number of credits.
If a student is not aligned with this schedule then every year the number of credits earned is lower than 60.
9The technology we adopted for the online implementation of these activities is php/MySQL. In the inter-
active sections (symbolic digit test and risk and time experiments) we have designed a dynamic interface in
Javascript.
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follow the literature in psychology and rely on self-reported traits (for a discussion of the
pros and cons of this approach see Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and Bas 2008). We
employ the same battery of questions of Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010) which
are taken from the German panel survey SOEP (for more on this see Heineck and Anger
2008). The traits we are interested in belong to the “big five” personality traits list defined
in the psychological literature: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness
and neuroticism (or emotional stability). In general, each trait is elicited through different
questions (each one is associated with a facet) which are combined in order to get an ag-
gregate measure. Since exercising, and in particular being consistent with plans, is mostly
related with conscientiousness, we focus more on that trait. Conscientiousness is defined
as the degree to which a person is willing to comply with conventional rules, norms and
standards. The main facets of this trait are: competence, order, dutifulness, achievement
striving and self discipline. Emotional stability is another trait we are interested in and it
is defined as the degree to which a person experience world as threatening and beyond her
control. To have a measure of it, other than standard question, we also run a test developed
by Frederick (2005) to measure impulsivity. We look also at two other traits: the internal
and the external locus of control. With the former we identify people who believe that that
the outcome they experience is determined by their own skills and behaviour. With the lat-
ter, we identify people who believe that outcomes are mostly affected by external elements
beyond their control.
We employ a web version of two standard laboratory experiments on risk and time
preference. The experimental design we follow is similar to Holt and Laury (2002) where
subjects must fill the rows of some tables where different payments are proposed (see the
appendix for more details). In the experiment on the risk preference, subjects face two tables
with 10 rows each. Each row is made by a couple of alternative payments: option A and
option B. The former is an amount of money that is granted for sure (e.g. 20 euro); whereas
the latter is a lottery that have a small prize (e.g. 5 euro) and big prize (e.g. 35). The two
payments of option B are granted with a probability 1/2. All the rows are displayed from the
beginning of the stage and the sequence is such that option B remains constant while option
A becomes at each row (moving downward) less attractive since it is reduced at each step by
a fixed amount. In the case of time preferences, the rows present to the user two payments:
a smaller amount of money in 2 days versus a larger one in a later date (e.g. 10 euro in 2
days versus 20 euro in 15 days). In order to achieve saliency, we pay subjects accordingly
to their choices. To do this, at the end of the experiment one of the rows filled by the subject
is chosen at random and the choice made in this row becomes the actual payment10 Finally,
10Online experiments have proved to be comparable with laboratory ones. However, in online experiments
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we address the issue of transaction costs which can be relevant in the time experiment. To
overcome this problem, participants are paid electronically with telephone credit in order to
eliminate transaction costs11.
In order to be sure that subjects have understood the instructions before starting, the
experiment requires first to complete a brief tutorial, with no associated payment. In the
tutorial subjects fill a demonstrative table and a simulation of the final payment draw is
performed. Moreover, we administer some questions are administered at the end of the
tutorial and users cannot start the payed stages until the answers are all correct. One user
out of five is actually paid at random (for more information on this experiment see Nardotto
2011a).
1.4 Empirical analysis
Contract choices and observable costs. Our analysis on contract choice and costs is fo-
cused on the role of distance in determining contractual choices made by users. We divide
the contracts into three categories: PPV, carnet and flat contracts, where the last category
contemplates all flat contracts of different durations. Computing at increasing distances the
frequencies of contracts purchased, we find a diminishing path for the share of PPV. In
particular, within the 2km circle, they amount to 12% of the contracts while carnet and flat
contracts are respectively 3% and 85% of the sales. Outside the 2km circle, the fraction of
PPV falls to 7%, mainly in favour of flat contracts.
To test this negative relation, we estimate a multinomial logit model where the depen-
dent variable is the category of contract. Results of the estimations are reported in table 1.2.
The table is divided in two panels. The left one reports the estimation of the multinomial
logit model with the three categories defined above while in the right part we report the es-
timated coefficient of a logit model where carnet and flat contracts are in the same category
(opposed to PPV). All regressions have the observed contractual choice as the dependent
variables so the estimation is performed clustering at the user level, since a user signs in
general more than one contract. Contractual choice is explained by the following variables:
the distance from home to the gym and the distance squared, demographic characteristics
we observe a shorter answering time and more noise. A comparative study on this issue is Anderhub, Müller,
and Schmidt (2001).
11Subject have been informed about the nature of the payment in the instructions. When the experiment took
place, the vast majority of consumers in the mobile telephone market in Italy has a pay as you go contract so our
payment is very likely to be valuable for our subject pool. Moreover, those who could not receive the payment
had the possibility to contact the experimenter and ask for a different type of payment. Nobody however did
use this option.
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such as gender, age, a proxy for budget constraint given by the dummy for receiving finan-
cial aid from the university, a dummy that takes value 1 if the contract is the first contract
bought by the agent, the experience maturated in the gym measured by the number of days
spanned by previous contracts and finally the mean temperature experienced during the
contract (and its square).
Table 1.2: Multinomial logit on contractual choice
Baseline outcome: flat contract
Dep. var: probability to purchase:
PPV Carnet PPV
Whole Excluding Whole Excluding Whole Excluding
sample 1st contract sample 1st contract sample 1st contract
Gender -.459∗∗ -.475∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗ -1.46∗∗∗ -.43∗∗ -.43∗∗
(.195) (.216) (.291) (.401) (.193) (.214)
Age -.063 -.065 -.011 .004 -.063 -.065
(.040) (.044) (.053) (.072) (.04) (.044)
Distance .782∗∗∗ .614∗∗ -.085 .122 .785∗∗∗ .611∗∗
(.291) (.313) (.192) (.26) (.29) (.312)
Distance2 -.247∗∗∗ -.221∗∗∗ .015 -.037 -.248∗∗∗ -.22∗∗∗
(.076) (.081) (.034) (.05) (.076) (.081)
Mean temp -.336∗∗∗ -.322∗∗∗ -.014 -.061 -.333∗∗∗ -.339∗∗∗
(.035) (.039) (.06) (.061) (.035) (.039)
Mean temp2 .012∗∗∗ .011∗∗∗ -.0013 .0002 .012∗∗∗ .011∗∗∗
(.0011) (.0013) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
Exper. days .0004 .0003 .0007 .0008 .0004 .0003
(.0005) (.0006) (.0008) (.0008) (.0005) (.0006)
First contr. -.812∗∗∗ .29 -.823∗∗∗
(.156) (.156)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 5708 4213 5708 4213 5708 4213
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.074 0.079 0.74 0.087 0.072
We analyze first the estimation of the multinomial logit in the left panel. This is divided
in two parts, where the first is on the choice between flat contracts and PPV (first and second
column) and the second is on the choice between flat contracts and carnet (third and fourth
column). In the first column of each couple we report the estimates of the regression on
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the full sample of contracts while in the second we restrict the sample excluding the first
contract bought by the user.
We start the discussion highlighting the difference between the first two columns, and
the second couple of columns. Most of the coefficient in the latter case are not signifi-
cantly different from zero meaning that users are not influenced by these variables in their
choice between flat and carnet. Analyzing the choice between flat and PPV, two variables
are worth noting before concentrating to the ones of interest. The gender variable has a
significant negative effect on contract choice, meaning a negative association between the
likelihood of buying a flat contract and being female. Hence, women are more likely to opt
for PPV and carnet than men. Moreover, the dummy for the first contract is also highly
significant meaning that at their first choice users are more likely to opt for a flat contract .
Moving to our main variable of interest, the distance, we find that a quadratic relation
best fit the data. The minimum of this function, depending on the estimation, ranges from
1.4km to 1.6km which is inside the spectrum of distances we have in our sample (from 0 to
8km). The interpretation for this quadratic relation is given by the two effects highlighted
discussing the model. Starting from the close nearby of the gym, as distance increases more
rational users are less willing to buy flat contracts and their share declines with respect to
PPV. At the same time, the effect on choices determined by naive and sophisticated users
is not strong enough to invert this trend. It is only after the threshold we identify that the
second effect dominates and the share of flat contracts increases. As we discussed in section
1.2, at this point we cannot distinguish between the flat contracts bought by sophisticated
users (to have a commitment to attend) and the missing PPV of naive users who plan to
attend ex-ante and do not show up ex-post. Since the carnet choice between carnet and flat
contract is not affected by this factor, we aggregate the two categories and we estimate a
logit model, reported in the right panel of the table. Coefficient are stable across samples
and models so we compute the effect of distance using the logit estimates. We find that the
change in the probability of opting for the PPV contract with respect to the flat is negative
and equal to -1.6% at the the third kilometer (estimation of the full sample) and it reduces
to -1.4% using the restricted sample12.
Ex-post price per visit and cost factors. The findings obtained so far have to be matched
with the ex-post performance in the gym, so we discuss now the role of foreseeable costs
in determining the actual per visit price payed by users to attend. The first point we must
12The computation is made on a male subject, with average age at the average temperature, studying engi-
neering (most common choice) and not receiving financial aid. The same parameters in the case of a female
user leads to higher estimated effects, slightly above 2% in absolute value.
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address however, is the presence of incorrect choices.
In section 1.2 we have derived predictions on contract choice and we have defined the
concept of loss in our context. To evaluate contractual choices, we compute the cost of
attending under all contracts available in the menu (given observed attendance) and we
compare them with the actual expense. More precisely, we compute the difference between
the best alternative and the actual expense and we divide it by the latter. We multiply this
measure by one hundred to have a percentage measure of the sub-optimality of observed
choice. For the sake of brevity in the following we label it as the loss associated to the
contract.
Table 1.3 reports the fraction of contracts which end up with a loss and the size of
that loss. A relevant number of contracts is characterized by losses and the average loss
Table 1.3: Summary statistics on losses by contract type
Type of contract Fraction of loss (%) Size of loss (%)
Carnet 41.3 37.47
One month 28.2 37.34
Two or three months 46.7 34.64
Academic flat 46.9 41.94
Flat 1 euro promotion 44.5 35.89
Overall 32.8 36.72
amounts to 36.7% of the price of the contract which corresponds to 8% of the average
monthly budget of an average user. Moreover, the vast majority of losses derives from low
actual attendance. In the case of flat contracts this is clearly the only possible source of
losses but it is interesting to notice that is also the case for carnets. Users incurring in a loss
with this type of contract are, in 92% of the cases, attending too few, making the pay as you
go a cheaper contract.
Possible explanations for these facts are: i) users do not have self control problems but
a majority of them has faced unexpected shocks affecting sport activity; ii) the population
is heterogeneous and a subgroup of user is overestimating the future number of visits or
is buying flat contracts and carnet to commit to attend, iii) a mix of i) and ii). In the
following we will discuss which of these alternative explanations can be considered the
most consistent with the data.
As pointed out above, a population of users without self control problems must be able
to anticipate correctly future attendance and no systematic relation should exist ex-post
between foreseeable costs and the probability of incurring in a loss. On the other side, in a
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population where agents do have self control problems, both in the case where expectations
are biased (case of naivete) and where expectations are correct (case of sophistication), then
this relation should emerge.
To verify empirically this prediction we estimate a reduced form model for the amount
of the loss implied by the per visit cost of contracts. As stated above, we compute a relative
measure of sub optimality (this is to avoid the spurious effect of having higher losses due
to a higher price of the contract) and this variable ranges from 0 (when the contract has
the lowest per visit cost meaning that the user chose correctly) to 100 that is when the user
buys a contract and never attend, which occurs very rarely in our sample. If we consider
the overall contract sample, out of 7414 contracts only 66 have zero attendance (0.009%
of the cases). Since 67% of the contracts are not sub optimal we have an inflation of zero
observations in our sample and we estimate a left censored tobit model pooling the contracts
and controlling for the characteristics of the users . Given that users typically buy more than
one contract (on average they buy 3 contracts), we run a cluster robust regression (clustering
is made at user level). Letting yk,i be the loss in contract k signed by user i we estimate the
following tobit model:
yk,i = max(0, y
∗
k,i)
where
y∗k,i = Ck,iβ1 + Piβ2 + Skβ3 + εi (1.11)
Vector Ck,i contains the observable characteristics of contracts: a dummy that takes value
1 if the contract is the first in the contractual history of the user, a dummy that takes value
1 if the contract is flat and 0 if it is a carnet and finally the contract length. The vector
Pi contains characteristics of the user like gender, age, distance from the gym, a dummy
for financial aid, academic field of study and indicators of academic performance. Finally,
Sk contains variables related to exogenous conditions as weather (fraction of rain days in
the contract) and mean temperature during the contract. Table 1.4 reports the results of
the estimation. In columns (A) and (B) all contracts are included in the regression and the
inexperience that users have at the very beginning of their contractual history is captured
by the dummy for the first contract. Since this can not be enough to control for the fact that
at the first experience, expectations are not well formed, in columns (C) and (D) we report
the estimates excluding all first contracts13. The first columns of both couples reports the
13Users generally start with a short trial period, given by the possibility to exploit two free entrances, before
being asked to pay to attend. Even if these two entrances are informative about the value of a visit, it can be
argued that it is not enough to understand the issue of implementing a planned activity. Hence, we run both the
regressions taking the first contract as the period where users learn about costs and benefits related to exercise
in the gym.
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marginal effect computed at the mean of the regressor for the uncensored dependent while
the second column of both couples reports the marginal effect on the probability of being
censored and uncensored.
Starting from the characteristics of the contracts, the estimates show that the first con-
tract is associated with higher losses. This is in line with the idea that users at this stage do
not know exactly their willingness to exercise and have difficulties to foresee their future
attendance. As an example, on average, the loss of a three months contract increases by
4,50 euro in absolute term if the user is at her first contract. The length of the contract is
also a determinant of higher losses and can be interpreted as the effect of uncertainty in
forecasting the number of visits in a longer time span. As an example, the effect of 30 more
days on the amount of the expected loss is to increase it by 0.9 percentage points. Interest-
ingly the amount of the loss is not significantly affected by choosing a flat contract meaning
that errors are made also by those who choose a carnet.
Even if the cost of reaching the gym is known at the beginning, distance has a non
negligible influence on the loss. On average a user who is 3 kilometer far from the gym
is experiencing higher losses by 2.7 percentage points with respect to a user who is in
the close nearby of it. This finding is reinforced by a probit estimation we run on the
probability of incurring in a loss. From this regression we see that the effect of an additional
kilometer is to increase the probability of incurring in a loss by 2.4 percentage points.
We also find a significant gender effect with males incurring in lower losses. Students
who receive financial aid tend to incur in lower losses by 2.4 percentage points. Looking
at the academic background dummies we find that some are related to lower losses with
respect to the baseline given by humanities. Users are grouped in the following fields:
humanities (literature, psychology, sociology, foreign languages and law), social science
(political science and economics), mathematical science (engineer, mathematics, physics,
chemistry and biology), medicine and physical education. The last group and students
with a mathematical background are less likely to incur in a loss. The first finding is not
surprising since physical instructors on average have a very high monthly attendance and
coherently choose flat contracts. The second group contains engineers, mathematicians,
physicist and other natural science related fields. This relation may suggest a higher ability
in computing the implicit price of the different options at the moment of choosing the
contract. Being a good student in terms of grades is not affecting the loss while being a
diligent student, which means to meet academic deadlines and to cope with the assigned
workload, is associated to a lower expected loss.
Finally, we observe a strong effect of the variables related to the temperature. More
precisely, higher losses are associated to contracts in the cold season and in the summer.
The polynomial in the mean contract temperature has its minimum at 12.5°C which is the
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Table 1.4: Tobit regression on the percentage loss in the contract
Dep. variable: amount of the percentage loss
(A) (B) (C) (D)
First contract (d) 3.771∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.672) (0.016)
Contract days 0.031∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.007) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)
Flat (d) -1.271 -0.032 -1.307 -0.033
(1.506) (0.038) (1.656) (0.041)
Gender (d) -2.427∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -2.631∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.734) (0.019) (0.916) (0.023)
Age -0.052 -0.001 0.008 0.000
(0.153) (0.004) (0.181) (0.005)
Distance 0.849∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.007) (0.312) (0.008)
Financial aid (d) -1.419∗∗ -0.036∗∗ -1.222 -0.031
(0.715) (0.018) (0.860) (0.022)
Medicine (d) 0.245 0.006 1.056 0.026
(1.193) (0.030) (1.493) (0.037)
Social science (d) 1.446 0.036 0.959 0.024
(1.087) (0.027) (1.321) (0.033)
Mathematical science (d) -1.978∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -1.845∗ -0.046∗
(0.837) (0.021) (1.017) (0.025)
Physical science (d) -7.782∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -6.636∗∗ -0.161∗∗
(2.600) (0.058) (3.271) (0.072)
Grade avg. -0.641 -0.016 -0.846 -0.021
(0.727) (0.018) (0.872) (0.022)
Credits -2.044∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -1.938∗∗ -0.049∗∗
(0.859) (0.022) (0.967) (0.024)
Rel. rain days 3.908 0.099 3.047 0.076
(2.810) (0.071) (3.300) (0.083)
Mean temperature -0.647∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.727∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.005) (0.212) (0.005)
Mean temperature2 0.026∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
N 4337 4337 3149 3149
pseudo R2 .00988 .00988 .00732 .00732
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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average temperature in April in Bologna. Periods of the year with higher and lower mean
temperature are characterized by higher losses. As an example, if we consider a cold month,
like December, when the mean temperature is 4°C, losses increase by 1.8 percentage points.
The same apply for the summer months. In June, when the mean temperature rises to 25°C,
losses increase by 3.7 percentage points. This finding is coherent with the presence of costs
related to exercise which are not fully anticipated by users at the moment of signing the
contract but arise at the moment of going to the gym to exercise. At the same time, the
relative number of rain days is not affecting the expected loss even if we see that it has a
non negligible effect on the number of monthly visits14.
The findings reported on the effect of distance matches the predictions we had on a
heterogeneous population of users. Indeed, we observe that ex-ante this cost factor do
not reduce the likelihood of signing flat contracts and ex-post is associated with losses.
This is not compatible with the predictions of a rational sorting model without self control
problems. Given that, the next step of the analysis is the identification of types of users in
the population.
1.4.1 Identification of types
So far we have shown that the observed behaviour is not compatible with an homogeneous
population of rational users. This is also the final claim of DVM. Given this observation,
we scrutinize the two alternatives proposed by a self control model to rationalize losses.
The question we want to answer to is: besides rational users, are those who incur in losses
naive or sophisticated?
To discriminate among these two possibilities we use the information we gather on
expectations about future attendance. It is known that eliciting expectation is not a trivial
issue and can be subjected to some critiques. In laboratory experiments however, especially
when the elicitation is made in a incentive compatible way, data on expectations are widely
accepted.
14This claim builds on a regression on the monthly attendance of users as a function of the exogenous
conditions. More precisely, we have estimated the following regression by OLS:
monthly attendance = β0+β1mean temperature+β2mean temperature
2+β3rel.raindays+controls
The relative rain days (measured as the fraction of days in the contract with a rain precipitation higher than 2mm
per square meter) in the contract have a positive effect on the number of visits. This is counterintuitive since
costs of attending should increase with rain. A sound explanation for this finding is that alternative occupation,
that represent a temptation for the user, become less attractive when the weather is bad lowering the self control
cost of exercising (for more on this see Nardotto 2011).
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Elicitation of beliefs (in our case concerning the expected attendance) is complicated
because, as we know from experimental economics, expectations cannot be elicited by mak-
ing a payment conditional to actual behavior since this would induce ex-post compliance.
Another difficulty comes from the elicitation technique. This element is critical since the
quality of the measure is sensitive to the way the question is posed to subjects. There is a
vast literature on this issue and we do not discuss it here. Considering all these elements, the
strategy we opted for was to ask different questions in the way suggested by the literature
and then check the consistency of the measures we get (more information on the elicitation
technique is in appendix 1.9.2).
We can rely then on this additional information for the 50% of the population from
2009 to 2010, that is a sample of 351 users15. Given elicited beliefs, we first investigate
the forecast error of users which is defined as the difference between expected and actual
attendance divided by the expected attendance. The average forecast error in the population
is positive and amounts to 30% which means that, on average, a user who expects to visit
the gym ten times in a month actually attends seven times.
Coherently with the presence of users who are not perfectly aware of their self control
problems, expectations are upward biased. To divide users between optimistic, pessimistic
and users with correct expectations we must define a threshold in the forecast error. We
reasonably consider an absolute value of 25% which implies that a user who expects to
attend twice a week (roughly eight times in a month) ends up missing this target half of
the weeks (if she exercises once in each week) or in one out four (if she does not exercise
at all in that week). We claim that this band is large enough to account for unexpected
contingencies affecting the sport activity and users who are above the positive threshold are
optimistic while those below the negative threshold are pessimistic. In figure 1.1 we report
the histogram of the forecast error and the two threshold we set to define pessimistic and
optimistic users. Users who correctly anticipate future attendance are 44.9% of the total
population, users with optimistic expectations are 51.1% and pessimistic users are only
4%. The last figure is interesting since it shows that agents can also be pessimistic about
future behaviour when this depends on their ability to stick to a plan. However, based on
this figure, it would be difficult to support a claim against the focus on overconfidence since
15A typical cohort in the gym is around 700 users. The number of users who participated to our activities is
405 (the activities have been made available in two periods of the year: from 1st September 2009 to 16th March
2010 and from 1st May 2010 to 31st July 2010.) and we consider 351 of them since we drop those who bought
specific contracts and those who were not active in the gym at the moment of answering to our questions. We
agreed with the gym that every user who bought PPV or any type of contract from September 2009 onward was
eligible to participate to the activities so some users filled the survey even if they were not active in the gym. In
this case we can use some information in the survey but not the one on expectations on future behavior.
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Figure 1.1: Forecast error in the population
4% is a very small fraction of the population when compared to the share of users with too
optimistic beliefs.
The next step is to match the information on expectations with the cost of attending.
This allow us to identify in the population the categories we have defined in section 1.2. In
this analysis we focus mainly on users with flat contracts and carnet since only three users
were attending buying PPV. The model implies that rational users have correct expectations
on future attendance and select contracts such that on average they do not incur in losses;
conversely, naive users have optimistic beliefs and can end up with losses depending on the
realization of costs; finally, sophisticated users have correct beliefs and due to self control
costs they incur in losses. As table 1.5 shows, in our sample the fraction of rational users is
40.6% while sophisticated users amounts to only 4.3% of the population. The percentage of
naive users is 51.1%. Part of them incur in losses (23.1% of the sample) while the remaining
part are overconfident but their attendance is high enough to avoid losses16. In this group
we also find the three users who attend the gym buying PPV. Without a commitment device
like the flat contract, they expect to attend a lot in the future but end up with very few visits,
as predicted by the model.
Expectations about future attendance and foreseeable costs. The discussion of the role
of foreseeable costs made so far has shown that users on one hand sort in the menu without
taking into account properly the self control cost of distance and on the other hand they ex-
perience ex-post losses related to this cost factor. Another direct proof for this bias comes
16This categorization is performed on 325 users who buy contracts that can be evaluated in terms of losses.
In the rest of the paper, when evaluating the precision of expectations on future attendance and not the loss
experienced by the users, we use the whole sample of 351 users.
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Table 1.5: Types of users
No ex-post loss Ex-post loss
Expectations’ group Rel. freq. (%) Rel. freq. (%)
Pessimistic 2.2% 1.8%
Correct beliefs
40.6% 4.3%
(rational) (sophisticated)
Optimistic
28.0% 23.1%
(naive) (naive)
from the analysis of expectations. Table 1.6 reports the estimated coefficients of two regres-
sions respectively on the probability of having correct beliefs and on the error in forecasting
future attendance. To performe the analysis we exclude pessimistic users and we focus on
those who have correct beliefs and on optimistic users. Explanatory variables are the dis-
tance and its square, mean temperature and its square, the dummy for the first contract, the
contract length and the usual controls (gender, age, academic etc.).
Table 1.6: Regressions on forecast error and probability of having correct beliefs on future
attendance
Dep. var:
Prob. of having Forecast
correct beliefs error
Distance 0.155∗ (0.065) -0.089∗ (0.064)
Distance2 -0.044∗∗ (0.023) 0.021∗∗ (0.042)
Mean temperature 0.122∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.049∗∗ (0.015)
Mean temperature2 -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.001∗∗ (0.029)
Contract days <-0.000 (0.521) <-0.000 (0.583)
First contract (d) 0.062 (0.326) -0.011 (0.792)
Academic controls YES YES
Demog. controls YES YES
N = 292, pseudo R2=0.08359, R2=0.0845
Marginal effects; p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We highlight first a regressor which contributes to strength our elicitation method. The
variable for the length of the contract is not only not significant but it is practically zero.
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Asking different questions to elicit beliefs (attendance in the next 30 days and until the
end of the contract) and taking the best answer, we have been able to avoid the problem
of heterogeneity in contract length and to obtain an estimate for the next future which is
comparable across users. Moving to the main variables of interest, we find that results on
the sorting behaviour are confirmed by expectations. The two polynomials in the distance
have their maximum (prob of having correct beliefs) and their minimum (forecast error) at
2km from the gym and then forecast errors increase both in likelihood and in the average
size. We observe that also the mean temperature has the same effect on beliefs, with a
inner maximum (or minimum for the error in forecast) roughly at 15C degrees. When
weather conditions are influencing the cost of attending with higher intensity they are not
fully anticipated by naive users and expectations are more likely to be upward biased.
Data on expectations confirm the presence of overconfidence about future behaviour.
Together with the information on contractual choices they allow us to identify types of users
in the population and to discriminate between the different self control models compatible
with the presence of losses. In particular, we see that the population is heterogeneous, as
predicted by DVM, and losses are largely due to the presence of naive users rather than
sophisticated.
However, this is not necessarily the only explanation for the documented facts. In par-
ticular, losses are compatible with two underlying scenarios: influence by the staff and risk
aversion, which will be discussed in section 1.4.2.
Are sophisticated users sophisticated? The categorization we made so far is intuitive
when we consider rational and naive users since it is based on expectations about future
behaviour and the objective to select a contract which minimizes the expense. Using these
two elements we identified also Sophisticated users who have correct beliefs about future
attendance but incur in losses. The self control model rationalizes this behaviour claiming
that sophisticated users consciously select contracts that foster attendance, such as flat con-
tracts, because they provide a commitment to exercise. To find empirical evidence for this
claim, we included in the survey some questions regarding the feature of contracts in terms
of the incentives to exercise they may provide. A possible confirmation of the identification
we made of the group of sophisticated users is to see whether this group recognizes the flat
contract as a commitment device. To this end, we employ three general questions regarding
pay per visits, carnet and flat contract; and one specific question on the contract chosen by
the user. The respondent must evaluate the following sentences and provide a judgment for
each of them:
D1: Pay per visits are useful to foster attendance
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D2: Carnets are useful to foster attendance
D3: Flat contracts are useful to foster attendance
Answers: 1) No; 2) A bit; 3) Very useful
In general, we see that users correctly recognize flat contracts as commitment devices. The
proportion of users who classify the pay per visit as very useful or a bit useful is only 15%,
while for carnet and flat contracts is 57% and 83% respectively. It is interesting to notice
that if we contrast our groups, then the percentage of sophisticated who find flat contracts
very useful jumps to 93%.
In the survey the same question is also asked with respect to the actual contractual
choice of the user:
D4: The contract I have chosen is useful because it fosters my attendance
Answers: 1) No; 2) A bit; 3) Very useful
It emerges clearly that groups have a different idea of the flat contract as a commitment
device. Sophisticated users recognize its effect on attendance not only in general but espe-
cially in their case. If we aggregate answers 2) and 3) and run a test on the difference in the
population mean of sophisticated and optimistic users, then the test does not reject the null
hypothesis of a significant difference at 5% (p-value=0.0359) if the test is one-sided (the
null hypothesis is that the mean of the sophisticated is higher) and at 10% (p-value=0.0719)
if the test is two sided17. This confirms the claim that sophisticated users are aware of their
future behaviour and select flat contracts because they foster attendance.
1.4.2 Alternative explanations for the documented facts
So far we have shown that users often do not select the contract that minimizes the expense
of their consumption plan. Moreover, they select flat contracts or carnet too frequently. A
simple explanation for that would be that the staff of the gym is able to make some pressure
in order to convince users to select flat contracts instead of PPV.
To check whether this claim is true, we add a question in the survey asking users whether
they select their contract autonomously, with some friends or with the help of the staff. We
find that 12.2% of the users ask for suggestions from the staff in selecting their contract
while 80% declare to choose autonomously. Hence, users who do look for suggestion are
17With the other possible aggregation, that is answers 1) and 2) as outcome 0 and answer 3) as outcome 1
the result of the test is the same. Moreover, a non parametric Wilcoxon test for ordinal variables rejects the null
of equal median at 10% (p-value=0.0745)
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not a negligible share of the population. Moreover, they can be under representative, since
part of those who declare to select autonomously can be in some way influenced as well
by the staff. To obtain an estimate of the relevance of the pressure of the staff at least on
the former group, we proceed identifying them with a dummy variable and performing a
probit regression on the probability to select a flat or a carnet. Results of the regressions
are reported in table 1.14 (see appendix 1.9.3). We find that the staff exerts some pressure
to the users who declare to ask for suggestions. Among this group, those who are at the
first contract in the gym always select the flat contract to exercise. It is interesting to see
however that, after the first contract, the estimate of the staff dummy variable, still has a
positive sign but becomes non significantly different from zero (p-value=0.604). Users who
are willing to accept suggestion follow the indication of the staff to select flat contracts,
which can be considered as the default option for a user at first experience. However, when
users acquire some experience, they start using other types of contracts and no clear relation
emerges between the suggestion of the staff and the actual choice of the user. Since this is
the result we get for the group of users who declare to ask for suggestions, it is natural
to think that the rest of the population is even less affected by the pressure of the staff.
Hence, it would be hard to claim that the pressure of the staff is the main explanation for
the observed behaviour, especially after the first contract.
A second explanation for the observed behaviour is that users select flat contracts or
carnet because they are risk averse. We test this claim with a probit regression for the
probability of selecting a flat contract or a carnet where among the regressors we have the
risk attitude we elicit through the payed experiment (see section 1.3 on data construction).
As in the previous case we employ all the contracts bought by the users for which we have
this information, under the assumption of stability of the risk attitude along time. We do not
find any significant relation between the risk attitude of the user and the contractual choice.
This result is confirmed also after the introduction of other variables like impatience and
the financial constraint of the user.
Finally, the analysis we conducted to check whether users are indeed too optimistic
about future attendance and to discriminate among types relies on the assumption that we
observe their “true” expectations. The elicitation method we used, as pointed out in the pre-
vious section, can be subjected to the critique of not being salient. Given that, the estimate
of future behaviour may differ with respect to the one that the agent had at the moment of
signing the contract18 because of inattention or impatience to finish the survey. To provide
18We do not elicit the expectation at the moment of signing the contract but through the online survey. We
prefer to ask this information in a later moment (when the contract is already chosen) not to influence the
decision in the gym.
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evidence on the quality of the data on expectations we first check whether users, given their
beliefs, are choosing a coherent contract in the menu. From this analysis we see that in 85%
of the cases there is consistency between expectations and choice. Moreover, this number
must be rounded upward (by 4% - 5%) considering sophisticated users who declare a cor-
rect belief and chose an apparently inconsistent contract. Another check for the quality of
our data is based on two variables that we have measured: the time to fill the survey and
the number of errors made by the subjects. Since the survey is made online, we are able to
compute the time the user needed to complete it. Moreover, every time a user made an error
in filling the survey (possibly because of inattention) we recorded this event (for example,
if the user does not complete a page the page is reloaded and the error recorded). The group
of users who have correct beliefs about future behavior and the rest of the users (those who
are above or below the thresholds) do not have significant difference with respect to the
time needed to complete the questionnaire and with respect to the number of errors. The
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests are not rejecting the null of equal means (p-value=0.792 for
the former and 0.4021 for the latter). Moreover, if we add the time to fill the survey in the
same regression reported in table 1.11, the estimated coefficient is close to zero: -0.0067
and a test for significance does not reject the restriction to zero (p-value=0.721).
1.5 The role of experience: are types stable over time?
The analysis conducted so far shows that in the population of users we can identify types as
predicted by a model of self control costs. This implies a natural question: are those types
stable? In other words, we are interested in seeing whether users tend to behave in the same
way along time or whether they become more able to predict future attendance through the
accumulation of experience. Taking seriously the problem of self control, this is probably
more interesting than to verify, as we did above, the presence of optimistic or pessimistic
beliefs.
In our data, differently to DVM, there is no automatic renewal of the contract after the
expiration. This means that every time a user signs a new contract she must rethink about
future attendance given a greater experience about her ability to stick to her exercise plan.
Hence, our strategy is first to measure experience that an agent has at a given contract as the
number of days spanned by previous contracts and see whether contracts signed by more
experienced users are less likely to be associated to losses. Since users who do not like the
gym environment are more likely to quit, especially after the first contract, a regression on
the whole sample of users is likely to produce a biased estimate of the effect of experience
whenever experienced users (those who stay) are more likely to derive more utility from
exercising than those who leave.
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We take care of this restricting the analysis to those who do not drop from the sample
and stay for at least two contracts (in the population a user signs on average three contracts).
We end up with 965 subjects and 3765 contracts. We estimate the same model as in 1.11
except for the introduction of the experience among the regressors. Results are reported
in table 1.7. Most of the coefficients have the same sign and magnitude as in table 1.4
Table 1.7: Tobit regression on the percentage loss in the contract
Dep. variable: amount of the percentage loss
First contract (d) -2.7975∗∗∗ Financial aid (d) -1.0279
(.74322) (.78648)
Contract days .02938∗∗∗ Medicine (d) 1.0672
(.00802) (1.3192)
Previous exp -.00522∗∗ Social science (d) 1.4915
(.00234) (1.195)
Flat (d) -.70795 Math science (d) -1.5471∗
(1.577) (.91336)
Gender (d) -2.173∗∗∗ Physical science (d) -6.8279∗∗
(.80939) (3.2113)
Age 8.7e-05 Grade avg. -.75123
(.17335) (.79205)
Distance .69294∗∗ Credits -.0492∗
(.2906) (.029)
Mean temperature -.78563∗∗∗ Rel. rain days 1.7142
(.19508) (2.9082)
Mean temperature2 .02915∗∗∗
(.0066)
N 3752 Clusters 965
pseudo R2 .00809
column (A). This subgroup of the population experiences lower losses in the first contract.
This is explained by the fact that once we eliminate the group of users who discovered that
the gym is not attracting and left it after the expiration of the first contract, the remaining
part of the population is composed by more “enthusiastic” users who at their first approach
tend to attend more, incurring on average in lower losses. The estimated coefficient for
experience is significant but low. This is evident if we compute the effect on the expected
amount of loss due to 180 days of extra experience (which is close to the average number of
contractual days of a user in the gym) which amounts to a decrease of 1 percentage points
in the expected loss. This finding suggests that users do not gain too much from experience
and this is compatible with the presence of stable types in the population.
In order to provide more evidence on this important result, we perform a different anal-
ysis. We generate a new variable that accounts for losses in the first two contracts and we
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include it as an explicative variable in a probit regression for the probability of incurring in a
loss in a later contract. We perform this analysis with different specifications and results are
reported in table 1.8. Column (A) and (B) refer to the model where the dependent variable
Table 1.8: Probit regression on the probability of a loss in the third or later contract
Dep. variable: probability of incurring in a loss
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Previous losses (d) .27297∗∗∗ .27994∗∗∗ .23647∗∗∗ .23266∗∗∗
(.04058) (.04257) (.03082) (.03112)
Regressors C YES YES YES YES
Regressors P YES YES YES YES
Regressors S NO YES NO YES
N 615 570 2149 2065
pseudo R2 .08154 .0996 .068 .07245
is the probability of incurring in a loss in the third contract while in columns (C) and (D) we
estimate the model for the probability of incurring in a loss in the third or any later contract.
The three groups of regressors we report are those we defined in model 1.11 (a table with
the whole estimates can be found in the appendix). As we can see, having experienced a
loss in the past is a strong predictor of losses today. The magnitude of the estimate we get
changes slightly with the specification of the model and ranges from 23 percentage points
to 28 percentage points.
So far we did not use data on expectations to analyze the role of experience. From pre-
vious results we expect that types are stable since experience has a small effect in reducing
losses and users who experienced losses in the past are more likely to incur in losses in
the future. A definite clue about this claim comes from the results of the three regressions
reported in table 1.9 (columns A-C). In the first two columns (A and B) we report estimated
coefficients of two linear regressions that relate the forecast error and experience. As we
said above, we define the forecast error as the difference between the expected number of
visits and the actual one, divided by the former. This measure is bounded above to one
which is the case of a user who declares some positive number of visits but then never
attend.
As we see in column (A), more experienced users have more correct expectation on
future attendance. The estimated coefficient is such that 180 days of experience imply a 6
percentage points reduction in the forecast error. However, this result is mostly driven by
very naive and inexperienced users who have a forecast error equal to one and are very likely
to quit their activity after the expiration of the contract. We exclude this group of users to
perform the same regression as in (A) and we report the estimates in (B). In this case the
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Table 1.9: Regressions estimates
Dep. Var. Forecast error Prob. of having
correct expectations
(A) (B) (C) (D)
First contract -.05555 -.01098 .0047 .01464
(.04966) (.04561) (.0684) (.06941)
Experience days -.00033∗∗ -.00018 6.4e-05 5.3e-05
(.00015) (.00014) (.00021) (.00021)
Gender .02388 .01261 .00877 .02238
(.03893) (.03549) (.05355) (.05437)
Correct recall .22616∗∗∗
(.05181)
N 351 326 351 351
R2 .01504 .00727
pseudo R2 .0003 .03783
coefficient is lower (the effect of experience on the forecast error is reduced to 2%) and is
not significantly different from zero. Finally, in column (C) we report the estimates of a
probit regression on the probability of being in the group of users with correct expectations.
In this case outliers, i.e. users with very wrong expectations, are less a concern and we
get an estimate which is very close to zero and not significant, confirming the claim that
experience plays a little role in improving the forecasts of the users.
We conclude the section analyzing a last but important element: the recall of past perfor-
mance. So far we have collected evidence on the presence of types observing that behaviour
does not change much along time (the probability of incurring in a loss is not much affected
by experience and users who incur in losses are likely to do so in the future) and expec-
tations (which do not improve sensitively with experience). Hence, coherently with stable
types, it is reasonable to expect that users who have wrong expectations about future beliefs
are likely to have also some bias in evaluating past performance, while users with correct
expectations also have correct beliefs with respect to the past. Following this reasoning, we
put together information on expectations on the future and recall of the past.
In the survey we asked users to recall their past attendance in the gym19 and to state
19To elicit beliefs on past attendance we employ two different questions on the performance in the month of
activity and in the overall gym history. Depending on the contractual history of the subject, one question or the
other has been selected. For details on the elicitation method see appendix 1.9.2.
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whether they take it into account when selecting a new contract20. For each user we match
the categories based on expectations about the future (pessimistic, optimistic and correct
forecast) with the same categories relative to the past behaviour21. In table 1.10 we report
the relative frequencies we observe in the population. First, the statistics clearly show that a
Table 1.10: Groups of users based on expectations and recall
Recall of past attendance
Pessimistic Correct recall Optimistic Total
Rel. Freq. Rel. Freq. Rel. Freq. Rel. Freq.
(No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)
Pessimistic 0.28% 2.28% 2.28% 4.84%
Expected (1) (8) (8) (17)
future Correct beliefs 1.42% 29.91% 13.39% 44.73%
attendance (5) (105) (47) (157)
Optimistic 0.57% 22.22% 27.64% 50.43%
(2) (78) (97) (177)
Total 2.28% 54.42% 43.30% 100.00%
(8) (191) (152) (351)
bias exists also in the perception of the past. More than 43% of the users overestimate their
past performance while 54% recall correctly. Interestingly, 30% of the users have correct
beliefs both on the future and on the past attendance while 28% are both overestimating their
past performance and have an optimistic view of future attendance. This evident persistence
in beliefs emerges clearly in the last probit regression we run for the probability of having
correct expectations on future attendance. Estimated coefficients are reported in column
(D) of table 1.9. From this regression we see that a strong predictor of correct beliefs is
given by having correct recall of the past performance.
From table 1.10 we also see that a relevant share of users, which amounts to 22.22% of
the total, have a correct perception of their past attendance but are still too optimistic about
the future. This is interesting because it suggests an interpretation that has to do with the
update of beliefs. From the data we can argue that naive users either do not update their
beliefs about the future remaining too optimistic even if they recognize the past performance
(78 out of 177, that is 44%) or (with the exception of the negligible minority of users
20Past performance is recognized by users as an important determinant of choice. In the survey we have ask
whether they evaluate the contract options available in the menu considering past performance and from the
answers we see that 58% of the population declares to take into account this element in their process of choice.
21We employing the same threshold of 25% as we did in the case of expectations on future attendance.
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with a pessimistic recall) even reinforce their wrong belief on future attendance through an
optimistic recall of the past one (97 out of 177, that is 55% of naive users).
1.6 The relationships between types and traits.
In order to form an expectation about future behaviour and to translate it into a contract
that minimizes the total expense or some other objective (such as reaching a minimum
number of visits) an agent must think carefully about her future activities and willingness
to exercise. This process undoubtedly needs some mental skills and mental resources22.
Moreover, other than cognitive skills, personality traits can play a big role in determining
the behaviour of a user. In order to shed some light on the relationship between cognitive
abilities, personality traits and economic outcome, we have elicited these traits in the same
population we have analyzed in the previous sections.
The trait elicitation is described in section 1.3 and in the appendix. Briefly, we measure
cognitive skills in two ways: through a symbolic test (which is a proxy for IQ); and with a
set of questions designed to elicit the ability of the subject in making simple calculations.
We label the latter as numeracy skills. With respect to personality traits, we refer to the
psychological literature and employ standard questions to elicit “neurocitism” and “consci-
entiousness”. These traits are in the “Big five” list of cognitive traits which are in turn built
on traits that belong to them (see section 1.3).
As a first step we run a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test looking at each trait. With this
test we compare the mean scores of two groups: users with correct expectations on future
attendance and the group of optimistic and pessimistic users. Among the list of traits we are
interested in, the only one which is significantly different in the two groups is the numeracy
index which is higher in the group with correct expectations. In this case we find that the
test rejects the null of equal median between the two groups at 10% (p-value=0.0699).
As a second step we perform a regression analysis that has as dependent variable firstly
the forecast error (columns A-D) and secondly the probability of having correct expectation
on future behaviour (columns E-H). We test different specifications, reported in table 1.11
. In column (A) and (E) we report the estimates of regressions on the cognitive skills. In
columns (B) and (F) we add to the previous specification the result of the test on impulsivity
since this can bias the estimates when it is left in the error term. We focus on personality
22Our experience in the gym during the planning phase of the study, showed us how much this is true. Very
often users think for minutes about the best contract to select and many of them consult the calendar that the
staff provides at the reception of the gym. Moreover, the vast majority exploits the possibility of the free trial
entrances and, during this trial period and before selecting the contract, ask for a copy of the contract menu.
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traits only in columns (C) and (G) and finally we consider models with both cognitive
abilities and personality traits in columns (D) and (H).
The picture we get is consistent among different specifications. Numeracy skills are the
most important. They are negatively associated with the forecast error and positively with
having a correct forecast, while the proxy for IQ (symbolic test) does not display any corre-
lation with the dependent variable. This finding confirms the negative correlation between a
scientific academic background and losses we have found estimating model 1.11 (estimates
are reported in table 1.4) and implies that mathematical skills help users to select contracts
accordingly to their actual behaviour. Among non cognitive traits, neurocitism do not cor-
relate with the probability of having a correct forecast while conscientiousness does. This is
not surprising since conscientiousness is defined as the degree to which a person complains
with plans (externally imposed as norms and duties but also internally imposed). The signs
of the coefficients we get from the estimation are stable among different specifications and
are negatively associated with a higher forecast error and positively with the probability
of having correct beliefs. Finally, internal locus of control (the degree to which a person
believes her own actions to be determinant to outcomes) and external locus of control (the
degree to which a person believes external elements beyond own control to be determinant
to outcomes), we find sound coefficients (they are of the same size with opposite sign) but
no one is significantly different from zero. Again, we do not find any significant coefficients
for experience.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper we empirically asses the self control model as a robust explanation for the ob-
served behaviour in our market. Here, agents are likely to incur in dynamically inconsistent
behaviour due to optimistic beliefs on future consumption. Moreover, showing that opti-
mistic beliefs are not reduced by experience, we argue that the observed persistence along
time of contracts characterized by a high per visit cost cannot imputed to random factors
but instead to the fact that users can have stable biased beliefs. This is consistent with the
presence of stable types of consumers in the population. Finally, we find that users’ types
are related to cognitive abilities and traits. In particular, numeracy skills are crucial to form
correct expectations and to select the best contract option from the available alternatives.
This analysis has the merit of providing a deep examination of the choice process behind
observed behaviour in our market. We achieve this goal through a sound implementation
of different methodologies of economic analysis which goes in the direction suggested by
Manski (2004) to complement data on choice and consumption with data on beliefs. The
major weakness of the study is in the representativeness of the subject pool we analyze
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since it is composed by students and by the fact that beliefs are elicited in a non-incentive
compatible way.
The stability of types in the population provides stronger motivations to the recent lit-
erature on general models of behaviour that can explain what we observe in this and in
many other contexts. See, for example, Benabou and Tirole (2004), Fudemberg and Levine
(2011) and Lowestein and O’Donoghue (2005). Moreover, it motivates the possibility to
provide to agents tools aimed to help in decisions and in subsequent behaviour. We explore
this possibility in a related paper, see Calzolari and Nardotto (2011).
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1.8 Variables
Table 1.12: List of variables
Age, gender Age and gender of the user at the moment of signing the
contract.
Distance, distance2 Linear distance (and distance squared) from the address of
the user and gym.
Mean temperature, mean
temperature2
Mean temperature experienced during the contract. Data
provided by the regional environmental authority.
Rel. rain days Relative number of rain days (more then 4mm of rain) expe-
rienced during the contract. Data provided by the regional
environmental authority.
First contract Dummy variable for the first contract in the user contractual
history.
Tot experience days Number of days spanned by the contracts signed by the user
before the one of interest.
Flat Dummy variable for a flat contract.
Medicine Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the student is enrolled
in the school of medicine.
Humanities Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the student is enrolled
in the school of Italian literature, foreign languages, history,
geography or law.
Social Science Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the student is enrolled
in the school of management and business, economics or
political science.
Mathematical Science Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the student is enrolled
in the school of engineering, statistics, biology, chemistry
or mathematics.
Physical Science Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the student is enrolled
in the ISEF (school for physical instructors).
Financial aid Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the student receives
financial aid from the university.
Grade avg. Average grade of the student in his academic history
Credits Total of academic credits earned by the student in his aca-
demic history
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Summary statistics
This section collects summary statistics on the population under analysis. Table 1.13 reports
the statistics of interest.
Table 1.13: Summary statistics
Gender Rel. Freq. (%) Distance Rel. Freq. (%)
Male 50.85 0 km - 0.5 km 31.33
Female 49.15 0.5 km - 1 km 22.76
Academic background Rel. Freq. (%) 1 km - 1.5 km 12.89
Humanities 35.9 1.5 km - 2 km 10.81
Medicine 8.5 2 km - 3 km 11.29
Social science 14.4 More than 4 km 10.92
Mathematical science 33.7 Age category Rel. Freq. (%)
Physical science 0.9 21 or less 29.1
Erasmus 6.0 22 to 25 46.1
Not categorized 0.6 26 to 29 15.5
Experience classes Rel. Freq. (%) 30 or more 9.3
First contract (0 days) 26.58
1 - 30 days 11.49
30 to 90 days 20.15
90 - 360 days 32.63
More than 360 days 9.15
The population of the gym is equally divided between males and females. Since they are
university students the vast majority of them has an age that ranges from 19 to 25 (75%
of the sample). The users are located in the nearby of the facility. Only 10% is more than
4km far from the gym. The facility is located in the center of the city and the vast majority
of the users reach it by foot or by bicycle. With respect to the academic are of study, the
taxonomy we followed is:
Humanities: literature, foreign languages, law, sociology, psychology.
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Mathematical science: mathematics, physics, engineering, biology, chemistry
Social science: economics and business, political science
Medicine: medicine, pharmacy
Erasmus: students that are visiting the University of Bologna through the Erasmus
program or similar programs
Not categorized: schools that are not specific to a field (e.g. Magistero and SISS are
school intended to prepare teachers of the high schools).
1.9.2 Surveys and experiments
This section is devoted to examine the data coming from the survey and the experiments in
more details.
Beliefs elicitation To gather this information on expected future attendance we employ
different questions in the survey depending on the type of contract signed by the user. These
cases are possible:
- PPV or carnet
D 1: How many times will you attend the gym in the next 30 days?
D 2: Probability table on the next 30 days (see below)
- Flat contract
D 1: How many times will you attend from until the end of the contract?
D 2: Probability table on the next 30 days (see below)
The first question in both cases requires a punctual estimate of future activity in the gym.
The second question requires to put probabilities to different possible outcomes. In figure
1.2 we report a screenshot of the table. We ask directly probability of events and before
the table there are instructions and examples to instruct the user. Even if the user is asked
to associate probabilities to events, in the examples we present some possible answers both
in terms of probabilities and in terms of frequencies. This is suggested by the literature
on beliefs elicitation in surveys, as summarized by Manski (2004). The answer is not valid
(and the user cannot proceed in the questionnaire) until the amount of probability associated
to the possible events is different from 100 percentage points.
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Figure 1.2: Probability table
Perception of past attendance With respect to the perception of past attendance, this is
asked to all of them in two ways: the first question asks what is their general past attendance,
the second is more specific and ask them what was their attendance in the last month.
Survey on Cognitive and Non Cognitive traits The cognitive abilities we focus on are
a general measure of IQ and a measure of numeracy skills. The former test is the same
as in Lang, Weiss, Stocker, and Rosenbladt (2007) which has been proved by the authors
to be highly correlated with IQ. The test is designed to be run online and it consists in
memorizing symbols and inputting them in a small table for 30 seconds. The user has one
trial stage to practice the test and then she has to do the three main stages. In figures 1.3
and 1.4 we reported two screenshots of this test.
Figure 1.3: Before starting the countdown Figure 1.4: After starting the countdown
As we can see from the figures, the user can start the test pressing the start button. After
the start she has 30 seconds to fill the cells with the number corresponding to the symbol
displayed. When a number is selected the following cell is automatically activated so the
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user is focused only on remembering the numbers the inputting them matching the symbols.
When the time elapses the user is redirected to the next stage.
The program is written in Javascript so it is run locally by the PC. Since it is also very
simple, so no slowdown is expected to occur during the test. If the user shuts down the
window during the test she has to restart and we record it in our database. Overall, 14 users
interrupted the test and they did it at the very beginning (that is during the trial stage) and
the following time they run it completely. The rest of the users did the test at the first time
without interruptions.
The aggregate measure we construct is the sum of the performance in the three stages
and the results we got in the online implementation is comparable with exactly the same
test run in the laboratory of the School of Economics in Bologna. The subject pool in
this case was composed by undergraduate students taking a course in econometrics. The
only difference we observe is that in the population that run the test online we observe an
higher non response rate (users who did not input any number and waited that the 30 second
elapsed). Out of 312 users who terminated the test, 11 decided not to do it while in the other
case we have only one non response. If we exclude these observations, in both cases we do
not reject a test for normality (as we expect from a test related to IQ). Moreover, the mean
value of the test in the online population is 34.058 while in the laboratory is 33.924 and
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test does not rejects the null hypothesis of equal means between
the two samples (p-value=0.3858). This is an indirect confirmation of the quality the data
collected online with respect to the one collected in the lab.
The numeracy trait is elicited through a battery of questions:
A. If in a population the probability of contracting a disease is 10 percent, how many
people out of 1000 will get it?
B. A shop is selling a sofa at half of the original price. If the current price is 150 euro
how much is the sofa without the discount?
C. A car shop is selling a second hand car at 6000 euro which is 2/3 of the original
price of the car. How much was the car when it was new?
D. Suppose you have 2000 euro in your bank account. The interest rate that the bank
is applying to your savings is 10% per year. How much will you have in two years
from now?
The impulsivity test is taken from Frederick (2005) and the battery of questions is the
same he proposes:
A. A bat and a ball cost 1,10Cin total. The bat costs 1,00Cmore than the ball. How
much does the ball cost? ___ cents
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B. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? ___ minutes
C. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake? ___ days
To elicit non cognitive traits we employ a standard set of question taken from the Ger-
man SOEP as in Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010). To elicit the following traits
compliance we ask:
Procrastination: When you have a task to do that you don’t like, how much do you
procrastinate? (1 to 11 scale)
Internal LOC 1: How my life is depend on me. (1 to 7 scale from I completely don’t
agree to I completely agree)
Internal LOC 2: One has to work hard to succeed. (1 to 7 scale from I completely
don’t agree to I completely agree)
Internal LOC 3: If I run up against difficulties in life, I doubt my own abilities. (1 to
7 scale from I completely don’t agree to I completely agree)
External LOC 1: What a person achieve in life is is above all a matter of fate or luck.
(1 to 7 scale from I completely don’t agree to I completely agree)
External LOC 2: I frequently have the experience that other people have a controlling
influence over my life. (1 to 7 scale from I completely don’t agree to I completely
agree)
External LOC 3: Inborn abilities are more important than any efforts one can make.
(1 to 7 scale from I completely don’t agree to I completely agree)
Conscientiousness 1: I consider myself as someone who does a thorough job. (1 to 7
scale from I completely don’t agree to I completely agree)
Conscientiousness 2: I consider myself as someone who does things effectively and
efficiently. (1 to 7 scale from I completely don’t agree to I completely agree)
Conscientiousness 3: I consider myself as someone who tends to be lazy. (1 to 7
scale from I completely don’t agree to I completely agree)
Neurocitism 1: I consider myself as someone who worries a lot. (1 to 7 scale from I
completely don’t agree to I completely agree)
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Neurocitism 2: I consider myself as someone who gets nervous easily. (1 to 7 scale
from I completely don’t agree to I completely agree)
Neurocitism 3: I consider myself as someone who is relaxed, handle stress well. (1
to 7 scale from I completely don’t agree to I completely agree)
1.9.3 Regression tables
In this table we report regression results of the probit model for the probability of selecting
a flat contract or a carnet.
Table 1.14: Probit regression on the probability of choosing a flat contract
dep. var. probability of selecting a flat contract or a carnet
gender .49408*** .49023*** .49199*** .54859*** .48852***
(.18104) (.17931) (.17906) (.16953) (.18006)
risk attitude -.02778 -.03425 -.03405 -.0251
(.03378) (.03448) (.03517) (.03528)
impatience .00835 .00868
(.01417) (.01341)
budget constrain 6.1e-05
(.00065)
staff dummy .40142 .2364
(.43427) (.45559)
first contract .08238 -.00679
(.13985) (.15099)
N 868 868 868 1035 868
pseudo R2 .03473 .03627 .0363 .04831 .03676
risk attitude: is the number of rows in the table before switching to the lottery. The
higher is the value the more a user is risk averse.
impatience: is the number of rows in the table before switching to the lower prize
at a former closer date. The higher is the value the more a user is patient.
We perform the analysis on all the contracts signed by users who filled our survey since
only for them we have this information and we are left with 1035 contracts.

Chapter 2
Nudging with information: a
randomized field experiment on
reminders and feedback
abstract
Can people be helped to stick to their plans with a little help of information? We provide
theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of reminders and feedback on investment ac-
tivities that contemplate up-front costs and delayed benefits, such as education and healthy
behavior. With a randomized field experiment we show a strong and significant increase of
physical exercise by users in a gym induced by simple reminders. We also study individ-
uals’ decisions to acquire feedback on their past activity and related effects on attendance.
We show that limited attention has a role in explaining our results which however also re-
quire an additional behavioral bias that we identify in strategies of mental accounting. We
think these results are important since they show that virtuous behavior, such as healthy
life style, can be induced with no monetary incentives thus significantly saving on public
finances: providing incentives with information is effective and cheap.
KEY WORDS: randomized field experiment; limited memory; inattention; reminders, feed-
back; mental accounting; sunk cost.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D03; D11; C93.
2.1 Introduction
When individuals face activities which require immediate costs or effort and deliver benefits
only in the future, they tend to under-invest and perform poorly, even as judged by them-
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selves. For example, since education requires up-front effort and costs by pupils and parents
but returns possibly higher income in the future, decisions leading to under-education are
common often leading to poverty traps. Similarly, healthy life-style requires restraining
from some current unhealthy behavior and practicing physical activity, with benefits that
are immediately intangible and delayed. Unhealthy behavior and limited physical exercise
lead to diabetes, cardiovascular diseases and obesity which the same individuals ex-post
regret.
In these and other similar cases, public policies are often advocated on two grounds:
first trying to alleviate the negative impacts and treating the consequences of suboptimal
behavior, second to prevent poor choices by individuals. With respect to prevention, mon-
etary incentives to induce virtuous behavior have been widely used with strong beneficial
effects. For example, in the context of suboptimal physical exercise documented by DellaV-
igna and Malmendier (2006), Charness and Gneezy (2010) (CG hereafter) have shown how
effective monetary incentives can be. In one of their studies (costing $6000 for eighty in-
dividuals), they offered up to $125 for at least nine visits to a gym over five weeks and
observed that after treatment these individuals continued to attend significantly more than
what they did before. As for education, the program studied by Angrist and Levy (2009),
which cost $650,000 to increase certification rate at school, turned out to be successful
although mainly for girls.1
Given the enormous direct and indirect social costs of poor individual behavior on activ-
ities such as education and health, it is not surprising that all these studies have proved that
the large amount of money put at stake in these programs was indeed worthily employed.2
In this paper we instead investigate whether desirable and comparable effects can be
obtained motivating individuals with no monetary incentives. In particular, we concentrate
on the possibility that providing information to individuals with reminders and feedback on
past activities may affect their behavior as desired and explore the underlying mechanisms
leading to those incentives. We believe this is important also because providing monetary
incentives, although effective, can be very costly for the public finances as the previous
figures illustrate and for some countries even not affordable. Providing incentives with the
help of information may be instead very cheap especially nowadays with mass information
1Fryer (2010) has studied very effective incentive experiments in public schools in four US cities for the
2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years, distributing a total of $6.3 million on incentives for inputs rather than
outcomes in education. Similar successful programs in the New York City school system has awarded $600 for
each passing grade, the Baltimore City Public School District has paid a bonus of up to $110 to improve scores
on state graduation exams and similar programs in the US award up to $500 for each exam passed.
2In the US, obesity may be responsible for almost $40 billion of increased medical spending through 2006
and the medical costs of obesity could have risen to $147 billion per year by 2008.
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and telecommunication technologies.
To this end we provide an empirical and theoretical analysis of the role of informa-
tion on investment activities. We first provide a parsimonious theoretical framework based
on a few behavioral assumptions, namely limited memory and a form of mental account-
ing related to sunk costs, that deliver testable implications on the role of reminders and
feedback on investment activities. We then provide related empirical evidence based on a
randomized field experiment on a particular investment activity, exercising in a gym, which
has been the subject of many recent studies. In this environment, we have monitored con-
tract subscription and attendance to a gym (a sport facility managed by the sport union at
the University of Bologna, Italy), before, during and after a treatment which contemplated
delivering information to some individuals. In particular, treated users received a weekly
E-mail reminding the possibility to exercise in the gym and also to obtain feedback on their
own past activity through a personalized web page accessible with personal credentials.
Users in the control group instead did not receive any reminder and could not access any
personalized web page. Our data on contracts and attendance span the entire population of
the gym from January 2008 to August 2010 (967 student users where present in the gym
in the Ac. year 2008-2009 and 568 new users in the following year3). The experiment
is run from September 1st 2009 to March 15th 2010 with 243 users participating (55% of
the active population in this time window). Part of these users are not considered in the
analysis since they quit the gym activity after the first contract. We focus instead on two
samples: first, the one with those who have contract before, during and after the treatment
(86 users); second, the enlarged sample of those who purchase contracts before and during
the treatment (146 users)4.
We have unveiled a remarkably strong effect of information which is capable to signif-
icantly increase monthly attendance comparing before and during treatment. In particular,
splitting the population as in CG between regular and non-regular users (on the basis of
mean monthly attendance), we verify that treated users with low attendance exercised 1.95
visit more per-month during treatment as compared with controls, an increase of 25%. This
effect is remarkably strong also because our low attendance users are quite active at the
baseline exercising more than 7 time per-month which would put them in the group of reg-
ular users of CG. After removing the treatment, i.e. when E-mail ceased to be sent, treated
and controls behavior converged but still showing larger attendance by treated (a statisti-
3Figures on the Ac. year 2008-2009 refer not only to new users joining the gym in this academic year but
also those who where already exercising with pre-existing contracts. We start our inquiry from January 2008
since the previous recording system was not reliable and has been replaced by a new one at the end of 2007.
4As it is shown in section 2.6, results obtained with the first sample are confirmed considering the second
one.
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cally significant 20% more comparing before and after treatment for low attendance users),
which could be the effect of habit formation as also reported in CG in the case of monetary
incentives. We also document with a probit regression that reminders have a strong and
highly significant impact in increasing the probability of attending in the next 12-36 hours
after receiving the E-mail.5 Furthermore, by increasing attendance reminders also reduce
the probability that individuals "give up" and quit the gym forever.
Why do simple reminders increase attendance and help forming good habits? Indeed,
our theoretical model clarifies that fully rational individuals and even present-biased users
should not be affected by reminders which instead might have an effect on individuals with
limited memory and or using some form of mental accounting based on sunk subscription
expenses. We show that considering the period before treatment (all users), the daily prob-
ability of attendance within monthly contracts significantly decreases from the first to the
fourth week and this is true any time a user subscribes a flat contract. We use our theoretical
analysis to show that this finding is not consistent with users uniquely affected by limited
memory and we also exploit different reactions to reminders by individuals affected by lim-
ited memory and using mental accounting. Overall, we provide evidence that reminders do
induce more physical exercise since they increase individuals’ attention but also because
they rekindle the initial expense to subscribe and attend the gym.
We finally, investigate why individuals decided to acquire feedback on their past ac-
tivity (available in their personalized web page during treatment) and what effect this had
on attendance, on top of reminders. We studied the probability to acquire feedbacks using
individual cognitive and non-cognitive traits obtained with online survey and experiments
administered to users in our experiment. The probability to acquire feedback is higher for
individuals with higher general cognitive abilities but low ability to make simple calcula-
tions. The probability is also higher for those who are more conscientious (defined in the
psychological literature as the degree to which a person is willing to comply with rules,
norms and standards) and patient (measured by time preferences as in Holt and Laury,
2002). Hence, more skilled users do not look for feedback probably because they are able
to recall the exact number of their past visits and to compute the implicit cost of their con-
tract. At the same time, cognitively endowed users are more likely to acquire information
probably because they receive a gratification in checking that they "did it right". We have
also verified that for those individuals acquiring feedback, mental accounting is a strong
drive for exercise. Overall, feedback seem to have an effect in inducing more attendance
5In all our regressions on attendance we also control for several individual characteristics (such as age,
gender and the physical distance between the place of residence and the location of the gym), seasonality and
local weather conditions (daily frequency).
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which sums up with that of reminders.
Our results are related to the vast theoretical and empirical literature on investment
goods. CG were interested in verifying whether after a period of intense exercise induced
by monetary incentives healthy habit persisted over time and showed that this is the case
for non-regular users (attending very low, i.e. 3 times per week) when observed up to two
and half months after treatment. These results have been confirmed by Acland and Levy
(2011) who also used monetary incentives and showed habits indeed last long (over eight
months after treatment), although decaying over time and being significantly diminished
by long vacations. Our results are comparable when considering the effect we document
during treatment and observing that our non-regular users are very active at the baseline
(7 times per week). What is more, we were able to obtain these comparable effects at no
cost and this has important implications for public policy.6 Another argument made by
opponents of monetary incentives is the risk of crowding out of intrinsic motivation which
CG documented for regular users. Our findings instead show no such effects, probably
because nudging individuals "softly" with information allows them to go on with their pre-
treatment decisions. This is another relevant policy implication because targeting monetary
incentives to the "right group" may be difficult, whilst information seem to self select as
desired.
This paper is also related to a recent and growing literature on limited memory. Karlan
et al. (2009) test a theory of limited attention by randomly reminding account holders to
make savings deposits and show that reminders increase savings balances by about 6%.
Stango and Zinman (2010) and Zwane et al. (2009) have shown that surveys may affect
saving and investment behaviors because they act as a shock to attention. With these papers
we share the effectiveness of repeated reminders but we differentiate with our analysis on
alternative motivations and the role of feedbacks.
Thaler (1999) has analyzed the role of mental accounting which is relevant also in
our experiment. Gourville and Soman (1998) with a qualitative analysis have reported a
decreasing path for exercise in a small pool of 33 users in a gym, but they used semester-
long contracts which may have been affected by seasonality trends. There is also a large
psychological literature documenting with real and though experiments that individual seem
to be affected by sunk costs (see Arkes 1996 among others). Baliga and Ely (2011) explain
the sunk cost effect as a consequence of a memory bias when a decision-maker does not
remember the reasons he began a project and the initial sunk cost may thus bring additional
6The once and for all cost of setup of the server technology for our dedicated web site is approximately
$1000 and thousand of users could have been addressed.
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information about future utility. Our results could be consistent with this idea if our gym
users do not remember the benefits they we able to infer at the date of subscription and the
sunk cost of subscription brings back this information. Finally feedback have been shown
to be effective also in reducing electricity consumption (Sexton et al. 1987).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a simple theoretical model. Section
3 illustrates the data and our experiment. Section 4 presents the main results on the effects
of reminders. The ensuing Section 5 illustrates what motivates the decision to acquire
feedbacks and its effects. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model
In any period t ∈ [1, T ] an individual may attend to an "investment" activity (e.g. exercise
in a gym) which involves an immediate cost ct and an one-period delayed benefit (of better
health and fit) b > ct. The cost is stochastic IID with distribution function F and strictly
positive density f over the support [0, c¯]. At t = 0 the individual may purchase a flat rate
subscription with up-front expense LT which allows to freely attend in any of the following
T periods. Alternatively, she can decide to attend with pay-per-visit at unitary price p. The
discount factor is normalized to one for simplicity and, for the time being, we assume no
cash constraints and risk neutrality. The individual may be present-biased in which case all
future payoffs are discounted by the same factor β ≤ 1 and she may be partially aware of
this bias so that the perceived bias is βˆ ∈ [β, 1]. As in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) the
consumer is naive if βˆ = 1 (she thinks herself not having any present-bias), if βˆ = β she is
sophisticated (being fully aware of her bias) and she is partially sophisticated if 1 > βˆ > β.7
At any date t > 0 the agent observes the cost realization and decides whether to attend,
dt = 1, in which case she pays p if she did not subscribe in t = 0 or not to attend, dt = 0.
Hence, in any t the individual attends if βb ≥ c when subscribing and if βb ≥ c + p
otherwise. Anticipating a present-bias βˆ she prefers to subscribe if
−LT + T ×
∫ βb
0
(βb− c)dF (c) ≥ T ×
∫ βb−p
0
(βb− p− c)dF (c).
Notice that an individual not affect by present-bias (i.e. β = 1) who attends independently
of the payment method (i.e. if c¯ ≤ b− p), would thus subscribe whenever
A0 = −LT + Tp ≥ 0, (2.1)
7We assume that β and βˆ are time invariant, a result confirmed in our data by Nardotto (2010). For a
theoretical model in which the individual learns about her present bias see Ali (2011).
51 Nudging with information
i.e. if she expects a sufficiently high attendance so that by subscribing at date t = 0 she
expects to save A0. An analogous expression for monetary saving will be further explored
below.
The individual may be inattentive and, at any date t, with probability λ the possibility
to attend is not salient with respect to alternative activities even if her current net payoff for
attending is positive. Furthermore, for a subscribing individual the up-front payment LT
may continue to be salient over the T periods even if it is sunk after t = 0. To formalize this
possibility and as suggested in the mental accounting literature (Thaler, 2004), at date t the
individual’s preference also contemplates a "transaction" utility v(At) weakly increasing
and concave with v(0) = 0, where At is some date-specific measure of mental account.
When the individual subscribes, she may open a mental account that considers the up-front
payment LT and may contrast this payment with the alternative of attending with a pay-
per-visit. At time of subscription t = 0, the expression of this mental account is reported in
(2.1), at later dates it could be, for example,
At = −LT + pDt (2.2)
where Dt =
∑t−1
i=1 di is past attendance. Since salience of the up-front payment LT may
decrease over time, we posit that v(At) depreciates at a factor δ ∈ [0, 1].
At any date t an individual is inattentive with probability λ, in which case dt = 0. With
probability 1− λ she is instead attentive and attends if
βb− c+ δt∆v(At) ≥ 0. (2.3)
where
∆v(At) ≡ v(At + p)− v(At)
is the mental accounting effect of attending at t. One possibility is that if v(At) = 0 for any
At ≥ 0, then mental accounting has an effect uniquely when the account is "in the red", i.e.
At < 0.
Reminders and feedback. As in our experimental treatment, any τ periods the individ-
ual receives a message that reminds her of the possibility to attend (a Pavlovian stimulus).
When the individual receives the reminder at date t (i.e. rt = 1), the individual becomes
fully attentive, she observes the cost and decides dt. However, with no reminders (i.e.
rt = 0), the probability of being inattentive in the following period t′ ≥ t increases back to
λρ(t′−t) where the "retention function" ρ(t˜−t) = 1 for some 0 < t˜ < t+τ and ρ′(.) > 0,
ρ(0) = 0.8 The stimulus of the reminder may also revamp the salience of the sunk cost LT .
8The decaying effect of the memory stimulus is supported by a large empirical psychological literature
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We thus similarly posit that the mental accounting depreciating factor becomes δρ(t′ − t).
Hence, upon receiving a reminder at date t, the probability of attendance at any date t′ ≥ t
is
Pr(dt′ = 1|rt = 1) = [1− λρ(t′ − t)]× F [βb+ δtρ(t′ − t)t∆v(At)]. (2.4)
At any date t an attentive individual has also the possibility to acquire a feedback on
past activity which specifies total past attendance since subscription Dt =
∑t−1
i=1 di, and
the implicit single-visit expense associated with the current subscription in case she attends
with the same frequency Dt/(t− 1) of the first t periods.
Testable implications. We now state some testable implications which we will consider
in the ensuing empirical analysis. The change in the probability of attending at date t′
having received a reminder at date t ≤ t′ is
Pr(dt′ = 1|rt = 1)− Pr(dt′ = 1|rt = 0) =
λ[1− ρ(t′ − t)]× F [βb+ δt∆v(At)] + [1− λρ(t′ − t)]×
∫ βb+δtρ(t′−t)∆v(At)
βb+δt∆v(At)
dF (c)
The first term is due to limited memory (it vanishes when λ = 0) and the second to mental
accounting (it vanishes when δ = 0).
(Implication 1) "In a population with inattentive individuals (i.e. λ > 0) and /or with
individuals with mental accounting (i.e. δ > 0), reminders increase attendance in future
periods. Instead, attendance of fully attentive individuals with no mental accounting is
unaffected by reminders."
Even if reminders do increase attendance, the previous implication does not allow to
disentangle the two motives, i.e. inattention and mental accounting. To address this issue
we first notice the following which can be seen from the definition of the probability to
attend (2.4) by setting ρ(t′ − t) = 1.
(Implication 2) "With no reminders, the probability to attend at any date t is constant
in t for inattentive individuals with no mental accounting (i.e. λ > 0, δ = 0) and may
decrease in t for attentive individuals with mental accounting (i.e. λ = 0, δ > 0)."
When λ = 0, δ > 0 the probability to attend at t becomes
Pr(dt = 1) = F [βb+ δ
t∆v(At)]
and, if ∆v(At) is either decreasing (as for example with a mental balance as in (2.2)) or
constant in t, then the larger is t the smaller is salience of the mental account and the
probability of attending is indeed decreasing in t due to mental accounting.
suggesting that a good fit for the function ρ(.), also known as the "retention function", is a power function with
an asymptote to some stable probability of attention, here λ. See Rubin and Wenzel (1996) among others.
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Also the effect of reminders is different with limited attention or mental accounting.
(Implication 3) "For an inattentive individual with no mental accounting (i.e. λ >
0, δ = 0), a reminder at t increases (the probability of) attendance in future periods t′ ≤ T
at a per-period rate which is non-decreasing in t′."
When λ > 0 and δ = 0 and the individual receives a reminder at date t, the probability
of attending at any of the future dates t′ ≤ τ is [1 − λρ(dt)]× F (βb) where dt = t′ − t,
so that the increase of (expected) attendance induced by the reminder (before receiving the
next reminder) is
λF (βb)
∑τ
dt=0
[1− ρ(dt)]
which is time invariant. Here we have assumed the stimulus of the reminder decays and
vanishes within τ periods. This may not be the case with high frequency of reminders (i.e.
τ is small) or more persistent stimulus. In these cases we should observe that receiving
a reminder increases attendance over time. This is different in case of mental accounting.
Consider, for simplicity, the extreme case of a full attentive individual (i.e. λ = 0) so that
Pr(dt′ = 1|rt = 1)− Pr(dt′ = 1|rt = 0) = [1− ρ(dt)]×
∫ βb+δt′ρ(dt)∆v(At′ )
βb+δt′∆v(At′ )
dF (c).
Now ∆v(At) may be constant or decreasing over time, as with the mental accounting bal-
ance in (2.2) where one checks period after period if past attendanceDt "justifies" the initial
expense LT . The cross derivative of the previous expression with respect to t′ and ρ(dt) is
negative: the larger is t′ the smaller is the effect of the stimulus ρ(dt) of the reminder.
(Implication 4) "For an individual with mental accounting (i.e. δ > 0), a reminder at t
increases (the probability of) attendance in future periods t′ ≤ T at a per-period rate which
may decrease in t′."
There are also types of balance for mental accounting which instead imply an effect of
reminders which increases over time. This is the case, for example, when the individual
also considers future attendance in the balance and this is determined extrapolating from
past attendance. Following a sequence of periods with no attendance, At sharply reduces
and ∆v(At) increases as well as the probability of attending.
Before concluding this section we notice that although mental accounting is intuitively
related to the possible regret faced by an individual after subscribing, one can show that a
direct application of regret theory first developed by Loomes and Sugden (1982) does not
allow to identify a specific effect based on this different behavioral assumption.
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2.3 The field experiment
This study is conducted in a gymnasium owned by a sport association for university students
in Bologna (Italy). This gym is not strictly reserved to students but they are the vast majority
of costumers (80% of the total) since the association has the objective to promote sport
activities among university students. Our analysis focuses on the students sub-sample. The
contracts offered to users by the gym are customary in this industry. The menu of contracts
contains subscription flat-rate contracts of different durations: one, two, three months and
for the entire academic year (respectively sold at: 45C, 85C, 118C and 270C); a pay-
per-visit ticket (at 6C) and carnet of visits (10 or 20 entrances, respectively at 50C and
90C). Fees are roughly 30% lower than average market fees (because of subsidies from
the university), but are still relevant for a student: the price for a monthly contract amounts
to 22% of the typical monthly disposable income of a student (200C, net of the cost of
board and lodging). Differently from other gyms (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006, for
example), in our case there is no automatic renewal of contracts so that users who discover
they do not like the activity, are very likely to quit immediately after the first contract.
For each student purchasing any right to enter the gym in the period January 2008 - Au-
gust 2010, we observe all choices in the menu of contracts and actual attendance recorded
at the gym entrance with an electronic key.9
Starting from September 2009 we conducted our field inquiry. We recruited students
advertising remunerated activities to be performed on a dedicated web-site by sending E-
mail to the gym mailing list composed by all students who ever purchased any right to
enter and distributing posters and fliers at the gym. Remunerated activities were available
to all participants just once and before proceeding to any further step.10 More than half
(55%) of the population of the gym registered at our dedicated web site thus leading to 243
participants.
At the moment of registration on the site, each user had been assigned to a treated group
9Some contracts allow students to both attend all courses organized by the gym and also use the gym
facilities, others discounted contracts only allow to use facilities. The performance of the gym and its staff is
monitored by the sport association which pays staff salaries and guarantees the staff’s incentives to monitor
entrance and the use of the electronic key.
10These activities consisted in (i) a survey with information on sport at the gym and in general, and also
students’ life, (ii) some cognitive and non-cognitive tests, (iii) an experiment on risk and time preferences (Holt
and Laury, 2002), also performed online. All participants were paid 5C for completing activities (i)-(ii). In
activity (iii) one out of five participants received a payment based on actual choices which ranged from 10 to
80C, with an average of 25C. The technology we adopted for the online implementation of these activities
is php/MySQL. In interactive sections we have designed a dynamic interface in Javascript. Results related to
these activities are reported in Nardotto (2010).
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or to a control group (8 subjects out of 10 have been assigned to the treated group). Each
treated user received a weekly E-mail containing no individual information but reminding
the possibility to attend the gym and to browse a personalized web page displaying (i) the
number of visits made since the beginning of the current contract and (ii) the implicit final
expense of each single entry at the gym expecting the same past attendance until the end
of the contract (the price of the alternative pay-per-visit was also displayed).11 Reminders
have been sent once a week in different days (generally on Sunday or Wednesday, see the
appendix for the exact deliver dates and the text of the message) and they neither reported
information on other users nor the list of recipients.
Users in the control group did not receive any reminder and could not access the per-
sonalized web page (they could only participate the activities described in note 2.3 but just
once and for all).
The timing of the experiment has been the following. In the first week of September
2009 our dedicated web-site became accessible and users could register. The closing date of
the site was unknown to the gym users and set at 2010 March 16th, well before the end of the
academic year (in Italy end of July) so that we could collect data on users’ performance also
after the end of the treatment. Since from July 31st the gym closes for one month summer
break, our data span from beginning of September 2009 to end of July 2010. We also have
data on individual contract choices and actual attendance for the entire population also in
the previous academic year (September 2008-July 2009). Since, as we will explain later,
a large part of the population is quitting the activity immediately after the first contract,
and we are interested in comparing performance before and after the treatment, we increase
the sample size of the control group adding those user of the previous academic year who
have a long contractual record (i.e. they subscribe in equivalent period translated one year
before). The inclusion of these users in the counterfactual for our treatment is based on the
following grounds: first, pre-treatment attendance of these users is the very close to the one
of the treated group; second, we see that users of the academic year 2009-2010 with long
contractual record are very likely to participate in the field experiment so we consider users
of the previous year with the same characteristic as a good counterfactual.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the timeline of the treatment for a user who subscribed contracts
before, during and after treatment. Each line represents the time span of a given subscription
11Participants could access the personalized web-page at any time logging in with individual credentials set-
up at registration. Treated users had also the possibility to use a calendar tool to plan days of future attendance
and check ex-post actually attendance. This tool received little attention (only 15 users). They could also use a
search engine to find the least costly solution to attend the gym based on expected attendance but also this tool
received little attention. Finally, they could unsubscribe the weekly E-mail and only two users did so.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of the experiment
Pre-treat Dur-treat Post-treat
1st
Sept
Web
Registration
16th
March
of this user: bold lines refer to days of the subscription in which the user did not receive
reminders, light lines refer to periods in which she received the weekly E-mails.
Summarizing, among the pool of 243 individuals registering our web-site, 103 users
purchased at least a subscription before and during the treatment period, and 52 of these
also purchased a subscription after the treatment has been lifted12. As we said above, add
to the control group users of the previous academic year who have purchased contracts in
the same periods (before, during and after treatment) one year ahead. Hence, the different
sample dimension, both in terms of users and in terms of contracts is reported in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Individuals registering the web-site by contract subscriptions
Total users (contracts) Treated
With contracts before, during and after treatment 86 (595) 43
With contracts at least before & during treatment 151 (771) 79
Total registered on the web-site 243
2.4 Reminders increase attendance
We now compare monthly attendance of treated and control users in the three periods,
before, during and after the treatment. Furthermore, we first restrict the analysis on the sub-
sample of those 86 users who actually purchased a subscription in each of the three periods
12The difference between the number of users who registered into the web site and bought contracts before,
during and after the treatment is due to two reasons. First, more than 40% of users sign one contract in the
gym and then quit the activity (some of them to do some other activity promoted by the University Sport
Association); second, since in between the before treatment period and the during treatment period there is
the end of the academic year and the consequent summer break, after the summer break many students do not
appear again in the gym.
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(before, during and after) so that referring to those "non-quitters" we can investigate to
effects of reminders at the intensive margin in a strict sense. Then, we will analyze whether
reminders had also an effect on the decision to quit the gym after treatment, thus verifying
the effect at the extensive margin. As we will discuss in the sequel (Section 2.6), our
results on reminders and attendance are confirmed with the larger sample of users which
contemplates also those who subscribed contracts only before- and during- but not after-
treatment.
Results on attendance for non-quitters are reported in table 2.2 which is divided in two
parts. The upper part reports average attendance of both groups, treated and controls. In
Table 2.2: Monthly attendance of treated and control users
Before During After Change Change N.
treatment treatment treatment Pre-Dur. Pre-Post users
Treated group 9.41 9.51 9.45 0.10 0.04 43
Controls 9.52 8.55 8.66 -0.97 -0.86 43
Diff. treat - controls -0.11 0.96 0.79 1.07* 0.9
(pooled) (0.0525) (0.1220)
Treated
High att. 11.14 10.35 10 -0.79 -1.14 23
Low att. 7.42 8.54 8.8 1.12 1.38 20
Controls
High att. 11.21 10.08 9.78 -1.13 -1.43 22
Low att. 7.75 6.95 7.48 -0.8 -0.27 21
Diff. treat - controls -0.33 1.59 1.32 1.92** 1.65
(low attendance) (0.0306) (0.1185)
the lower part both groups are split between high- and low-attendance users where this
distinction is obtained using the threshold of the average attendance in the period before-
treatment.
Before treatment, controls and treated users display a very similar behavior in terms
of monthly attendance. On average they attend the gym 9.5 times per month and statis-
tical tests do not reject the null of equal mean (Wilcoxon test, p-value=0.57, two sided
t-test, p-value=0.84). Notice that these users are quite active as compared with previous
studies. We then compare the change of behavior during treatment and with respect to
pre-treatment, of both treated and controls and observe that treated attendance increases
and instead that of controls decreases. This shows a difference of attendance of 1 visit per
month in the treatment period. The decline of attendance of the control group during treat-
ment is due to seasonality since months during treatment are characterized by cold winter
weather which is associated with lower attendance (we precisely study the effect of tem-
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perature below). However, this is not the case for treated users, who instead increase their
attendance during treatment. The different behavior of treated and controls (fourth column
lines two and three) is statistically significant (Wilcoxon test, p-value=0.0651, one-sided
t-test, p-value=0.0525).
When reminders ceased to be sent, i.e. after treatment, the two groups converged to-
wards more similar monthly attendance. A difference in attendance is still observed with
treated again attending more than controls (the third column), but it is not statistically sig-
nificant (Wilcoxon test, p-value=0.28, two sided t-test, p-value=0.24). With this respect
however notice that we are currently pooling all subscriptions from the day after we ceased
treatment (March 16th) to the closure day of the gym (end of July), i.e. a long period of four
and half months. It is then possible that treatment had an effect in building habits as re-
ported in CG, thus explaining the difference which still is observed after treatment between
controls and treated, but this habit fade out in the following months thus explains why this
difference is not significant. In fact, if we consider a shorter period after treatment of two
and half months (as in CG), then the (non reported) difference comparing during and after
treatment for treated and controls becomes higher and significant (one sided t-test).
Independently of treatment and periods, on average our user are very active showing
more than two visits to the gym per-week. This rate of attendance is significantly higher
than in all other studies with and without students (see the Introduction) and thus the effect
of reminders that we are documenting is even more striking. For example, CG reported that
their monetary incentives had an effect on non-regular users but had no significant effect on
regular users who were defined as those attending more than 1.6-2 times per week before
treatment, actually even less than our low attendance users.
If we split our sample between low and high attendance users, and concentrate on the
former group the effect of our reminders is even stronger and more striking. During treat-
ment and as compared with before treatment, low attendance treated users show an increase
of 1.92 visits per month with respect to low attendance controls, roughly an increase of
25% in monthly visits. This difference is significant despite the reduction in the sample
size (Wilcoxon test p-value=0.054, one sided t-test, p-value=0.0153, two-sided t-test, p-
value=0.03). Hence, as in CG our results on the effect of reminders are mainly driven by
low attendance users, although the effect is significant also for the entire population, as
shown before.
It is also instructive to compare the effect of reminders on low attendance users before
and after treatment, thus excluding the during treatment period (the last column of table 1,
bold numbers). The difference in attendance between treated and controls is again statisti-
cally significant and amounts to 1.65 more visits per month, thus an increase of more than
20% of attendance which we can attribute to habits persisting even after treatment. This
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figure is clearly less than what observed in CG who were mainly interested in habit forma-
tion observed after treatment and not during-treatment, since they used monetary incentives
that obviously affected treated attendance. The difference between our and their figures can
be attributed to two facts. First, we use a longer period after treatment (4.5 instead of 2.5-3
months). Second, our low attendance users are much more active than their non-regular
users (respectively around 7 and 3 visits per month) which implies that it is much more
difficult to induce a persistent change of habits to our users.
The effect of our reminders on attendance are confirmed by a linear regression per-
formed on the contracts purchased by (non-quitting) users. The dependent variable is the
number of monthly visits in each contract and the main regressors are the dummy for being
treated, the dummy that identifies the contracts that belong to the treatment period (labeled
"During") and the interaction between the two. The model also includes characteristics of
the user like age, gender, academic background, a dummy for receiving financial aid from
the university and variables which are important in determining the monthly attendance, i.e.
the distance from home to the gym and the average temperature experienced during the cur-
rent subscription. Table 2.3 illustrates the estimated coefficients for this model. Since the
unit of observation the contract, we employ a cluster robust regression (clusters associated
to users). The first column reports the estimated coefficient of the regression performed on
the whole sample while the second is restricted to low attendance users.
Estimated coefficients confirm the previous findings. Reminders have a substantial ef-
fect on the number of monthly visits to the gym which is stronger in contracts of low atten-
dance users. Indeed, the dummy referring to treated users is not significant by its own but it
is instead positive and significantly different from zero when interacted with the dummy of
the period in which the treatment was active. It is also interesting to notice that the (linear)
distance between dwelling place of users and the gym location reduces monthly visits and
that temperature has a hump shaped effect on attendance with an attendance maximizing
temperature at 14 degree Celsius which is exactly the mean annual temperature of the city
of Bologna where the gym is located (Nardotto 2011b further exploits these results).
As a final check of the effect of reminders on attendance, we estimate the probability of
attendance at any calendar date t for user u with the following model
Pr(attendance in dayt,u) = Φ(remindert, Dt,Wt, Su, C) (2.5)
where remindert is a dummy equal to one when we consider a day t which is treated by a
reminder,Dt is a vector containing monthly dummies and dummies for the day of the week,
Wt is a vector of local weather conditions of the day (temperature and rain), Su is a vector
of user’s characteristics such as gender, age, distance from home to the gym and academic
variables. In order to consider users facing the same incentives to attend as defined by the
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Table 2.3: Linear regression for treatment effect on monthly visits
Dep. Var: Monthly visits (clusters on users)
Whole sample Low attendance users
coeff. std err coeff std err
Treated -0.075 (0.558) 0.587 (0.376)
During period -0.933* (0.559) -0.864 (0.609)
Treated * During 1.207* (0.655) 1.768** (0.682)
Distance -0.424** (0.206) -0.370*** (0.116)
Mean temperature 0.258*** (0.093) 0.298*** (0.096)
Mean temperature2 -0.010*** (0.003) -0.011*** (0.003)
Gender -0.396 (0.654) 0.190 (0.446)
Age 0.021 (0.149) 0.117 (0.104)
Fin. aid 0.066 (0.691) -0.354 (0.416)
Academic controls YES YES
Constant 8.406** (3.657) 3.273 (2.466)
N. of contracts 595 358
R2 0.0924 0.1295
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
inequality (2.3), we base our analysis on those subscribing monthly contracts, which are by
far the most common choice in the gym’s menu (63% of all purchases in the gym, see table
2.11 in the appendix). Since we do not exactly observe when our E-mail is actually read
(which depends on how frequently users check their E-mail), we consider a day as treated
if we sent the E-mail the day before or the same day but before 12:00 a.m. (the gym is open
from 7:00 to 22:00). The strong and highly significant effect of reminders is reported in
table 2.4.13
All these results confirm that reminders do affect attendance inducing a significant in-
crease in month visits. The theoretical model developed in Section 2.2 clarifies that (Im-
plication 1) fully rational individual and even present-biased users should not be affected
by reminders. On the contrary, individuals with limited attention and / or using mental
13This analysis shows that reminders have an impact within 36 hours after we sent out our E-mails. How-
ever, depending on the technical equipment used by individual to check their E-mail account (e.g. PC or smart-
phones), the time window in which reminders produce their strongest effects may be different and possibly
even shorter. We are currently exploring this possibility.
61 Nudging with information
Table 2.4: Immediate effect of reminders on attendance
Dep. var: probability of a visit
Probit LPB
(Clusters) (I D)
Reminder (d) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.086∗∗∗ (0.019)
Monthly YES YES
Weather YES YES
Demographics YES YES
N 25437 25437
pseudo R2 .07224
R2 0.1144
Marginal effects, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
accounting should be induced to attend more by reminders (Implications 3 and 4) and our
empirical findings illustrate that the population of individuals is indeed affected by either
or both of these two biases. Before proceeding and trying to disentangle these two possibil-
ities, we conclude this section illustrating the effect of reminder on users’ decision to quit
or not the gym.
So far we have analyzed a subgroup of the overall population exercising before, during
and after treatment (i.e. non-quitting the gym). However, the composition of the treated
group may be affected by the treatment itself (extensive margin). In particular, the treatment
may discourage those who do not perform well, or on the contrary it may foster attendance
making users more likely to continue exercising after the expiration of a given contract
thus renewing a new contract. In an unreported regression we show that the probability
of quitting the gym thus not renewing any contract during the treatment period is reduced
by being treated with our reminders although the coefficient is not significant. Hence, if
anything, reminders induce some users who otherwise would have quit the gym, to instead
remain and continue exercising, thus increasing attendance also at the extensive margin.14
2.5 Why do reminders increase attendance?
As discussed in section 2.2 (Implication 2), if users are only affected by limited attention
then, independently of reminders and in a given subscription, the probability to attend at
any date t should be constant over time. Instead, individuals using mental accounts may
14This regression also shows that the probability of quitting is higher and significant for users at the first
contract and for being male.
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show attendance varying over the contract, increasing or decreasing in t, depending on the
mental account they use. We begin by directly checking the daily probability of attendance
over monthly contracts and we consider first monthly contracts signed before the start of the
treatment in order separate the effect of treatment on attendance.15 In figure 2.2 we plot the
Figure 2.2: Probability of a visits at each contract day for monthly contracts.
observed density of attendance in each of the 31 days of a contract and simple inspection
shows that there is a clear decreasing path over the month.
The figure also shows some spikes in attendance which are expected and correspond
to the first day (when users buy a contract they are physically at the gym and immediately
profit of the right to attend), and every seven days (since the week day of purchase and of
first attendance tends to be the most preferred day in the week). Notice also that the day
after a spike the probability of visit drops since although our users are quite active, it is rare
that they attends two days consecutively.
Now, to model attendance during the contract we estimate the following linear proba-
bility model for observing a visit in day t in contract j signed by user u,
P (V isit in dayt,j,u) =γ22
ndweek + γ33
rdweek + γ44
thweek+
+ γ5Remaining days+ β1Dt + β2Wt + β3Su
(2.6)
The main explanatory variables of interest are the dummy variables for the four weeks in the
contract. More precisely, we divide the span of the contract in five parts: the first week, from
the 1st to the 7th day, the second from the 8th to the 14th, the third from the 15th to the 21st, the
15Again we refer to monthly flat contracts also because longer flat contracts may be affected by strong season-
ality and by a long sequence of unpredictable and adverse contingencies which naturally decrease attendance
over time.
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fourth from the 22nd to the 28th and finally a dummy for the remaining days.16 We use the
first week as the baseline for these dummies. As before, we control for weather conditions
with Wt, weekly and monthly seasonality with Dt, and individual characteristics with Su.
The analysis is performed on two samples: the first, labeled “pooled” refers to attendance
before treatment and pools all users, the second, labeled “treated” refers to attendance of
only treated users and during treatment. All regressions are performed with individual fix
effects.
Results of the estimation are reported in the first two columns of table 2.5. The esti-
Table 2.5: Regression for the probability to attend in day t
Dep. Var: Probability to observe a visit in t
Before During Before During
treatment treatment treatment treatment
pooled treated pooled treated
Red account 0.022 0.074***
(0.014) (0.020)
Week 2 -0.027** -0.034* -0.027* -0.032*
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
Week 3 -0.051*** -0.056*** -0.043** -0.027
(0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022)
Week 4 -0.088*** -0.084*** -0.076*** -0.041**
(0.015) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025)
Remaining days -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.068*** -0.082**
(0.025) (0.037) (0.025) (0.039)
Dt YES YES YES YES
Wt YES YES YES YES
St YES YES YES YES
N 8854 4104 8854 4104
R2 .12338 .17737 .12449 .18406
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
mated coefficients of the first column (before treatment condition) capture the decreasing
16We divide the month on a seven day basis to have the first (preferred) day in each of the weeks. We also
include the Remainingdays dummy since some contracts, due to calendar effects, are slightly longer than
others.
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path identified in figure 2.2: attendance reduces along the month and at an increasing rated,
reaching a reduction of almost 9% in the last fourth week as compared with the first one.
With standard t-test on the week dummy variables we reject the null hypothesis of joint
equality to 0 (p-value=<.00001)17. Attendance within a subscription is indeed a decreasing
function of time and this finding is not compatible with limited attention only, as derived in
Implication 2. This result is further strengthened by estimated coefficients in column 2 of
the Table where the same regression is performed on the sample of treated users during the
treatment. Even if these users are made more attentive by reminders, the declining trend
in attendance is also present for these users and there is no evidence for a reduction with
respect to non-treated.18
In the last two columns of the table we provide evidence for a possibly more robust
explanation for the effect of reminders. As we have illustrated in the model section, there
are possibly many different accounting rules that individuals may have in mind.
Here we try to test directly the simplest rule illustrated in equation (2.2) according to
which the account is "in the red" and negative as long as past attendance was not enough
to justify the decision to purchase the flat contract, i.e. At = −LT + pDt. This account
is weakly decreasing over time and should then imply a mental accounting effect which
is decreasing over time along the time-span of the contract. Hence, we introduce in the
econometric model a dummy variable, Red account, which takes value 1 if the account is
in the red, i.e. At < 0, and value 0 if it is positive19.
Starting form the third column, we observe that the inclusion of Red account only
slightly reduces the size of the weekly trend which is still present in the data. The estimated
coefficient is positive as we expect but it is not significantly different from zero. We inter-
pret this finding as the presence of a greater incentive to attend when the account is in the
red which is however not so widespread in the population to emerge perhaps also because
some users may employ types of mental accounting that are more sophisticated than the
one we are currently considering. Alternatively, it could be that being inattentive, users do
not react perfectly to the current status of the account. This is consistent with the fact that
results change dramatically when we consider treated users during the period of treatment
17Single t-test performed on couples of coefficients lead to the following results: first, H0 : γ2 = γ3 is not
rejected (p-value=0.101), second, H0 : γ2 = γ4 is strongly rejected (p-value= <0.0001), third: H0 : γ3 = γ4
is rejected at 5%, (p-value=0.013) and fourth: H0 : γ2 = γ5 is strongly rejected, (p-value=0.0083).
18In an extended regression (not reported) with both samples and interactions terms between weeks and a
dummy for treatment period, we do not reject the null hypothesis that imposes a zero restriction on all these
interactions terms.
19Notice that the gym sets independently the values of L and p and so it determines exogenously the pivotal
visit at which the account of the user goes from red to positive.
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with estimates are reported in the last column. Here the effect of the mental account is the
dominant force in the first weeks of the month when users are reminded to attend and strive
to reach the goal of going positive in their account. In the data we observe that more than
75% of the switch (from red to black account, respectively negative and positive) are made
in week 2 and week 3 (36.7% and 40.4% respectively) and the change in magnitude of the
weekly dummy between column 2 and column 4 (both on treated users in the during pe-
riod) we testifies the importance of the mental account in determining attendance behavior.
The effect of going in the black account in the second and third week is captured by the
Red account dummy and the weeks after, the third and the fourth (but also the remaining
days), display a strongly reduced effect. Week 3 is roughly half of its value in column 2 (it
goes from -0.056 to -0.027) and the same holds for the Week 4.
The complementarity of remainders and mental accounting in inducing attendance is
further confirmed by a set of regressions, reported in table 2.6 on the effect of remainders.
The regression performed is the same as in the previous case when we estimated the effect
Table 2.6: Regression for the effect of reminder during red or positive account
Dep. Var: Probability to attend in day t
Red Account Positive account
Low High Low High
attendance attendance attendance attendance
Reminder 0.088*** 0.059 -0.001 0.085*
(0.026) (0.038) (0.041) (0.044)
Monthly YES YES YES YES
Weather YES YES YES YES
Demographics YES YES YES YES
N 8689 6244 3689 5089
R2 .15878 .20417 .13052 .16656
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
of reminders on the daily probability of attendance. Here the sample is split dividing the
days when the account is in the red (first two columns) and the ones in which the account
is in the black (last two columns). In the first column of each couple we consider the low
attendance users while in the second the high attendance ones. As previously reported the
effect of reminders is larger and strongly significant for low attendance users than for high
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ones. On top of this, we find that the effect of reminders on low attendance users vanishes
when they reach the goal of going positive in their account while it is stable in case of
high users, which is predicted by our model. Since low attendance users are characterized
by high cost and or low benefits of attendance, an important contribution to their utility
to attend may come from the mental accounting component. Because of that, when they
are in red, the arrival of the remainder determines a revamp of this component in their net
utility which determines a strong propensity to visit the gym. On the contrary, when the
account is positive, this additional component may be very small and the propensity to
attend in the next day is not affected. This is not the case for high attendance users who
continue to respond similarly to the reminder independently of the account since they are
more motivated by their smaller costs and or larger benefits of exercising.
The mental accounting we analyzed so far is only one of the many possible alternatives
and has been empirically tested through the inclusion of a dummy variable which takes
value 1 when the account is in red and 0 when the account is in black. In the following table
we explore the same myopic account but we allow for a non linear response to the account
status At. This means that we compute for each day At as the difference between LT and
the price for the past visits pDt and we include it in regression. This allows to estimate
the shape of ∆v(·) which should be decreasing as the account becomes more positive so
affecting at a decreasing rate the probability to attend. Result are reported in table 2.7.
There are now two remarkable facts. First, this accounting method is now strongly
significant, independently of treatment, with a second order polynomial effect which is
decreasing in attendance up to a value of +7.8 and +11 (which means to visit the gym more
than 15 to 18 times since the first 6 visits are in the red part of the account). Hence, users
are more likely to exercise when the account is in red and this effect fades out as the number
of visits increases (notice that the second branch of the parabola is not relevant since it is
associated to a very high number of monthly visits). Second, the negative path of attendance
over the month which we have documented above is now entirely explained by the mental
account since the coefficients of the week dummies now become positive (and significant)
partly incorporating the positive constant of the second order polynomial20.
20An estimation of a linear formulation of this account confirms this finding. However, we think that the
better fit of the second order polynomial has a relevant economic interpretation since it is associated to the fact
that the change of sign in the account, from red to black, matters for at least for part of the population. Hence,
the parabola better capture the non linearity between the red part of the account and the black one.
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Table 2.7: Regression for the probability to attend in day t
Dep. Var: Probability to observe a visit in t
Before treatment During treatment
pooled treated
Red account -0.033*** (0.0026) -0.033*** (0.0036)
Red account2 0.0021*** (0.0003) 0.0015*** (0.0005)
Week 2 0.069*** (0.0162) 0.0455** (0.0222)
Week 3 0.114*** (0.0197) 0.0899*** (0.027)
Week 4 0.12*** (0.0227) 0.111*** (0.0326)
Remaining days 0.146*** (0.0289) 0.113*** (0.043)
Dt YES YES YES YES
Wt YES YES YES YES
St YES YES YES YES
N 8854 4104
R2 0.126 0.183
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2.6 Feedback on past attendance
In order to understand the characteristics of individuals who acquire feedback and then
compare their attendance before and during the treatment, here we consider all the 151 users
who purchased monthly contracts at least before and during treatment but not necessarily
after treatment.
Table 2.8 illustrates regressions for the probability to acquire feedback, performed only
on the treated users who were the only users with the possibility to access to the personal
web pages. Regressors are several individual characteristics that we obtained with our sur-
vey and online experiments (see Section 2.3). The variable "Symbol digit test" refers to the
score of a fast test due to Lang, Weiss, Stocker, and Rosenbladt (2007) that has been em-
ployed also in other papers in economics (e.g. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2010)
and that we implemented in our web-site to measure computational speed (known to be
strongly correlated with IQ). The "Numeracy" variable refers to another cognitive skill and
is obtained as a score on a number of questions designed to elicit the ability of the subject to
make simple calculations (Nardotto 2011 provides more details and shows how this score
is strongly related to users’ ability to correctly forecast future attendance). "Conscientious-
ness" is one of the "big five" non-cognitive personality traits defined in the psychological
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Table 2.8: Probit regression for the probability to acquire feedback
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Symbol digit test 0.133** 0.141** 0.204**
(0.067) (0.067) (0.083)
Numeracy -0.050 -0.068 -0.188**
(0.068) (0.074) (0.090)
Experience days 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Gender -0.072 -0.022
(0.117) (0.128)
Age 0.015 -0.001
(0.024) (0.027)
Conscientiousness 0.137** 0.059
(0.063) (0.071)
Neurocitism 0.070 -0.066
(0.059) (0.077)
Monthly visits (BT) -0.003 -0.005
(0.010) (0.010)
Patience 0.091***
(0.031)
N 79 79 79 79
pseudo R2 .04358 .10635 .09798 .28248
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
literature to measure the degree to which a person is willing to comply with rules, norms
and standards. "Neuroticism" is another "big five" non-cognitive personality trait measuring
emotional stability (which in many contexts has been proved to affect economic choices)
and in our case it could be a proxy for the attitude towards information acquisition (in par-
ticular bad news). Finally, "Patience" is a standard measure time preferences obtained with
Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. "Monthly visits" are the average monthly visits in the
period before the treatment. Other regressors, not included in these table, are the demo-
graphic characteristics already used in previous regressions, other measures of traits and
the measure of disposable income obtained in our survey.
These regressions show that the probability to acquire feedback is larger for individuals
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with higher cognitive abilities but low numeracy skills. The probability is also higher for
those who are more conscientious and patient. The first two elements are interesting, and
their effect is strong. More skilled users, in terms of numeracy, do not look for feedback
probably because they are already able to compute the implicit cost of their contract which
was available in the feedback page and to recall the exact number of past visits. At the same
time, cognitively endowed users are more likely to acquire information probably because
they value it or simply because they are more curious (for a discussion on the relation
between personality traits and cognitive skills, see Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and
Bas, 2008). Experience seems to affect the decision to acquire feedback. The effect on the
probability of 90 days of experience is to increase it by 18%. This coefficient is stable across
specification but always borderly significant. Personality traits are borderly significant but
the sign, at least for conscientiousness, is the one we expect: users who have a better score
are more likely to acquire feedback. Finally, more patient users are more likely to acquire
information.
We now concentrate on the group of individuals acquiring feedback (26 users in the
group of 79 treated). First, the following picture illustrates the density (across all users) of
Figure 2.3: Day of the month in which the feedback is acquired with respect to the switch
from red to green
this decision to access the feedback web-page in relation with the days before and after the
day in which the account defined as At = −LT + pDt changes sign becoming positive.
Notice that users using feedback inspect the web-page not just once but repeatedly for many
days. More importantly, we observe two spikes at 3 to 6 days before the switching day of
the account and the second spike just after the switch. This suggests that those who use
feedbacks like observing the confirmation of having performed well at the gym and look
for this information in two precise moments: when they are closed to pass the pivotal visit
that makes the account positive and right after this visit to the gym.
Feedback on past attendance 70
Now we estimate the same regression illustrated at the end of the previous section, with
a linear probability model of attending in a given day on the three week dummies (see Table
2.9) but we restrict to the individuals who do acquire feedbacks.
Table 2.9: Regression on the effect of being in the red account
Dep. Var: probability to observe a visit in day t
Coefficient Std. Error
Red account 0.083* (0.044)
Week 2 -0.046 (0.038)
Week 3 -0.029 (0.047)
Week 4 -0.021 (0.059)
Remaining -0.075 (0.075)
N 1195
R2 .16746
Marginal effects; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Remarkably, for these individuals the coefficients of the week dummies are no more
significantly different from zero, whilst the dummy for the mental accounting continues to
be significant, positive and of the same magnitude. Hence, it seems that for individuals
acquiring feedbacks, the main driver of the decision to attend is strictly related to mental
accounting.
We conclude this section by investigating an interesting effect of feedbacks. Increased
attendance induced by reminders has clearly an effect on whether a given subscription turns
out to be ex-post an optimal choice in the sense that it minimizes the subscriber expense
among the options available in the menus of the gym. This measure of cost optimality
has been extensively used in the literature to verify whether individuals are present-biased
(see for example DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006 and Nardotto, 2011). As a measure of
(sub-)optimality we thus define a monetary loss
L =
Sˆ(DT )− min
S∈Menu
S(DT )
Sˆ(DT )
where Sˆ(DT ) and S(DT ) are the costs respectively for the contract actually subscribed
and for any (combination of) contract available in the menu offered by the gym and these
costs are in general functions of total attendance DT actually observed at the end of ac-
tual subscription. We then estimate a probit model (with clusters at the user level) for the
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probability that the contract k of user i generates a loss lk,i with
lk,i = max(0, l
∗
k,i)
where
l∗k,i = Ti +Dk + TDk,i + Ck,iβ1 + Piβ2 + Skβ3 + εi (2.7)
and Ti, Dk, TDk,i are respectively dummy for being treated, dummy for contract in the
period during treatment and interaction, Ck,i is a vector of users and contract’s characteris-
tics (e.g. whether it is a flat rate, experience of the user at the moment of subscribing and
others), Pi are user’s characteristics (gender, age, academic background and others), Sk are
other contract specific factors including weather and distance from home.
Table 2.10 reports the estimated coefficients. Since reminders do increase attendance
Table 2.10: Probit regression on the probability of incurring in a loss
Dep. Variable: Prob. of incurring in a loss
Full sample Info-active + controls
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std Error
During treatment (d) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.158∗∗∗ (0.056)
Treated (d) -0.037 (0.044) -0.074 (0.055)
Treated x during (d) -0.102∗∗ (0.044) -0.127∗∗∗ (0.047)
Weather YES YES
Academic YES YES
Demographics YES YES
N 771 462
pseudo R2 0.08168 0.10513
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses
and higher attendance reduces the loss of a contract, the probability of incurring a loss is
reduced by the interaction of the treatment and the during-treatment period dummies. These
regressions performed on the larger sample of 146 users who buy contracts before the treat-
ment and during the treatment periods, confirm the previous findings on the restricted users
with contracts in all periods. What is interesting to notice is that in the case of individu-
als acquiring feedback (column two) this interaction is even stronger and more significant.
Although our web-site also allowed users to calculate the least cost contract (or sequence
of contracts) for given time horizon and expected attendance, we rather think that more
plausible explanations are that either individuals attending more and thus incurring in lower
Concluding remarks 72
losses sort into the group of those acquiring feedback, or feedback further revamp mental
accounting and induce higher attendance (or both these two effects are active).
2.7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigated the effects of reminding consumption opportunities to individ-
uals who are likely to be inattentive and using mental accounting strategies. We have tested
this possibility on a sample of subscribers in a gymnasium, finding that reminders strongly
increase attendance in the gym for treated users receiving weekly E-mail, especially for
those users with relatively low attendance before treatment and that reminders have an ef-
fect few hours after being received. We have also clarified that inattention alone cannot
explain the change of behavior we observe and that an at least concurrent (if not predom-
inant) channel through which reminders foster attendance is mental account. Individuals
indeed respond in their attendance decision to a mental account that contemplates the up-
front subscription payment to attend the gym, actual attendance and the expense associated
with alternative means to attend. Finally, we have studied the identity of individuals who
deliberately decided to acquire feedback on past individual performance and relate this to a
further increase in attendance and lower monetary expense to attend.
With our filed experiment and simply using reminders and feedback we were able to
obtain results comparable to those that have been obtained in similar environments but with
significant monetary incentives. A word of caution must be warned as usual when extrap-
olating our results to different environments. However, we think that they are important
in terms of policy implications since they show that good habits can be induced with a
very cheap but still effective instrument, information, also very much limiting the risk of
crowding out intrinsic motivations.
Our analysis has been limited to individuals who, independently of our treatments, de-
cided to enter the market, the gym, and at least to try to exercise. An interesting avenue for
future research is to see if and how reminders may also induce individuals to actually start
(and then continue) with desirable and healthy activities.
A simplistic extrapolation in terms of policy of our results is that we could try to incen-
tivize individuals on many different and desirable investment activities by simply sending
them as many reminders as the activities. We expect however that the problem of limited
attention would emerge again although, in this case, with respect to the many reminders
competing for attention. It would be interesting to verify whether this is the case and what
is the optimal number of reminders which limits the risk of information overload.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Tables
Contract menu and actual purchases.
Table 2.11: Attendance by contract category and prices (year 2010)
Type of contract Price (C) No. Rel. freq.
Single entrance 6,00 548 8.8%
Carnet (10 visits) 50,00 122 2%
Carnet (20 visits) 90,00 62 1%
One month 45,00 3918 63.1%
Two months 85,00 308 5.0%
Three months 118,00 518 8.3%
Academic flat 270,00 58 0.9%
Flat 1 euro promotion – 281 4.5%
Specific contracts – 384 6.2%
The text of the E-mail (English version).
Dear student,
do you want to know your actual use of GymCus?
Go to your personal webpage at [http: address] (send an E-mail to cusb.gym@unibo.it if
you forgot your login credentials).
In the webpage "Information on your activities at the gym: learn how to use the GymCus!"
you can:
1- Check your weekly attendance and associated actual price for single entrance
2- Plan and check your visits to the gym
3- Find the least costly solution that better fits your needs (mostly useful when you are
about to subscribe a new contract)
4- Unsubscribe this E-mail service
Use these information services for a more convenient use of your GymCus!
Regards, cusb.gym@unibo.it

Chapter 3
On the relationship between risk
aversion and impatience with
cognitive abilities and personality
traits
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the relationships between individual characteristics of cognition
and personality and two fundamental determinants of economic decision: risk aversion and
impatience. To investigate this link we run an online experiment on a sample of students
enrolled at the University of Bologna. Experiments where incentivized through monetary
rewards and incentive compatible. Cognitive skills have been measured through an estab-
lished test and personality traits have been elicited through a standard questionnaire em-
ployed in both psychology and economics to measure the Big five personality traits. We
find that risk aversion and impatience are negatively associated with higher cognitive skills.
Moreover, subjects with higher numeracy skills are more likely to behave as risk neutral.
Personality traits are the main predictors of time preference and in particular neurocitism
and conscientiousness. The former is the degree to which a person is emotionally stable
when facing stressful situations, the latter is the degree to which a person sticks to plans
both internally and externally imposed. Finally, we show that personality facets like impul-
sivity strongly affects behaviour in the experiment and much can be gained in the analysis
taking into consideration these factors.
Keywords: Cognitive ability, personality traits, risk aversion, patience, online experiment
JEL codes: D12, D81
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3.1 Introduction
It has been recognized, both by economist and psychologist, that economic outcomes are
related to cognition and personality. Cognitive skills are fundamental to interpret, collect
and elaborate information and so to make economic decisions. At the same time, person-
ality traits may also influence the mental processes related to choice, determining relevant
consequences in economic decisions. For example, the emotional reaction to uncertainty
of an individual is likely to affect his attitude towards risk. At the time the same factor be-
hind this reaction may influence also the response for example to the possibility to acquire
information or the way information is processed.
So far, both in the economic and psychology literature, most of researchers investigated
these relationships analyzing the correlations between both cognitive skills and personality
traits and labor outcomes or other economically relevant life outcomes (examples are the
probability of being unemployed, earnings, mortality, unhealthy habits etc. ). In this paper
we study the relationships between risk aversion and impatience with cognitive abilities and
personality traits. We measure directly these preference characteristics through two payed
experiments and we elicit cognitive skills and personality traits of the participants.
The experiments are performed online and the subject pool of participants is composed
by 300 students at the University of Bologna. The design of the experiments is close to the
one of Holt and Laury (2002) on risk preference. We elicit personality traits following the
established categorization in psychology of the Big five personality traits. This theory of
personality reduces the multitude of facets that characterize human behaviour to five factors
(openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neurocitism)
which can be considered at the highest level of generalization. We consider two types of
cognitive skills. The first is the ability to process and recall information which is measured
through a test developed by Lang, Weiss, Stocker, and Rosenbladt (2007). The second are
numeracy skills (in our case we focused on the ability in making simple calculations: to
compute sums, divisions and ratios) which are measured by a small sample of questions.
This paper is close to the one by Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010) (hereafter
DFHS). In this respect we find that the relationships highlighted in this paper between cog-
nitive skills and both risk attitude and patience are confirmed. In particular, higher cognitive
skills are associated to lower risk aversion and greater patience. Moreover, two new results
come out from our study. The first is related to the role of numeracy skills, which proved
to be important in determining the attitude towards risk of subjects. In particular, we find
a positive and strong correlation between numeracy skills and risk neutral behaviour. This
result is robust to the inclusion of the academic background of subjects among the explana-
tory variables and confirms the findings of other studies such as Benjamin, Brown, and
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Shapiro (2005). The second result regards the role of personality traits in affecting the time
preferences of subjects. We find neurocitism (that is defined as the degree to which a person
is emotionally unstable and experiences the world as threatening) as an important predictor
of patience. Coherently with recent studies such as Anderson, Burks, DeYoung, and Rusti-
chini (2011), we find that more emotionally stable subjects are also more patience. Another
trait which seems to have a role in affecting time preferences is conscientiousness, which is
defined as the degree to which a person is willing to comply with rules and standards, both
internally and externally imposed. In this case we find a positive effect of this trait and the
willingness to postpone gratifications. However, a statistically significant relation emerges
in some tests but not in general specifications of our econometric estimations.
The second contribution is methodological. On one side we show that results coming
from an online experiment are comparable with those obtained in a more controlled en-
vironment (in the case of DFHS subjects received the visit of a trained experimenter in
their home). This is in line with the few studies that compare the behaviour of participants
in online and laboratory experiments and provides support for the reliability of online ex-
periments. On the other side we show the importance of including, both in the case of
laboratory and online experiment, measures of impulsivity in the battery of test proposed
to subjects. In our case, as in every experiment, subjects may be not be very attentive to
their task (even if the experiment is payed and incentive compatible), so it may be worthy
to control for disturbing factors like impulsivity in completing the activity. Including into
our test a short number of questions proposed by Frederick (2005), designed to measure the
degree of cognitive reflection and impulsivity of subjects, we show that noise in the data
can be effectively reduced once controlling for this element in the analysis.
The paper is organized as follows: is section 3.2 we present the data. In particular,
we discuss how measures of risk attitude, patience personality traits and demographics are
obtained. In section 3.3 we report the empirical analysis and in section 3.4 we perform
some robustness analysis on the previous results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data description
Data were collected as part of a study on choice behaviour in a subscription market (see
Nardotto 2011b). The subject pool is composed by students at the University of Bologna
and experiments have been run from September 2009 to the end of July 2010. The age
of these students ranges from 19 years old to 34 years old and the vast majority of them
is between 19 and 27. Participants went through a survey on demographics, the tests on
cognitive abilities and personality traits and, as a last step, they run the payed experiments
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on risk and time preferences1.
3.2.1 Measures of cognitive ability
The test we adopt to measure cognitive abilities borrows from a submodule of the nonverbal
section from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) which is the most established
test in psychology to evaluate the cognitive skills and is composed by different sections
designed to measure different aspects of cognition. In the test we use, subjects have to
match symbols accordingly to a mapping and have a time limit. The purpose of the test is
to evaluate how fast subjects are in processing and recalling information. We opt for this
particular test because it is well suited to be performed online and Lang, Weiss, Stocker,
and Rosenbladt (2007) proved it to be highly correlated with general IQ measures. The test
consists in the following: subjects are told about the content of the activity which consists
in being faced with nine unfamiliar symbols each of them paired with a digit from one
to nine. Beneath the box with the symbols and the digits, subjects find a start button and
below two rows of covered symbols that become visible only at the moment of start. Once
the subjects press the start button, they have ninety seconds to fill as much entries as they
can. Whenever a number is inputted, the cursor goes automatically to the next symbol. Two
figures of the screen are reported in appendix 3.6.1. The test is made of three stages with
increasing difficulty and is preceded by a trial stage to show to the subject the functioning
of the test.
The program is written in Javascript and it is run locally by the computer of the subject
so no slowdown can be caused by the connection to the remote server. Moreover, since it is
also a very simple program, no slowdown is expected to occur during the test. If a subject
interrupted the test (closing the window, shutting down the computer etc.) we recorded
this event in our database. In this way, when the subject connected again to the web site
she had to start again from the beginning. Overall, 14 subjects interrupted the test but this
happened always at the very beginning (during the trial stage) and at the second connection
they run the entire test properly. The rest of the subjects did the test at the first time without
interruptions.
The distribution we get for the score in this test is reported in figure 3.1. As we see
from the graph, a subject did not run the test properly but waited until the time was up.
In the analysis we exclude this observation from the sample2. We run the same cognitive
1Every step has been implemented online and the technology we adopted is php/MySQL. For the interactive
sections (symbolic test and risk and time experiments) we have designed a dynamic interface in Javascript.
2We see also that this subject performed very poorly in the impulsivity test. We did not condition the
payment for participation to any performance indicator, and is very likely that this subject did not pay much
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of scores in the cognitive ability test
test in a class of undergraduate student of the university of Bologna and a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for the equality of the two distributions do not reject the null hypothesis that
the two samples come from the same population (p-value=0.325). Hence, performing the
test online rather than in a laboratory do not seem to have an effect on the performance of
subjects.
The second measure of cognitive ability we employ is based on a short test for numeracy
skills. It consists in four questions designed to evaluate the attitude of subjects in doing
simple computations of ratios, sums and proportions. Questions and the distribution of
scores are reported in appendix 3.6.1.
3.2.2 Measures of personality traits
The modern theory of personality identifies five factors at the broadest level of abstraction:
openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neurocitism.
All these factors are categories to which different facets (hence considered at lower lever
in this hierarchical scale) belong. For example, neurocitism, defined as the degree to which
a subject is emotionally stable, has as its facets, among the others, traits like anxiety and
vulnerability. Hence under this approach, to obtain a measure for each trait, it is necessary
to elicit the different facets that belong the broader factor.
In our case we focus on two of these five traits, conscientiousness and neurocitism,
since we consider them as the most relevant in the choice problem we propose to the sub-
jects. Conscientiousness is defined as the degree to which a person is sticky to externally
or internally imposed plans and the tendency to act consciously. Neurocitism, often labeled
attention to the activities we proposed.
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emotional stability, is the tendency to experience negative emotional states such as anxiety
and anger. Other than these two, we elicit two other traits which can be relevant in our case:
internal and external locus of control. The former is the degree to which a person believes
that life outcomes are determined by own actions and abilities while the external locus of
control is the degree to which she believes they are determined by external elements beyond
her own control such as fate or luck.
To measure these personality traits we employ standard questions proposed by the psy-
chological literature and in particular the same questions employed in the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP). The survey approach to elicitation of traits is obviously the com-
mon choice in large scale studies where direct elicitation by professional psychologists is
not feasible. For a discussion on the strength and the weaknesses of this approach see
Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and Bas (2008).
3.2.3 Experiments on risk aversion and impatience
The experiments to elicit the attitude towards risk and patience are payed and incentive
compatible. Every subject does both of them starting from the one on risk attitude. The
stages are the following: first, subjects read the instructions of the risk experiment; second,
they run a tutorial which has the same features of the payed stages and at the end of the tuto-
rial stage, it is performed a simulation of a final payment. Third, in order to check whether
the subjects have understood the content of the experiment, they must fill a questionnaire
and cannot proceed to the payed stage until the provided answers are all correct. Fourth,
the payed stages on risk preference are run. After this stage, the subjects follow the same
procedure for the time experiment, so they read the instructions, run the tutorial, answer to
the questions and finally do the payed stage. When the time experiment is finished, subjects
go to the web page where the payment is displayed and automatically the experiment ends3.
Instructions of the experiment are reported in appendix 3.6.3.
The design of both experiments is very close to Holt and Laury (2002). In the experi-
ment on the attitude towards risk, subjects face two tables with 10 rows each. Each row is
made by a couple of alternative payments: option A and option B. The former is an amount
of money that is granted for sure (e.g. 20 euro); whereas the latter is a lottery that have a
small prize (e.g. 5 euro) and big prize (e.g. 35). The two payments of option B are granted
with a probability 1/2. All the rows are displayed from the beginning of the stage and the
3Subjects are part of a field experiment so they are registered in our database and can login in the experiment
web site only through their account. Before seeing the actual displayed in the screen, the access of the subject
to the web page of the experiment is disabled so nobody could re-start the experiment in order to get a higher
payment.
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sequence is such that option B remains constant while option A becomes at each row (mov-
ing downward) less attractive since it is reduced at each step by a fixed amount. Because
the valued of the option B is constant and the one of option A is decreasing, a subject with
monotonic preference should switch from A to B at a certain point of the table and then
continue to select B. However, it is common in the literature to see cases in which subjects
select again option A after the first switch to B. This makes difficult to infer the degree of
risk aversion of these subject who in general amount to 8%-12% of the subject pool. In our
case we design the experiment in a way that lessen this issue. First, we allow the subject to
go back to a previous row to change the selected option at any point in the table. Second,
when option B is selected, a pop-up window appears in the screen saying that in the sub-
sequent rows option A guarantees a lower payment. When the pop up disappears, subjects
can complete automatically the table pressing a button that becomes active besides the table
or to continue to fill it manually. In our case, with this two elements, we do not observe any
switch back to A after a switch to B.
Switching points associated to risk neutrality are placed differently in the two tables. In
the former a risk neutral agent should switch at row 7 while in the second table at 6 or 7.
Payments differs among the tables. In the first, option B has a small prize of 5 euro and a
large one of 20 euro (this implies an expected value of 12.5 euro) while the certain amount
starts from 18 euro and is lowered at each row by 1 euro (hence, in the last row it reaches
a value of 9 euro). In the second table, option B has a small prize of 20 euro and a large
one of 80 euro (this implies an expected value of 50 euro) while the certain amount starts
from 75 euro and is lowered at each row by 5 euro (hence, in the last row it has a value of
30 euro).
First table switching row First table certainty equivalent
Figure 3.2: First table switching row and corresponding certainty equivalent
Results for the switching rows in the two risk experiments are reported in figures 3.2,
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3.3. As we see from the graphs a non negligible share of subjects switches immediately
Second table switching row Second table certainty equivalent
Figure 3.3: Switching row and corresponding certainty equivalent, second table
in both tables. Without considering this group, which is treated separately in the follow-
ing, few subjects are very risk loving. If we split the population between risk loving sub-
jects (switches between 1 and 4), risk neutral (switches between 5 and 7) and risk averse
(switches between 8 and 10) then the shares are respectively 19.39%, 50.72% and 29.35%
in the first table with lower payment and 7.55%, 52.16% and 40.29% in the second table
with higher payment. This seems to suggest that users tend to be risk neutral and risk averse,
expecially when payments increase4
The experiment on impatience is similar to the previous one. In this case each row has
2 options, A and B, where the former is 20 euro of telephone credit which is transfered in
2 days, while the second is a 40 euro telephone credit transfered in a later point in time5.
Moving down in the table, which in this case has 20 rows, the time span between the small
amount and the large amount of credit increases since latter is made more far in time. In
the first row the subject has to wait 7 days which are increased constantly by 4 days per row
until 51 and then by 10 days per row. In the last row to obtain the large prize the subject has
to wait for 131 days.
As for the risk experiment, once the subject makes the first switch, a pop up window
4From our survey we know that the average monthly income (net of expences) of the population is 200 euro.
Hence, the expected value of the lottery amounts to 6.25% of the monthly income in the first table and to 25%
in the second table.
5Subject have been informed about the nature of the payment (telephone credit) in the instructions. When
the experiment took place, the vast majority of consumers in the mobile telephone market in Italy has a pay as
you go contract so our payment valuable for our subject pool. Those who could not receive the payment had
the possibility to contact the experimenter and ask for a different type of payment. Nobody however did use
this option.
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appears saying that in the following rows the large payment is made even more far and au-
tomatic completion button appears. To lessen the issue of transaction costs of obtaining the
payment at different dates, which can be a serious concern in this experiment, the telephone
credit has been transfered electronically by the experimenter so no cost is born by subjects
to receive their prize at any date. Results for the switching row in the time experiment are
reported in figure and 3.4. The modal row is the last one and is associated with a annual
discount rate lower or equal to 5.8%.
Figure 3.4: Number of rows without switch in the time experiement
Considering the data obtained in the three tables, an important issue regards the imme-
diate switches made by a subgroup of subjects. They selects to switch at the first row in
both tables of the risk experiment and are very impatience in the risk experiment, switch-
ing at the beginning of the table. We explain this behaviour through the possibility to quit
the experiments quickly through the automatic completion button. This explanation is sup-
ported by the fact that this group of subjects perform poorly in the impulsivity test (see
section robustness for more details) but interestingly not in the symbolic test, which cannot
be skipped since the time duration of the stages is fixed. Hence, for this group of subjects,
the observed behaviour in the experiment is likely not to reflect their actual characteristics.
This is an important issue that researcher who run experiment online must consider as a
potential source of noise in the data. Because of this, in the analysis we focus on the rest of
the population
3.3 Result
Our findings are in line with results emerged in the literature. We find however other results
that have not been pointed out so far. First, as in Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde
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(2010), we find a negative relation between cognitive ability and risk aversion; second, we
find a positive relation between cognitive ability and patience. Other than that, we also
show that cognitive skills are positively associated with being risk neutral and in particular
numeracy skills. Moreover, we find a relation between some personality traits, namely
conscientiousness and neurocitism, and impatience.
3.3.1 Relationship between risk aversion and impatience with cognitive skills
We start by examining the relationship between risk aversion and cognitive skills. Table
3.1 reports the estimated coefficients of an interval regression6 of the switching row on the
measures of cognitive skills. The measures of cognitive skills we consider are the score
in the symbolic test7 and score in the numeracy test. Column (A) to (C) refers to the first
Table 3.1: Estimation of the relation between risk aversion and cognitive skills
Dependent variable Number of rows before switching to option B
First table Second table
(A) (B) C) (D) (E) (F)
Symbol digit test -.257∗∗ -.241∗ -.183∗ -.174∗
(0.031) (0.051) (0.076) (0.098)
Numeracy -.198 -.157 -.120 -.091
(0.283) (0.405) (0.339) (0.475)
Constant 6.76∗∗∗ 7.34∗∗∗ 7.25∗∗∗ 7.53∗∗∗ 7.9∗∗∗ 7.81∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log pseudo-
likelihood -564.98 -571.51 -564.51 -534.56 -537.23 -534.36
N 275 276 275 277 278 277
p-values in parentheses, robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
table of the risk experiment where option A range from 4% of the average monthly income
of subjects to 10% and the certainty equivalent of the lottery is 6,25% of this income.
Columns (D) to (E) to the second table where payoffs range from 10% to 40% and the
certainty equivalent of the lottery is 25% of the average monthly income.
6We follow Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010) estimating this generalization of the tobit model
which allows for left and right-censored observation with known intervals.
7We standardize this measure so it has mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal so one.
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Both cognitive measure are negatively correlated with the degree of risk aversion rep-
resented by the number of rows where option A is selected. Subjects with higher cognitive
skills tend to have switch to the risky option before meaning that they are willing to bear
more risk. Coefficients however are significant at 5 and 10 percent only for the first measure
of cognitive skills. This suggest that cognitive skills are associated with less risk aversion,
as pointed out in the literature, but numeracy skills are less important.
The role of numeracy skills emerges in table 3.2 which reports the estimates of a probit
regression for a switch to option B in the rows associated with risk neutrality8. The posi-
Table 3.2: Estimation of the relation between risk neutrality and cognitive skills
Dependent variable Probability of switching at 6th or 7th row
First table Second table
(A) (B) C) (D) (E) (F)
Symbol digit test .0686∗∗ .0583∗ .0358 .0244
(0.021) (0.052) (0.246) (0.437)
Numeracy .109∗∗∗ .0983∗∗ .129∗∗∗ .124∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003)
N 275 276 275 277 278 277
Pseudo R2 .01507 .02175 .0323 .00356 .02611 .02766
Marginal effects; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
tive coefficients of our general measure of cognitive skills, captured by the digit score test,
suggest that risk neutral agents tend to be more skilled but only in table 1 column (A) the
coefficient is significantly different from zero. The main result we find regards the impor-
tance of numeracy skills. Coefficients are strongly significant and robust to the inclusion of
the other trait in the specification. The two tables confirm the findings of previous research
on the relationship between cognitive skills and risk aversion and add an important element
to the picture since we identify in the numeracy skills a determinant of the risk attitude of
economic agents.
8To perform this analysis we create a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the subject switches to option
B at rows 6 or 7. In the second table row 6 is the one where the expected value of the two options are the same
(50 euro) while in row 7 the value of option A decreases to 45 and the lottery does not change. Hence, at row
6, a risk neutral agent is indifferent between the two options while in row 7 should select option B. In table 1,
the expected value of option B is 12.5 euro while the value of of option A is 13 in row 6 and 12 in row 7. A
strict rule in this case would be to consider as risk neutral only subjects who switch at row 7 but we consider
such a criterion too restrictive and we categorize as risk neutral also subjects who switch at row 6.
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The empirical analysis for the relationship between impatience and cognitive skills is
similar to the previous. We estimate an interval regression model for the switch to option
A on both our measures of cognitive ability. Table 3.3 reports the result of the estimation.
Estimated coefficients have the expected sign but the score in the symbolic digit test is not
Table 3.3: Estimation of the relation between patience and cognitive skills
Dependent variable Number of rows before switching to option A
(A) (B) C)
Symbol digit test -0.184 -0.338
(0.737) (0.545)
Numeracy 1.292∗ 1.360∗
(0.095) (0.084)
Constant 13.911∗∗∗ 9.946∗∗∗ 9.713∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log pseudo likelihood -760.8 -760.598 -758.946
N 274 275 274
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
significant. It is however strongly significant the numeracy score in both the specifications
of columns (B) and (C).
3.3.2 Relationship between risk aversion and impatience with personality
traits
Personality traits have been recognized by the psychological literature as relevant in predict-
ing socioeconomics outcomes such as academic achievement and job performance. A grow-
ing economic literature is focusing on this relationships and notable examples are Heckman
and Rubinstein (2001) and Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006). Our results confirms this
relationship in particular with respect to the link between patience and personality traits.
Table 3.4 reports estimated coefficient of an interval regression between the switching row
and the personality traits we are interested in. Neurocitism is defined as the tendency to
experience negative emotional states such as anxiety and anger. The measure we have is
reversed and the higher the score the more stable a subject is. The estimated coefficient
of neurocitism is positive and strongly significant, meaning that more emotionally stable
subjects are also more patient in the payed experiment. An important trait determining
choice in our experiment is impulsivity. As for neurocitism the scale in which the trait is
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measured is reversed in the sense that the higher the score, the less impulsive is the subject.
Columns (E) and (G) report the estimated coefficient for this trait. As we said at the end of
section 1.3, we focus here on the restricted subject pool of participants who did not switch
immediately at the first row in the risk experiment and in the time experiment. Hence, these
coefficients, which are always strongly significant, show the importance of this personality
trait in determining economic choices, especially those involving intertemporal trade-offs.
Conscientiousness is defined as the degree to which a person is sticky to externally or inter-
nally imposed plans and the tendency to act consciously. Also in this case we find a positive
coefficient which is weakly significant in specifications (F) and (G). The last two columns
reports estimated coefficients for the entire sample of subjects. In this case the results are
in line with previous findings and the significance of conscientiousness increases.
3.4 Robustness
In this section we perform some robustness checks to verify whether the relationships we
identified are robust to the inclusion of elements that have been shown to affect traits, both
cognitive and personality traits. This in turn may affect the relationship between these
primitives of cognition and personality and the economic preference of subjects.
The first one is age. As summarized by Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and Bas
(2008), traits tend to evolve over time at a slow rate, so in our case, where the age spectrum
is limited, we do not expect to find a significant effect of age on the traits and so on risk
attitude and impatience. The second one is the gender which has been shown to be related
positive to patience, see for example DFHS. In our case the dummy variable takes value 1
when the subject is male. The third is disposable income. In particular, each subject has
been asked to indicate his monthly disposable income net costs of board and lodging and the
distribution in the population is reported in figure 3.5. The graph of the variable is reported
in figure 3.5. Income is introduced in the regression model in a discrete way. We divide
the population between low income, medium income and high income subjects where the
former category is given by the first 25 percentile of the population and the latter by the
last 25 percentile. This allows to better capture the different groups in the population of
budget constrained and high income subjects. The last control is the academic background
of subjects. Since this may be relevant to determine skills, as in the case of numeracy skills,
we control also for this element which we can observe9.
9In case of numeracy skills this is particularly evident in the data. Subject with a mathematical background
display a positive correlation with the numeracy index equal to 0.3 while students in literature and other schools
which belong to the humanities display on average a correlation of -0.21. However, due to space limitations we
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Figure 3.5: Disposable income distribution in euro
Results are reported in table 3.5. Starting from the risk attitude, we find that the relation
between cognitive skills and risk aversion is still significant and negative, both in the first
table with lower payoff and in the second with higher payoff. Age has very little effect
and this is probably due to the restricted range of age in our sample (DFHS instead find
a positive and highly significant U-shaped relationship). Income seems to be negatively
correlated to risk aversion but the estimated coefficient is never significantly different from
zero (this seems however to confirm the result in DFHS). The gender dummy do not have
a clear effect since in the first table (low payoff) the sign is positive, meaning that male
subjects are more risk averse while in the second it is reversed. However, in no one of
the estimation the coefficient is significantly different from zero, which is also the case in
DFHS.
The inclusion of the disposable income, age and gender do not change our results on
the relationship between numeracy skills and the risk neutral choice. Here the numeracy
skills of individuals confirm to be the most important element to predict a switch precisely
in correspondence to the row in which the expected value of the lottery is equal to certain
amount. This confirms the idea that, on top of cognitive skills a key factor for observing a
risk neutral choice, is the ability to compute expected values.
Finally, the relation on patience qualitatively as the one we estimated without the new
variables. Numeracy skills are positively related to patience while cognitive skills, captured
by our symbolic test are negatively related to patience. Neurocitism remains the main ex-
planatory factors, with a positive and significant relationship with patience, which confirms
the findings of other paper in the literature, see for example Anderson, Burks, DeYoung,
do not report the estimated coefficients of the academic dummies.
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and Rustichini (2011). In our sample, male subjects tend to be less patience with respect to
female but the coefficient is borderly significant. Surprisingly, subjects with higher dispos-
able income tend to be less patience and prefer to have immediately the telephone credit.
This result is not in line with previous studies such as DFHS.
Summarizing, the relationship highlighted in section 3.3 are robust to the inclusion of
additional controls, confirming the idea that cognitive abilities and personality traits are
determinant of the attitude toward risk and impatience.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the relationship between both cognitive abilities and
personality traits with fundamental elements of economic choice as risk aversion and im-
patience. We have confirmed some of the results already emerged in the literature on the
negative relationship between cognitive skills and risk aversion and on the positive rela-
tionship between these skills and impatience. Other than that we have produced evidence
for a qualitative interpretation of cognitive skills since we have shown how numeracy skills
do affect risk taking behaviour in the direction of increasing the likelihood of risk neutral
behaviour. With respect to personality trait, we have shown the importance of emotional
stability in determining the degree of patience of subjects.
The paper contributes also to the experimental economic literature since it shows that
online experiments are a valid instrument for economic analysis and can be used in place of
laboratory ones which suffer the limit of a limited number of participants. At the same time
we provide evidence that impulsivity of participants in performing the assigned task may
be a factor that largely affects outcomes in experiments and much can be gained reducing it
or, when not possible, controlling for it in the empirical analysis.
Results coming from this study have important policy implications, from the perspec-
tive of improving human capital and economic development, since it is proved the role
of cognitive skills on risk attitude and patience. Entrepreneurship for example requires
the willingness to take calculated risks and patience to develop projects and to innovate.
Hence, investments oriented to the the accumulation of skills can have high returns in terms
of higher economic activity. Our findings are also important for contract design and screen-
ing since cognitive skills and personality traits, which are more easy to observe than risk
and time preferences, can be useful information to design optimal incentives in contracts.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Cognitive and numeracy test
The test we employ to measure cognitive abilities in the same as in Lang, Weiss, Stocker,
and Rosenbladt (2007) which has been proved by the authors to be highly correlated with
IQ. The test is designed to be run online and it consists in memorizing symbols and inputting
them in a small table for 30 seconds. The user has one trial stage to practice the test and
then she has to do the three main stages. In figures 3.6 and 3.7 we reported two screenshots
of this test.
Figure 3.6: Before starting the countdown Figure 3.7: After starting the countdown
As we can see from the figures, the user can start the test pressing the start button. After
the start she has 30 seconds to fill the cells with the number corresponding to the symbol
displayed. When a number is selected the following cell is automatically activated so the
user is focused only on remembering the numbers the inputting them matching the symbols.
When the time elapses the user is redirected to the next stage.
The aggregate measure we construct is the sum of the performance in the three stages
and the results we got in the online implementation is comparable with exactly the same
test run in the laboratory of the School of Economics in Bologna. The subject pool in
this case was composed by undergraduate students taking a course in econometrics. The
only difference we observe is that in the population that run the test online we observe an
higher non response rate (users who did not input any number and waited that the 30 second
elapsed). Out of 312 users who terminated the test, 11 decided not to do it while in the other
case we have only one non response. If we exclude these observations, in both cases we do
not reject a test for normality (as we expect from a test related to IQ). Moreover, the mean
value of the test in the online population is 34.058 while in the laboratory is 33.924 and
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test does not rejects the null hypothesis of equal means between
the two samples (p-value=0.3858). This is an indirect confirmation of the quality the data
collected online with respect to the one collected in the lab.
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The numeracy trait is elicited through a battery of questions:
A. If in a population the probability of contracting a disease is 10 percent, how many
people out of 1000 will get it?
B. A shop is selling a sofa at half of the original price. If the current price is 150 euro
how much is the sofa without the discount?
C. A car shop is selling a second hand car at 6000 euro which is 2/3 of the original
price of the car. How much was the car when it was new?
D. Suppose you have 2000 euro in your bank account. The interest rate that the bank
is applying to your savings is 10% per year. How much will you have in two years
from now?
The distribution of scores is reported in figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8: Distribution of scores in the numeracy test
3.6.2 Estimation results on the relation between risk aversion and personality
traits
We report here the results of the estimations on the relation between risk aversion and
personality traits. Coefficients are almost all not significantly different from zero. This is
in line with Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010).
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3.6.3 Instructions
Since the experiment is performed online and readers may be not willing to read long para-
graphs, we divided the instructions in different pages with a specific content and let the
reader to move forward and backward in the navigation. At the end of the instructions we
report the questions which every subject must answer correctly to proceed to the trial stage.
Instructions are translated from Italian.
Welcome page Welcome, this activity is aimed to study some aspects of economic decision.
• We guarantee your privacy and that the objective of the study is only scientific re-
search
• Participating to the activity, you have the possibility to receive an amount of money
or telephone credit as a payment for you participation
• This payment will depend upon your choice in the activity. For more details see the
following pages.
• The activity lasts more or less 20 minutes. Hence, we ask you to start only if you
have the time to finish, otherwise you can do it a more suitable moment.
• The activity is divided in two parts and can be done only once. The first part involves
money and the second telephone credit of similar value. The instructions of the first
part are in the next pages while those of the second will be presented after the end of
the first part.
Page 1
Instructions
To perform this activity you must read the following instructions.
It is very important to read them carefully since the payment will depend on your decisions
and it is not possible to redo the activity or going back to a previous stage during the activity.
It may be useful to print the instructions. However, do not worry, it is not too complicated!
Introduction The activity is aimed to study some aspects of economic decision.
Briefly, you will be asked to fill some tables (plus two trial ones that will help you to
familiarize).
In each row of these tables you will have to select the option you prefer among two, labeled
option A and option B.
97 Risk aversion, impatience, cognitive traits and personality
ATTENTION! Read the instructions carefully. At the end you will take a short test to
verify if you understood the content of the activity.
Page 2
INSTRUCTIONS – AN EXAMPLE
An example of choice between the two options is the following. Suppose you are asked to
choose what you prefer between: having 10C with certainty (option A) or having 15 euro
is the result of a coin flip is head versus 1C if the result of coin flip is tail (option B).
You are asked to answer to this kind of question of the basis of your preferences.
It is important that you will select the option on the basis of what you prefer because, at the
end of the activity, if you will be selected for receiving the payment, one of your choices
(randomly selected) will be your actual payment.
Select on the basis of what you prefer since in case of being payed you will determine your
payment with your decisions.
In the next screen you can see graphically who options will be displayed. . .
Page 3
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FIRST PART OF THE ACTIVITY
An example of choice between the two options is reported below:
As you can see, Option A is placed on the left of the table and option B on the right (green
circles). Moreover, notice that:
• Option A: is certain payment. If you select this option and this row is selected
for the payment, you would receive this amount of money. In this case the amount
corresponds to 34C.
• Option B: is an uncertain payment, and it offers you the possibility to obtain a higher
amount of money with some probability and a lower amount of money with another
probability. In this example option B contemplates to receive 5C in one case out of
two or 40C in one case out of two.
Important: in all the tables option A will always be a certain amount of money while
option B an uncertain amount of money. Moreover, option B will always be charac-
terized by the same probabilities for the two outcomes: one case out of two (which is
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equivalent to a coin flip).
Once you have evaluated which option you prefer in the row, to make your choose is simple:
in the table you have two buttons associated to the two options and one button to confirm
the choice on the right of the row.
In the figure you can see these elements circled in purple and red:
Page 4
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE FIRST PART OF THE ACTIVITY
The table must be filled one row at the time, from the top to the bottom. To go from one
row to the next you must make your choice and confirm it using the buttons presented in
the previous page.
Important: The table is such that moving to the bottom, option B is always the same and
option A decreases in the payment.
To fill the table you can also use these buttons:
• Restart the table: with this button you can refresh the entire table and restart.
• Previous row: with this button you can go back to the previous row of the table.
A third button is the automatic completion button which allows you to let the program
filling the table and skip to the next one when there is the possibility to do so. If, in a
certain row you select option B, and in the following rows the same option B is confronted
with other options A which are worse than the one you did not select, then you have the
possibility to avoid to select manually the option B in all the remaining rows but to let the
computer doing it automatically and skip to the next table.
This button, when becoming available, will be announced by a pop-up window.
These buttons are placed in the upper part of the screen as the figure below shows:
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Page 5
THE PAYMENT
The amount of the payment for this activity is high. Hence, 1 participants out of 5 will
receive a payment.
The procedure contemplates to make an extraction by the computer of a number between
1 and 5 and to give the payment to those who will extract the number 1. We guarantee
all participants not to manipulate the extraction since the funding for the project is high
enough to cover the expenses. However, for transparency reasons, you have the possibility
to come to the gym to perform a physical extraction there (write us an e-mail to settle the
appointment).
For those who will extract the number 1, the procedure to determine the actual payment is
the following (it will be simulated also in the trial tables):
• The computer will extract one of the rows of the tables at random. NOTE: the row
extracted may be one row of the second part of the activity.
• If the selected option in the row is the certain amount (option A) it is not necessary
another extraction
• If the selected option is the uncertain amount (option B) then another extraction will
be performed to determine which of the two outcomes is the one selected for the
payment. The rule in this case is that is 1 is extracted then it is the lower amount and
if 2 is extracted the payment is the higher amount.
• Payment for the first part of the activity are available at the gym from the first Monday
after completing the activity.
NOTE: the rule of the Monday after completing the activity is valid for this first part
(hence, if the row extracted is one of this part). If instead the payment extracted is the
telephone credit, then the payment will be granted automatically.
FINAL NOTE: It is not possible to do the activity twice or to go back using the naviga-
tion buttons of the browser. For this reason we suggest to do the activity carefully. If you
close the browser during the activity, then you can restart connecting again. If this happens
in a trial stage you will restart from the instructions. If this happens in a payed table you
will restart from the beginning of that table.
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Control questions
A. What is the content of your choice in the activity?
1. I have to choose among the 2 option my preferred payment
2. I have to choose at random a payment
B. Suppose to be faced by the following possibilities:
Option A: 10C with certainty
Option B: 5C in one case out of 2 or 20C in one case out of 2
Suppose you select option A in this row. What happens if this row is extracted for
your final payment?
1. I will receive 10C as a payment for the activity
2. I will receive 20C as a payment for the activity
3. I do not know yet, another extraction must be performed to know the result of
option B
C. Consider the previous case and suppose now that you choice is option B. What
happens in this case?
1. I will receive 10C as a payment for the activity
2. I will receive 20C as a payment for the activity
3. I do not know yet, another extraction must be performed to know the result of
option B
D. Is it possible that two participants obtain different payments?
1. No, the payment for the activity is the same for everybody
2. Yes, because they may choose different options and also the final extraction
may lead to different results
3. Yes because the payment is completely random
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INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TIME EXPERIMENT
Page 1 INSTRUCTIONS OF SECOND PART OF THE ACTIVITY
You have started the second part of the activity.
What you have to do in this part is not much different from the previous since you have to
fill a table choosing in each row among the two options.
What you are asked to choose between are different amount of telephone credit granted at
different dates.
One example is the following: what do you prefer between 10C of credit today or 20C in a
month?
Page 2
INSTRUCTIONS OF SECOND PART OF THE ACTIVITY
An example is in the following figure: As you can see, option A is on the left of the table
and option B is on the right. Moreover,
• Option A: is a lower amount of credit (here is 15C) but is granted in two days
• Option B: is a higher amount of credit (here is 4010C) but is granted in a longer time
IMPORTANT: in each table (the trial one and the payed one) option A will always be the
same both in terms of the amount of credit and in terms of the time to wait to obtain it.
Instead, option B will change at each row only in terms of the time to wait to be granted.
The amount of the telephone credit remains the same.
Once you have evaluated the two options in the row you can make your choice easily, also
in this case you have two buttons and the confirmation button on the right of the row.
In the figure they are circled in red and purple:
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Page 4
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SECOD PART OF THE ACTIVITY
The table must be filled one row at the time, from the top to the bottom. To go from one
row to the next you must make your choice and confirm it using the buttons presented in
the previous page.
To fill the table you can also use these buttons:
• Restart the table: with this button you can refresh the entire table and restart.
• Previous row: with this button you can go back to the previous row of the table.
A third button is the automatic completion button which allows you to let the program
filling the table and skip to the next one when there is the possibility to do so. If, in a
certain row you select option A, and in the following rows the same option A is confronted
with other options B which are worse than the one you did not select, then you have the
possibility to avoid to select manually the option A in all the remaining rows but to let the
computer doing it automatically and skip to the next table.
This button, when becoming available, will be announced by a pop-up window.
These buttons are placed in the upper part of the screen as the figure below shows:
Chapter 4
Teams or Tournaments? A Field
Experiment on Cooperation and
Competition in Academic
Achievement
Abstract
This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes
on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exoge-
nously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Stu-
dents are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between cou-
pled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration
between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor co-
operate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort
with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase reduces effort with respect
to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to
non-monetary incentives.
Keywords: education, field experiments, incentives, competition, cooperation
JEL codes: A22, C93, I20
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4.1 Introduction
In the recent years a large debate has focused on the possible ways to improve schooling
achievement at every level of education. The relevance of this goal is not disputable, since
education contributes to the accumulation of human capital, the development of societies
and it is considered as one of the main channels for the reduction of inequality. In this paper
we study the effect of different incentive schemes on the schooling achievement of a sample
of students enrolled in a undergraduate course at the University of Bologna (Italy). More
specifically, we focus on the effect of non-monetary incentives on academic performance
running a field experiment where randomized groups of students have been assigned to
different incentive schemes.
The design of the field experiment is based on a theoretical model that contemplates
three different incentive schemes. As a benchmark we consider the effect on effort of a
piece rate reward. Then we analyze two alternatives: a tournament that fosters competition
among matched students and a cooperative scheme in which they can share information
and collaborate. The model suggests a weak ordering between the three: in a competitive
environment individual performance should be weakly higher than in the benchmark and
effort under the benchmark should be weakly higher than in the cooperative scheme. We
also show that the detrimental effect of cooperative incentives on effort does not depend
on the specific shape of the distribution of types in the population, while the magnitude –
but not the sign – of the effects of a competitive incentive scheme depends on the shape of
this distribution. To test these theoretical predictions, we randomly assign students to the
treatments and we adopt a between-subjects design, i.e. each subject is only exposed to a
single incentive scheme.
Data confirm the theoretical predictions in the full sample. Moreover, we show that
an important difference emerges between genders: promoting competition appears to have
a strong positive effect on the exerted effort only for males. In contrast, promoting co-
operation reduces effort with respect to the case where students can neither compete nor
cooperate, but this effect is not statistically significant for both genders. These findings are
in line with the literature on how competition affects behaviour depending on gender (see
for example Gneezy, Leonard, and List 2009) and provide an interesting comparison with
respect to the result of Angrist and Lavy (2009) who find that monetary incentives improve
performance especially on girls. We depart from this branch of the literature, complement-
ing the results obtained through monetary incentive, by focusing on non-monetary ones
since they represent a relatively cheap way to increase student’s effort1.
1Studies on monetary incentives proved to be successful in improving students’ performance but the cost of
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The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief review of the related literature (Section
1) we describe and discuss in detail our experimental design (Section 2). In Section 3, we
present a simple model, and derive the theoretical predictions which will serve as a refer-
ence for the analysis of the experimental data, presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes,
and presents possible extensions of this research.
4.2 Related Literature
We provide a brief review of the literature to highlight our contribution with respect to
previous theoretical and empirical work.
On the general issue of how to foster students’ effort and school achievement through
explicit incentive schemes, several papers explore the role of pecuniary-based incentives.
Among those, Blimpo (2010) represents the closest study to our experiment. Analysing
data from a field experiment in Benin with a pool of 100 secondary schools, he studies
whether individual or different kind of team incentives can lead to a higher students’ school
performance. He considers three treatments. In the first treatment, each student obtained
an individual monetary reward if and only if his or her performance exceeded a minimal
threshold at the final exam. In the second treatment, participants were randomly assigned
to teams of four students and each team-member received a monetary reward depending
on the average team performance, if and only if all the team-members achieved a target
performance level. Finally, in the third treatment, participants were randomly assigned to
teams of four students but in this case only the components of the three top-performer teams
were awarded with a monetary prize. Blimpo (2010) finds that the individual based incen-
tive scheme with cut-off target is most effective for students at an intermediate performance
level: at the lower tail of the skills distribution, students reduce effort, probably because
they perceive the target out of reach; at the higher tail of the distribution, students know that
they are able to get the prize without any extra effort, thus the average impact of such in-
centives is smaller. When teams are evaluated according to the average performance of the
group conditionally on the achievement of a minimal performance target (2nd treatment),
students across all levels of ability are positively affected: the effort exerted by the differ-
ent team-mates is pushed toward the target. The tournament scheme (3rd treatment) yields
the most beneficial effects: it induces all the teams to work harder as students exposed to
this treatment do not have any prior information about the quality and the skills of their
inducing higher effort is not negligible. In a study conducted in the New York City school system $600 have
been awarded for each passing grade, the Baltimore City Public School District has paid up to $110 to improve
scores on state graduation exams and similar programs in the US award up to $500 for each exam passed.
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competitors in the other teams.
Recent papers consider tournaments at school with financial rewards. Kremer, Miguel,
and Thornton (2009) focus their study on the evaluation of a merit scholarship programme
dedicated only to female students in an elementary school in Kenya. They observe a sub-
stantial increase in the exams scores: in particular girls with low pre-test scores, who were
unlikely to win a scholarship (and actually did not get it), reported positive and signifi-
cant gains in terms of higher school performance. De Paola and Scoppa (2010) studied
the effectiveness of monetary incentive schemes in enhancing students’ performance using
a randomized experiment involving undergraduates in an Italian University. Students par-
ticipating in the experiment were assigned to three different groups: a high reward group,
a low reward group and a control group. Rewards were assigned according to a ranking
rule to the top performing students in each treated group. The authors report that financial
rewards contributed to increase the students’ performance: a very strong reaction emerged
among high ability students who were likely to win the contest, while no significant effect
was observed for low ability students that have fewer chances to win the tournament com-
petition. Along the same lines, Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw B. (forth.) present
results of a randomized field experiment in which freshman students at the Amsterdam Uni-
versity had the opportunity to earn financial rewards for passing all first year requirements.
Their findings provide evidence that high ability students perform significantly better when
assigned to rewarded groups. On the contrary low ability students’ outcome decreases if
assigned to rewarded groups. The small aggregate average effect that they observe is there-
fore the sum of a positive effect for high ability students and a negative off-setting effect for
low ability students. These previous results highlight the importance of controlling for stu-
dents’ ability and individual characteristics when assessing the impact of incentive schemes
on their school performance.
Among the authors who studied the effects of financial incentives, some focused fo-
cused specifically on gender differences. Angrist and Lavy (2009) evaluate the effectiveness
of financial rewards on the achievement of Israeli students using a randomized experiment
providing monetary awards to students who obtain the university admission. The authors
show how the program led to significant effects for girls but not for boys. Differences in
gender-scheme interaction emerge also from the field experiment by Angrist, Lang, and
Oreopoulos (2009). In this study, researchers randomly assigned a sample of students en-
rolled in a Canadian university to one of three different treatments: the first group was
provided with a set of support services (e.g. tutoring); the second group was offered finan-
cial rewards for good academic scores; the third one was offered a combination of support
services and monetary incentives according to the academic performance. The results of the
experiment show that while males did not react to any of the treatments, females improved
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significantly their academic performance when monetary incentives were provided.
While females appear to react more than males to monetary incentives awarded for
achieving an exogenously given target, incentive schemes based on competition may yield
opposite effects. Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) found that males are more prone
to engage in competition than females and in general males’ performance increases more
than the females’ one when subjects are exposed to a competitive setting. Similarly, Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) find that, when given the opportunity to choose between a piece-rate
payment scheme or a tournament, men select the tournament twice more frequently than
women, suggesting that women tend to avoid competition when they have the chance to do
so. Azmat and Iriberri (2010) find that, even when the incentive scheme is based solely on
the subject’s performance, providing information about the relative performance promotes
higher levels of effort among men, but not among women. We explore the role of gen-
der, and we find that males tend to respond to incentives as predicted by the theory, while
females do not.
From a theoretical standpoint, Bratti, Checchi, and Filippin (2008) proposed a model
of student cooperation/competition in learning activities, showing that free riding oppor-
tunities lead to an insufficient degree of cooperation between schoolmates, which in turn
decreases the overall achievement of the group. According to their analysis, a cooperative
learning approach may successfully emerge when the class is homogeneous in terms of
students’ ability. In our study we consider an experimental design and a theoretical model
where the incentive scheme is exogenous but similarly to Bratti, Checchi, and Filippin
(2008) we focus on student cooperation/competition in learning activities. Our theoretical
model suggests that in a competitive environment individual performance should be higher
than in the cooperative environment. We also show that the detrimental effect of cooperative
incentives on effort is relatively stronger for high-ability types than for low-ability types,
and that the magnitude – but not the sign – of the effects of a competitive incentive scheme
depend on the shape of the distribution of types in the population.
4.3 The Experimental Design
The experiment involved all the undergraduate students enrolled in the Introductory Econo-
metrics course of the major in Management Studies at the University of Bologna, in year
2010.2 The course lasted 10 weeks (a three-hour-lecture per week). Students participating
to the experiment had to undertake 5 tests whose marks were translated into bonus points
2The University of Bologna is considered the oldest University in Europe and counts on average nearly
8000 enrolled students each academic year.
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for the final exam. The bonus points for the final exam were equal to the average mark the
student obtained in the five tests.3
Tests have been scheduled every two weeks and each test consisted of five multiple-
choice questions to be answered in 50 minutes. Each test concerns all topics taught in the
course until the last lecture before the test.
Tests were computerized4, and were held in the computer laboratory of the School of
Economics of the University of Bologna. Desks were arranged so to minimize the possibil-
ity for students to talk during the exams (see Figure 4.3 in Appendix).
The mark in each test consisted in an individual component, based on the number of
correct answers in the test, and a number of extra points related to the treatment and possibly
to the performance of the partner.
Our study included two treatment conditions – characterized by a competitive and by
a cooperative incentive scheme, respectively – and a control treatment. In all treatments
including the control, part of the incentive depended solely on individual effort. Treatments
differed in how tests two, three and four were performed, while the first and the last test
were identical across treatments. The first and the last tests were taken individually by
each student. In contrast, in the second, third and fourth tests students in the two treatment
conditions were randomly matched in couples at the beginning of each test, and had the op-
portunity of exchanging messages with their partner via a controlled chat program, running
on their computer. In both treatment conditions, the total score in tests 2, 3, and 4 of the
test depended not only on the student’s individual performance (i.e. the net score), but also
on the partner’s performance. Table 4.1 summarizes the treatments, which are described in
detail below.
Students were assigned to treatments between the first and the second test. Before
starting tests 2, 3, and 4, students assigned to the two treatment conditions were asked
whether they wanted to use the chat or not to communicate with the paired partner. This
decision was taken simultaneously by all students. During the test, a couple of students
could use the chat program only if both students declared to be willing to communicate,
at the beginning of the test. If the two students chose to communicate, per each of the
questions of the test they could send only one “signal” to indicate what the right answer
was, and one short text message of up to 180 characters. Interactions were anonymous, as
students could not know the identity of their partner. In the control treatment no interaction
between students was allowed.5
3Marks in the final exam range from 0 to 30. The exam is passed with a mark equal or above 18. The bonus
points ranged from 0 to nearly 4.
4The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
5Figure 4.6 presents a screen-shot of the graphical interface of the program used for the tests On the left-
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Table 4.1: Summary of the treatments, in tests 2, 3 and 4
treatment extra points (rounds 2, 3, 4) messages available
CONTROL 1 no
COOPERATIVE I(skj ≥ 1.5) yes
COMPETITIVE 2 · I(ski > skj ) yes
In each test, the value pq of correct answers to each question q ranged between 0.3 and
1.2 points. Across all treatments, the number of points vki a student could get by correctly
answering the questions of test k was:
vki = s
k
i · I
(
ski ≥ 1.5
)
, ski =
5∑
q=1
pq,ki , k = 1, . . . 5
In each test, the maximum number of points v¯ was equal to 3. This is the individual part of
the mark in the test, i.e. the component which is common across all treatments.
In the COMPETITIVE treatment, student i’s mark in a test was increased by 2 extra points
if she performed strictly better than the partner. The k-th test’s mark vˆki for student i under
this incentive scheme is described in equation (4.1).
vˆki = v
k
i + 2 · I
(
ski > s
k
j
)
, k = 2, 3, 4 (4.1)
This provides an incentive for both matched students to compete.
Conversely in the COOPERATIVE treatment, student i’s mark in a test was increased by
1 extra point if the partner’s performance was sufficiently good. The k-th test’s mark vˆki for
student i under this incentive scheme is presented in equation (4.2).
vˆki = v
k
i + I
(
skj ≥ 1.5
)
, k = 2, 3, 4 (4.2)
Finally, students in the CONTROL treatment received 1 extra point in tests 2, 3 and 4.6
Time-line of the experiment. The experiment started in February 2010, and ended in
July of the same year. In the first lecture of the course, on February 25th, the full set of
instructions was distributed to students and each student had two days to decide whether to
hand side of the screen students could read the question, and the multiple-choice answers. On the top-right part
of the screen they could send messages to their partner, while on the bottom-right part of the screen they could
read the messages possibly sent to them by the partner.
6This is done so that the maximum number of bonus points per team is constant across treatments.
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take the partial exams or not. At this stage, students were not explicitly informed that they
were taking part in an experiment and only at the very end of the course, participating stu-
dents were asked to sign a consent form authorizing the treatment of data collected during
the partial exams.7
On March 1, during a standard class, students were asked to fill in a questionnaire
collecting data about some personal characteristics (age, gender, familiarity with computers,
e-mail and chat programs, mother and father education). Questionnaire answers are used in
the econometric analysis to control for individual-specific characteristics.8
On March 22nd students took the first test. Notice that at this stage students had not yet
been assigned to treatments, so the grade in this first test can be used as a measure of their
performance before being exposed to the treatment. Students received information about
what treatment they had been assigned to only three days later, on March 25th.9 In the same
day, students were informed about their own result in the first test, and about the distribution
of the first test score among participants. In this way we tried to convey common knowledge
of the distribution of competences and ability in the population. Section 1.2 will show how
this is relevant from the theoretical point of view.
The remaining four tests were taken approximately every two weeks, in April and May
2010 with the exception of the fifth which was administered one week after the fourth.10
Student could benefit of the bonus points gained in the tests only if they took the final exam
in June or July 2010. On March 22, before the experiment started, students were informed
that the bonus points would expire after the summer.
4.4 The Model
This section describes the main features of the model we use to derive theoretical predic-
tions and inform the experimental design. After briefly characterizing the general features
of the model, we illustrate its implications in terms of expected effort under the different
incentive schemes. We first describe what happens without competitive or cooperative in-
7The experiment was authorized by the ethics committee of the the University of Bologna (Comitato
Bioetico per la Valutazione di Protocolli di Sperimentazione).
8An overview of the answers to the questionnaire is provided in Section 4.5, and a translation of the ques-
tions is reported in Table 4.10 in Appendix.
9Students taking part in our experiment were then randomly assigned to two groups of about 65 people each,
because the computer lab can host only up to 80 students at a time. All students assigned to the competitive
treatment and half of those assigned to the control treatment were in the first group, while all students in the
cooperative treatment and the remaining students of the control treatment were in the second group.
10This is made on purpose since the last test is taken by students individually and covers the last contents of
the program as well as some of the previous ones. Hence, it will reflect the effort exerted in the previous stages.
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centives (BASELINE treatment). We then characterize the optimal effort under incentives
to cooperation and to competition and finally we highlight the testable predictions of the
model.
General features We assume that students’ abilities are in the interval θ ∈ [0, 1] and
are distributed according to a non-degenerate distribution function F (·). Students choose a
level of effort ei ∈ [0, 1], which determines their performance in the tests and in the final
exam. The dis-utility from effort is c(ei). We further assume that c(·) is independent on
subjects’ ability θi, and that c′(·) > 0 and c′′(·) > 0.
The expected score in test k is a function of ability and effort and is given by the fol-
lowing expression:
ski = ei · θi · v¯ (4.3)
The utility of each student is positively affected by the score and negatively affected
by the effort. We assume that students choose their level of effort two times: the first
time they choose ei,0 when the course starts, before the first test and before the assignment
to the treatments; later, after having been assigned to treatments they choose the level of
effort ei that determines their performance in tests 2 to 5 and in the final exam. At this
point, their expected utility is given by 3 components: the bonus points obtained in the four
remaining tests to be taken – which in the two treatment conditions is the outcome of the
interaction with the matched agent – the individual mark in the final exam11 and the cost of
effort. Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the expected utility at the time in which ei
is chosen is:
E[Ui] =
1
5
5∑
k=2
∫ 1
0
vˆki (θi, ei, θj , ej) · f(θj)dθj + V¯ · ei · θi − c(ei) (4.4)
where V¯ is the maximum mark in the final exam.
Baseline treatment A student assigned to the baseline treatment does not interact with
any other student. As a consequence, considering the four tests and the final exam, the
expected utility (4.4) simplifies in:
UBLi = V¯ · ei · θi +
1
5
· (4 · ei · θi · v¯) + 3
5
− c(ei) (4.5)
from this utility function we can derive the optimal effort exerted:
∂UBLi
∂ei
= (V¯ +
4
5
· v¯) · θi − c′(ei) (4.6)
11Remember that the bonus adds points on top of this mark.
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Normalizing the quantity V + 45 · v¯ = 1, we get the baseline effort:
c′(eBLi ) = θi
that implies
∂eBLi (θi)
∂θi
> 0
i.e., we expect more able individuals to exert more effort in the baseline treatment with
respect to less able individuals and no variation over the optimal choices of effort.
Competitive treatment To model student’s behavior under the two treatments and to
derive predictions, we look for the equilibrium in the bayesian-Nash games where students
have private information about their own type and a common knowledge on the distribution
of abilities in the population.
Under the competitive scheme, students get bonus points if their performance is better
than the partner’s. Equation (4.7) describes the expected utility in this case.
U compi = V¯ · ei · θi +
1
5
[4 · ei · θi · v¯] + 3
5
· 2 · Pr(ei · θi > ej · θj)− c(ei) =
= V¯ · ei · θi + 1
5
[4 · ei · θi · v¯] + 6
5
·
∫ θi· eiej
0
f(θj)dθj − c(ei) =
= V¯ · ei · θi + 1
5
[4 · ei · θi · v¯] + 6
5
· F
(
θi · ei
ej
)
− c(ei)
(4.7)
where 6/5 ·F (θi ·ei/ej) is the expected number of additional points obtained in the second,
third, and fourth test in case the student outperforms his partner. Hence, the expected utility
can be expressed as:
ei(θi) ∈ arg max
ei
{
E[Ui] = V¯ eiθi +
1
5
[4eiθiv¯] +
6
5
∫
θj |θjej<θiei
f(θj)dθj − c(ei)
}
(4.8)
Under regularity assumption on the distribution of types in the population, it can be
shown that the first order conditions are12:
θi − c′(ei) + 6
5
f(Φj(ei))Φ
′(ei) = 0 (4.9)
12In order to have a pure strategy Nash equilibria, the distribution function of types must be non-degenerate
and the mapping from type to effort must be continuous and increasing. The requirement on the distribution
of types is a plausible requirement, given the heterogeneity in the population while the two on the mapping
between type and effort can be proven to be true in our case. In the non-heterogeneous case, that is when the
distribution of types is degenerate, it can be easily shown that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
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where Φk is the mapping from the effort to the type (individual ability). Now, since Φ′ =
1/e′, we have the following solution for the optimal effort in the competitive treatment:
c′(ei) = θi +
6
5
f(θi) · 1
e′i
(4.10)
From this equation we see that the optimal effort exerted under this scheme is equal or
higher than the optimal level of effort eBLi in the control treatment. The magnitude of the
effect depends on the subject’s ability θi and on the shape of the distribution F (·).
Cooperative treatment Under this scheme, each student has a clear incentive to share
her information (in tests 2, 3 and 4) and the mark depends also on the partner’s effort.
In this case the expected utility becomes:
U coopi = V¯ · ei · θi +
1
5
· [ei · θi · v¯] +
+
1
5
∫ 1
0
3 · [v¯ · (ei · θi + ej · θj − ei · θi · ej · θj) +
+ I(ei · θi + ej · θj − ei · θi · ej · θj > 0.5)] · f(θj)dθj − c(ei)
(4.11)
The second term in equation (4.11) represents the points obtained form the fifth test,
where no interactions among student was allowed, while the third term represents the bonus
obtained in tests 2, 3 and 4.
The assumption that information is shared by the students is crucial and implies that the
probability of knowing the answer is given by the common knowledge of the couple. Thus,
here the knowledge of the couple is the union of the knowledge of the two members and the
optimal effort is given by:
c′(ecoopi ) = θi −
3
5
· v¯ · θi
∫ 1
0
θj · ej · f(θj)dθj (4.12)
The second term in the right-hand side of equation (4.12) is always non-positive, and its
absolute value increases with θi. This shows that, since information is shared, each team
member has an incentive to exploit the effort of the other lowering his own contribution. As
a consequence, under the cooperative treatment, team members have an incentive to shrink
their effort, and this detrimental effect of cooperation on effort is stronger for students with
higher ability (θi).
Testable predictions To sum up, our theoretical model predicts that, given the ability θi,
the effort exerted by student i in the three treatments is such that:
ecoopi ≤ eBLi ≤ ecompi
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i.e., we expect that on average students randomized into the COOPERATIVE treatment exert
lower or equal effort than students randomized into the CONTROL treatment whereas stu-
dents randomized into the COMPETITIVE treatment should exert more effort.13 Conversely,
at time 1, all students have the same individual incentives to increase effort and optimal
effort depends only on their ability level, i.e. ecoopi,0 = e
BL
i,0 = e
comp
i,0 = ei,0. Moreover,
the model predicts that the detrimental effect of the cooperative scheme is stronger for high
ability individuals while the same type of individuals should exert more effort with respect
to the less able individuals in the baseline treatment. Note that our main testable predic-
tions involve the differential changes in effort across treatments and ability levels. Our
design allows to measure these changes, as discussed in more detail in section 4.5.1.
We also expect that students assigned to the cooperative treatment will use the chat
more frequently and will use it to exchange information. Conversely, students assigned to
the competitive treatment should use the chat less frequently and could potentially use it
for acts of sabotage, i.e. to suggest the wrong answers. We collected data to check these
aspects. Results of our inquiry are discussed in section 4.5.3.
4.5 Results
In this section we first discuss our choice of outcome measure, then present the data and
discuss the results on the effect of the incentives on information sharing and on effort.
4.5.1 Measuring Effort
Our theoretical model predicts that for a given level of ability, there is a weak ordering in
the effort exerted by each student i, namely ecoopi ≤ eBLi ≤ ecompi . We thus expect that on
average students randomized into the COOPERATIVE treatment exert lower or equal effort
than students randomized into the CONTROL treatment whereas students randomized into
the COMPETITIVE treatment should exert more effort.14
Equation (4.3) in our simple model describes the relationship between expected student
performance at each test and effort, namely si = θiei, where si is the net score of individual
i, θi is a measure of individual ability and ei is the effort exerted.
Taking logs and allowing for noise in the way in which effort generates performance,
we get
yi = ζi + i (4.13)
13The ordering holds if the distribution of abilities is the same in the three treatments.
14The ordering holds if the distribution of abilities is the same in the three treatments and this is guaranteed
by randomization.
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where yi ≡ log(si) is the log of the net score of individual i, ζi ≡ log(ei) is the log of the
effort exerted, while i = log(θi) + εi and E[i] = log(θi), i.e. we assume that only the
idiosyncratic component ε averages to 0 for any i, while the error i has a possibly non-zero
mean equal to an individual specific constant.
Our experimental design provides an interesting way to measure effort under weak as-
sumptions. Recall that we observe students’ performance in similar tests both before the
assignment to the treatments (test 1) and after the exposure to the treatments (test 5). Both
these tests are taken individually under all treatments and cover similar topics15. However,
by construction, the performance in the first test and the effort exerted to pass it cannot be af-
fected by the treatments since both performance and effort are pre-determined with respect
to the assignment to the different incentive schemes. Conversely, the performance in the last
test should reflect changes in effort induced by the treatment. Indeed, moving from equation
(4.13) and contrasting the performance in test 5 and 1, we have yi−y0 = ζi−ζi0 +εi−εi0.
It follows that E[yi − yi0] = E[ζi − ζi0] , i.e. by looking at the change in the logarithm
of performance between the first and last test, we measure the change of the logarithm of
effort net of the direct effect of any fixed individual specific factor.
Recall that all our treatment conditions have a common individual incentive to increase
effort but differ in the incentives to compete or cooperate and only in the baseline students
can neither compete, nor cooperate. Following the theoretical predictions of our simple
model, we expect an increase in effort in all treatments with respect to a set up where no
individual incentives are granted. Our experiment is not designed to estimate this com-
mon effect -none of our groups has no individual incentives- but to capture the differential
changes induced by the different treatments. The testable prediction of our model involves
the differential increase in effort under the cooperative and competitive scheme with respect
to the baseline. This weak ordering holds also if we consider log(e), since the logarithm is
a monotonic transformation.
To test the theoretical predictions, we first contrast the distribution of effort under the
three schemes and check for heterogeneity in the treatment effect over the effort distribution.
We then assess the effect on the average change in log(e) and run the following regression
E[ζi − ζi0] = β0 + β1Coop+ β2Comp (4.14)
where β0 represents the average change in log(e) under the baseline, β1 is the average dif-
ferential change in log(e) under the cooperative scheme with respect to the baseline, and
β2 is the average differential change in log(e) under the competitive scheme with respect
15The last test covers a larger set of arguments which includes also those covered by the first and is more
closely spaced over time with respect to the other tests.
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to the baseline. The theory predicts β1 ≤ 0 and β2 ≥ 0. There is an additional prediction
that β0 = 0, i.e. no change in performance under the baseline. However, our model does
not allow for learning which may occur in practice. Namely, after the first test the perfor-
mance of the students in the baseline improves because they are becoming more familiar
with the types of tests and the way the tests are performed in the laboratory. Allowing for
learning will not affect our theoretical predictions provided that learning is constant across
treatments. If learning occurs in practice, β0 > 0.
4.5.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Among the 145 students attending the course, 131 applied for participation into the experi-
ment. Our elaborations are based only on the records of the stayers, i.e. 114 students who
participated to all 5 tests.
We exclude from the elaborations the records of 17 students who missed at least one
test: 10 students assigned to the control treatment (BASELINE in what follows), 2 students
assigned to the COOPERATIVE treatment and 5 students assigned to the COMPETITIVE treat-
ment (see table 4.9 in Appendix). We shall highlight that 6 of these students were late at the
3rd test and were thus excluded from that test. The experimental program is run in z-Tree
Fischbacher (2007): when the test (the experimental session) starts, additional subjects can
participate only shutting down and restarting the entire session. Students were informed
that not being on time for the test would result in being excluded from the test session. Out
of these 17 students, 8 dropped out after the first test: all these students were assigned to the
baseline treatment after test 1. When we compare stayers and dropouts in the full sample,
we cannot reject the null that drop-outs had a worse performance in the first test.16
Once we limit the analysis to the students who participated at all tests, the samples are
relatively balanced across treatments with respect to observed and pre-determined charac-
teristics: we do not detect differences in the distribution of the score the first test (score 1)
and the average score at previous exams (GPA) between any two treatments (BASELINE,
COOPERATIVE, COMPETITIVE) at any conventional level of confidence (see Table 4.2).
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 in Appendix report the empirical probability distribution of the pre-
treatment variables (the score in the first test, and the average mark in previous exams).
16There are no significant differences between the subpopulation of excluded students and the stayers in
observable and pre-determined characteristics among the students who where assigned to the COOPERATIVE
treatment. We do not reject the null of equal means at 1% level -but we reject at 5%- in the subpopulations for
the other treatments: students who participated to all tests in the BASELINE and in the COMPETITIVE treatment
tend to be those who achieved a higher score in the first test (0.7 points higher than the one for those who
dropped out in the BASELINE group and 0.85 points higher than the one for those who dropped out in the
COMPETITIVE treatment).
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Table 4.2 also reports the mean value of several other individual characteristics, obtained
from subjects’ answers to the questionnaire and p-values of tests aimed at detecting dif-
ferences in these characteristics across treatments.17 In general, the overall sample is well
balanced across treatments. There are some exceptions: the frequency of use of e-mail is
significantly higher in the BASELINE treatment than in the COMPETITIVE and in the CO-
OPERATIVE treatments. Significant differences emerge also in terms of the education level
achieved by the students’ fathers (but not mothers).
To detect the role of interactions effect between the treatments and the students’ ability,
we consider several different proxies for student’s ability and include interaction terms in a
simple regression. Our favorite proxy to control for student’s ability is the average mark at
previous exams: students who participated in the experiment are third year students taking
exams is in the last quarter of the third year; therefore, their academic history can be a
reliable proxy of their academic skills. In line with the most recent empirical evidence from
Italy (AlmaLaurea, 2009), also in our sample females tend to perform significantly better
than males in terms of GPA (Females = 25.2, Males = 24.3, Rank-Sum Test = P 0.028).
We say an individual is a high ability individual if his/her score on the classification variable
is above the median for that variable in the sample.
4.5.3 Communication and treatments.
Students under both treatments’ schemes had two ways to communicate: they could send
text messages or hints18. Messages and hints were limited in two ways. On the one hand
students could not send any information useful to identify themselves (under the threat of
exclusion from the test); on the other hand, for each of the 5 questions asked in a test, a
student can send and receive only one message of both types.
Table 4.3 together with Table 4.11 in the Appendix report descriptive statistics on the use
of chat by subjects. The figures suggest that almost everybody under the COOPERATIVE
treatment accepted it19, and that the average number of exchanged messages is six times
higher than in the COMPETITIVE treatment.
The chat tended to be used more frequently than the hint under both schemes.
The content of conversations suggests the chat has been actually used to exchange infor-
mation. Conversely, the chat was not actively used by students under the COMPETITIVE
17We contrasted averages across treatments by means of linear and non linear regressions.
18The hint consisted in a simple message informing the receiver that the sender believes a certain answer to
be the right one. The sender can suggest a different answer with respect to the one actually selected in the test.
19At the beginning of the exam the student must input the registration number and then choose if she wants
to use the chat or not.
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Table 4.3: Use of the chat
Treatment Acceptance of Av. num. Av. message
the chat of messages length
Cooperative 98% of subjects 3 (out of 5) 28 words
Competitive 70% of subjects 0.5 (out of 5) 11 words
scheme: they declared to be willing to use the chat but only 0.5 messages were exchanged
on average. More importantly, students did not believe in the messages of the partner20. In-
deed, in some cases the chat has been used to deceive the partner (see Table 4.5, and Figure
4.8 in Appendix for an illustrative example).
Table 4.4 reports descriptive statistics on the number of actions taken by students under
Table 4.4: Number of actions (i.e. use of chat and use of hints) by round and treatment.
Cooperative
mean sd median min max
Test 2 5.12 3.36 6 0 10
Test 3 5.80 2.92 7 0 10
Test 4 6.37 2.91 6 0 10
Competitive
mean sd median min max
Test 2 1.47 2.48 0 0 8
Test 3 1 2.51 0 0 10
Test 4 1.67 2.24 0 0 8
each treatment. Sending a text message or giving a hint are actions. Under the COOPERA-
TIVE scheme the average number of actions tend to increase from the first test in couples
(test 2) to the last (test 4), changing from nearly 5 to above 6, and the correlation between
the number of actions taken in different tests is positive, between 0.34 and 0.53, and de-
creasing with the lag between tests. Some students under the COOPERATIVE scheme used
all the available actions (5 text messages and 5 hints) and the median number of action is
between 6/7: students tended to use at least one of the two available actions in each question
20We do not provide descriptive statistics on the extent of sabotage because these statistics would not be com-
parable across treatments. Indeed, given the low number of individuals that used the chat under the competitive
treatment, we will not get reliable statistics for that group.
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of each test and they often used both. Generally, the text message was sent before the hint,
and the time lag between the text message and the hint ranges between 1 and 5 minutes in
most questions and tests (see Table 4.11 in the Appendix). Conversely, under the COMPET-
ITIVE scheme the median number of actions taken is always 0 and the average number of
actions remains relatively stable slightly above 1: students tend to use both the chat and the
hint for the same question and only once per test. They also tend to send the text message
and the hint almost simultaneously or to send the hint before the text message (see Table
4.11 in the Appendix). The correlation between the number of actions taken in subsequent
tests is weaker (between 0.17 and 0.36) and tends to increase with the lag between tests.
The correlation between the exerted effort and the number of actions is negligible under
both schemes.
We consider data on the couples in each test and contrast answers of the members: Table
4.5 shows that members of the couples under the COOPERATIVE scheme tend to give the
same answer much more frequently than their class mates under the COMPETITIVE scheme.
The difference is stable across tests and slightly higher than 25%.
Table 4.5: Proportion of cases in which the members of the couple give the same answer.
Test 2 Test 3 Test 4
Cooperative 56.38% 77.26% 84.78%
Competitive 30.5% 52% 56.84%
Difference 25.88 25.26 27.94
We interpret the observed pattern of information exchange across treatments as a pos-
itive response to the incentives: students understood the different mechanisms underlying
the two different schemes and behaved accordingly as far as exchange of information is
concerned.
4.5.4 Treatment effects
Figure 4.1 depicts the empirical distribution of effort (i.e. log(net score 5) - log(net score 1))
across treatments. The vertical blue line represents the median of the distribution, the left
hinge of the box indicates the 25th percentile, and the right hinge of the box indicates the
75th percentile. Visual inspection suggests that under the COOPERATIVE treatment, sub-
jects perform more poorly respect to the BASELINE treatment, while no sizable differences
emerge between the COMPETITIVE and the BASELINE treatments.
Wilcoxon tests do not reject the hypothesis that the distribution of effort is the same
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Figure 4.1: Box-plot showing the distribution of effort across treatments.
across treatments. These tests are not appropriate if we want to establish an ordering across
all three treatments. Thus, we also perform a Jonckheere-Terpstra test, a non-parametric
test designed to detect alternatives of ordered class differences. This test does reject the
hypothesis that effort is constant across treatments versus the alternative hypothesis that
effort is ordered across treatments according to our main theoretical prediction ( ecoopi ≤
eBLi ≤ ecompi ) at 10%.
P-values of these tests are reported in Table 4.6, together with the mean level of effort in
each treatment condition.
It has been pointed out in Section 4.2 that according to the experimental literature, a
competitive environment may induce different effects on effort for females and for males.
Consistently with these works, we find that the picture indeed changes when we split the
sample by gender. Figure 4.2 reveals that the treatment effect is substantially different for
male and female subjects. The detrimental effect of the COOPERATIVE treatment on effort
with respect to the COMPETITIVE treatment only emerges for males, whereas for females
no clear treatment effect arises.
One-sided Wilcoxon tests confirms that males’ level of effort is significantly lower in
the COOPERATIVE treatment than in the COMPETITIVE treatment at 10% level but no sig-
nificant difference emerges with respect to the baseline. In contrast, the same test does not
reject the hypothesis of equal distribution of effort between any two treatments for the fe-
male sample. These tests are not appropriate if we want to establish an ordering across all
three treatments. Thus we run the the Jonckheere-Terpstra test for the subsamples of males
and females: for the male sample, the test rejects at 5% the null hypothesis that effort is not
ordered across treatments against the alternative hypothesis that effort is ordered according
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Table 4.6: Mean level of effort, by gender and treatment.
pooled males females
Mean effort
cooperative 0.500 0.377 0.628
baseline 0.583 0.452 0.677
competitive 0.570 0.680 0.459
Wilcoxon tests (p-values)
base. vs. coop. 0.313 0.135 0.948
base. vs. comp. 0.745 0.442 0.721
coop. vs. comp. 0.190 0.059∗ 0.713
Jonckheere-Terpstra tests (p-values)
0.088∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.624
Legend: One star, two stars, three stars for significant differences at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
to what predicted by the theory; no effect is detected for females. P-values of these tests are
reported in Table 4.6.
Our theoretical model predicts heterogeneity in the effect of the incentives’ schemes
on effort with respect to students’ ability, at least for the competitive treatment. To control
in a parsimonious way for individual ability, and for other individual characteristics, while
assessing the effects of the treatments’ scheme on average effort, we use linear regression
models.
We run the analysis separately for males and females as previous results suggest that
they react differently to incentives.
Table 4.8 presents the benchmark results of two baseline specifications for males and
females: column (1) and (2) do not allow for heterogeneity in the treatment effects with
respect to students’ ability while in column (3) and (4) we include interactions between
treatments and the ability indicator based on the average mark at previous exams. All re-
gressions include controls for father education, risk aversion and trust. The top panel of
Table 4.8 reports coefficients estimates while the bottom report p-values of both bilateral
and unilateral tests: by specifying the direction in which the null hypothesis of no effect is
violated (as predicted by theory), we increase the power of the t-test to detect significant
deviations. As reference, we computed the power of a test to detect differences between
any two treatments for males and females separately using the descriptive statistics (mean,
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Figure 4.2: Box-plot showing the distribution of effort across treatments, by gender.
standard deviations and sample size) of our sample and significance level α = 0.5.21 Table
4.7 shows that we have little power to detect differences between the baseline and the coop-
erative treatment, while we have more power to detect differences between the baseline and
the competitive treatment for both genders, even all values are quite low. In addition, the
table reports the sample size required for a test to detect difference of the size we observe
with power 0.8 (assuming constant sample sizes across groups): most of these sizes can be
hardly met within a design structured as ours.
Table 4.7: Power of the two-sided and one-sided test of mean comparison across treatments
and optimal size n∗ for two sided tests with equal group sizes and power 0.8 . Males and
Females.
Null Hypothesis Males Females
Power n∗ Power n∗
2 sided 1 sided 2 sided 1 sided
Baseline vs Cooperative 0.08 0.12 658 0.06 0.08 3078
Baseline vs Competitive 0.25 0.35 84 0.25 0.36 101
Cooperative vs Competitive 0.07 0.11 879 0.16 0.25 161
Results in Table 4.822 confirm previous results on the differential effects across treat-
21The power of similar tests for the pooled sample is lower: the gender heterogeneity makes point estimates
of the average log(e) less precise.
22With respect to control variables, High parental education is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if
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Table 4.8: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No heterogeneity with ability Heterogeneity with ability
Variables Males Females Males Females
Constant 0.386** 0.652*** 0.239 0.740**
[0.174] [0.178] [0.262] [0.294]
Cooperative -0.125 -0.156 0.100 -0.135
[0.178] [0.219] [0.263] [0.382]
Competitive 0.331* -0.235 0.492* -0.363
[0.189] [0.211] [0.272] [0.359]
Coop · High Ability -0.486 -0.117
[0.401] [0.475]
Comp · High ability -0.266 0.080
[0.398] [0.449]
High ability 0.127 0.073
[0.280] [0.319]
High parental education -0.249 -0.155 -0.317* -0.219
[0.151] [0.185] [0.173] [0.210]
Frequent use of e-mail 0.139 -0.224
[0.161] [0.206]
Risk averse 0.290* 0.221 0.290* 0.280
[0.147] [0.173] [0.150] [0.198]
Truster 0.105 0.084 0.136 0.114
[0.155] [0.194] [0.164] [0.213]
Observations 50 55 50 55
R2 0.237 0.066 0.311 0.157
P-values for the null of no effect against bilateral or unilateral H1
(R)≡H1: β > 0; (L) ≡H1: β < 0
Competitive
1 sided (R) 0.039∗∗ 0.867 0.035∗∗ 0.844
2 sided 0.089∗ 0.266 0.071∗ 0.312
Cooperative
1 sided (L) 0.240 0.238 0.649 0.362
2 sided 0.480 0.476 0.703 0.724
Competitive for high ability
1 sided (R) 0.221 0.837
2 sided 0.441 0.326
Cooperative for high ability
1 sided (L) 0.092∗ 0.186
2 sided 0.184 0.373
the highest qualification of at least one of the parents of the individual is above high school and 0 otherwise.
Risk averse is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the answer of the individual on the risk aversion scale
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ments: there is evidence of a significant increase in effort under the competitive treatment
with respect to the baseline for males but not for females.23 The effect is statistically dis-
tinct from zero at 10% and not-negative at 5%. When we control for ability, we find that :
(i) the positive incentive for males is higher for the low ability individuals (still significantly
non-negative at 10%) and decreases substantially for high ability individuals; (ii) there is a
negative and statistically significant (at 10%) detrimental effect of the cooperative treatment
for high ability individuals only. However, the difference in effects of incentives between
ability groups is not significant in our sample for the competitive case nor for the coopera-
tive case. The magnitude of the effect ranges from 33% to 49% which is a strong increment
of the exerted effort. Notice that this is in line with the findings of Angrist and Lavy (2009)
who use monetary incentives based on the achievement of a specified score target.
For females, no statistically significant effect can be detected. The pattern of the effect
of competitive incentives on effort for females is similar to the one detected for males but
in the opposite direction: the point estimate of the effect is negative and, when we control
for ability, point estimates of the effect of competitive incentives for females are negative
for both low and high ability individuals but less so for high ability individuals.
We detect a significant increase in effort also in the baseline: we attribute this to the
fact that students become more familiar with the instruments used for the test (learning).
Students’ ability does not play any role in determining the increase in effort in the baseline.
Few regressors are relevant in determining changes in students effort: risk aversion and
parental background attract significant coefficients in some specifications, suggesting that
individuals who are risk averse tend on average to increase effort, while males with higher
socio-economic background (here proxied by highly educated parents) tend to decrease
effort, other things equal.
4.6 Conclusions
Our study investigates how two alternative incentive schemes affect students’ effort, both
from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view. To test the theoretical predictions,
we run a field experiment in an undergraduate course at the University of Bologna (Italy).
We randomly assign students to either a tournament, where coupled students compete to
get the reward, a cooperative scheme where information sharing is allowed, or a control
is above 6 and 0 otherwise. Truster (1) is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the answer of the individual
on the trust 1 scale is above 6 and 0 otherwise.
23Since we include control variates and 9 students do not answer the questionnaire, the sample size relevant
for the regressions is 105 instead of 114.
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treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. Differently from previous
studies, none of our treatments involves pecuniary incentives but consists in extra points for
their final grade.
The field-experiment data we collected confirm the theoretical predictions: we observe
a weak ordering between the effort exerted by students under the different treatments with
students in the competitive treatment exerting on average more effort with respect to stu-
dents in the baseline and in the cooperative treatment.
We break down our results by gender and show that a significant difference emerges:
only males react to incentives to compete while we cannot detect significant effect for fe-
males. Cooperation seems not to foster effort exertion and no gender effect emerges. In
contrast with theoretical predictions we find that students’ ability plays little role in deter-
mining the effectiveness of the incentives.
Our experimental results suggest that non-pecuniary incentives based on competition
have the potential to increase students’ effort as pecuniary incentives do (see Blimpo 2010)
but at a much lower financial cost. In our case competition proves to work on males which
is line with findings in several other contexts (see for example Gneezy and Rustichini 2004
and Niederle and Vesterlund 2010) where it has been shown that males are more prone to
compete with respect to females. The estimated increase in effort induced for males in the
competitive treatment ranges from 33% to 49%, meaning that, for example, if a student in
the baseline spends 3 afternoons in preparing the test (roughly 10 hours), a student under
the competitive scheme will spend one more afternoon. Moreover, highlighting the different
effect of incentives to compete depending on gender, we complement the results in Angrist
and Lavy (2009) who show that monetary incentives based on absolute performance are
more effective for females.
Our study represents a first exploration of the effects of non-monetary incentives on
students’ performance and effort. It would be interesting to extend the inquiry to different
samples, to verify whether our result holds for students with different majors (such as litera-
ture of philosophy), who are probably less trained to optimization, and for younger students
at high school and middle-high school.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Laboratory
Figure 4.3: The laboratory arrangement
4.7.2 Additional tables
Table 4.9: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive Statistics- Stayers
Predetermined controls
assigned stayers score 1 exams’ avg score 5
Baseline (control) 47 37 1.80 (0.81) 24.76 (1.8) 2.91 (0.24)
Cooperative 42 41 1.92 (0.84) 24.88 (2.3) 2.80 (0.50)
Competitive 41 36 1.69 (0.74) 24.83 (1.6) 2.69 (0.53)
Full sample 130 114 1.81 (0.80) 24.83 (1.9) 2.80 (0.45)
Score 1: score at the first mock exam. Score 5: score at the last mock exam. Exams’ avg: average score at
previous exams. Stayers: students who participated to 5 experimental sessions.
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In Table 4.10, we report the precise definition of questionnaire data used in the analysis.
Table 4.10: Description of questionnaire data.
Variable Corresponding question Range Coding
gender gender 0, 1 1 = male
age age 0-100 age in years
freq. mail how frequently do you check your
e-mail?
1-5 1=“more than once per day”
2=“at least once per day”
freq. pc how frequently do you use the pc to
study/work?
1-5 3= “at least once per week”
4=“less than once per week”
freq. chat how frequently do you exchange
text messages via chat (msn, face-
book, google talk, skype, etc.)?
1-5 5=“Never”
father edu. please, indicate the education level
achieved by your father
1-5 1=“junior high school”
2=“high school”
mother edu. please, indicate the education level
achieved by your mother
1-5 3=“bachelor”
4=“master”
5=“Ph.D.”
risk aversion I would describe myself as a risk-
averse person.
1-10 1=“fully agree”
10=“fully disagree”
trust 1 Do you think that most people try
to take advantage of you if they got
a chance or would they try to be
fair?
1-10 1=“people would try to take
advantage”
10=“people would try to be
fair”
trust 2 Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in
dealing with people?
1-10 1=“you can never be too
careful”
10=“most people can be
trusted”
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Table 4.11: Descriptive statistics -mean, [median] and (standard deviation)- on lag between
the use of chat and use of hints, by treatment and round. Questions 1-5
Lag & proportion of user of both chat and hint (seconds). Test 2.
Treatment Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5
Cooperative 107.6 [21.7] 322.8 [252.2] 58.6 [6.3] 151.0 [114.1] 54.2 [6.4]
(449.0) (378.3) (565.9) (513.5) (495.6)
Users (count) 14 12 11 13 16
Users (%) 35.0% 30.0% 27.5% 32.5% 40.0%
Competitive 80.6 [54.1] -123.3 [-123.3] 130.4 [23.9] 13.3 [13.3] 25.3 [16.9]
(67.9) (131.1) (1113.5) ( n.a. ) (21.3)
Users (count) 3 2 3 1 3
Users (%) 8.8% 5.9% 8.8% 2.3% 8.8%
Lag & proportion of user of both chat and hint (seconds). Test 3.
Treatment Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5
Cooperative 492.5 [374.8] 496.2 [368] -56.0 [-3.2] 167.6 [71.7] 76.4 [5.2]
(693.1) (577.4) (423.0) (427.3) (303.5 )
Users (count) 14 16 14 17 15
Users (%) 35.0% 40.0% 35.0% 42.5% 37.5%
Competitive 73.8 [7.6] -164.2 [-164] 720.1 [720] -194.0 [165.4] 97.0 [97.0]
(131.3) (951.9) (223.6) (380.5) (123.7)
Users (count) 3 2 2 4 2
Users (%) 8.8% 5.9% 5.9% 11.7% 5.9%
Lag & proportion of user of both chat and hint (seconds). Test 4.
Treatment Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5
Cooperative 146.9 [55.9] 119.8 [20.8] -15.8 [-3.3] 169.7 [40.8] 95.0 [4.1]
(482.1) (342.8) (522.4) (355.0) ( 240.2)
Users (count) 14 17 17 17 22
Users (%) 35.0% 42.5% 42.5% 42.5% 55.0%
Competitive 194.3 [12.3] 8.5 [8.5] 180.1 [2.1] 458.8 [72.6] 322.3 [322]
(365.8) (n.a.) (314.1) (721.4) (449.4)
Users (count) 4 1 3 3 2
Users (%) 11.7% 2.9% 8.8% 8.8% 5.9%
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Table 4.12: Robustness checks, different measures of ability
Measures of ability:
Symbolic digit test Number of exams Number of credits
VARIABLES Males Females Males Females Males Females
Constant 0.346 0.939*** 0.317 0.983*** 0.369 1.211***
[0.241] [0.273] [0.260] [0.248] [0.263] [0.288]
Cooperative -0.172 -0.212 -0.135 -0.393 -0.115 -0.616**
[0.254] [0.315] [0.233] [0.278] [0.249] [0.306]
Competitive 0.253 -0.248 0.401 -0.715** 0.248 -0.927**
[0.272] [0.327] [0.279] [0.336] [0.310] [0.359]
Coop · High Ability 0.117 -0.172 0.172 0.451 0.009 0.767*
[0.420] [0.440] [0.414] [0.461] [0.380] [0.444]
Comp · High ability 0.138 -0.198 -0.047 0.670 0.177 0.902**
[0.409] [0.453] [0.471] [0.431] [0.435] [0.437]
High ability 0.078 -0.144 -0.116 -0.328 -0.033 -0.551*
[0.306] [0.306] [0.328] [0.317] [0.299] [0.311]
High parental education -0.284* -0.299 -0.214 -0.182 -0.275 -0.188
[0.164] [0.209] [0.171] [0.214] [0.171] [0.196]
Frequent use of e-mail 0.033 -0.277 0.110 -0.303 0.056 -0.368*
[0.176] [0.204] [0.179] [0.199] [0.173] [0.196]
Risk averse 0.305* 0.280 0.286* 0.297 0.291* 0.259
[0.154] [0.180] [0.157] [0.182] [0.154] [0.180]
Truster 0.096 0.135 0.122 0.069 0.105 0.089
[0.167] [0.195] [0.163] [0.202] [0.167] [0.197]
Observations 50 54 50 54 50 54
R-squared 0.264 0.150 0.251 0.152 0.247 0.194
P-values for the null of no effect against bilateral or unilateral H1
(R)≡H1: β > 0; (L) ≡H1: β < 0
Competitive
COMP 1 sided (R) 0.176 0.776 0.0754 0.983 0.212 0.995
COMP 2 sided 0.352 0.447 0.151 0.0333 0.424 0.00970
Cooperative
COOP 1 sided (L) 0.249 0.250 0.281 0.0791 0.322 0.0219
COOP 2 sided 0.499 0.501 0.562 0.158 0.644 0.0438
Competitive for high ability
COMP HIGH 1 sided (R) 0.0997 0.925 0.157 0.562 0.0702 0.539
COMP HIGH 2 sided 0.199 0.150 0.314 0.877 0.140 0.922
Cooperative for high ability
COOP HIGH 1 sided (L) 0.432 0.116 0.543 0.561 0.360 0.676
COOP HIGH 2 sided 0.863 0.232 0.915 0.878 0.720 0.649
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4.7.3 Additional figures
Figure 4.4: Empirical probability distribution of score 1 by treatment
Figure 4.5: Empirical probability distribution of average score at previous exams by treat-
ment
Appendix 132
Figure 4.6: Screen-shot of the graphical interface for partial exams.
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4.7.4 Examples of chat messages
Figure 4.7: Example of use of the chat under the cooperative scheme
A: Come on! Tell me which answers do you need. If you don’t get 1.5 points,
we will lose the bonus.
B: In my opinion the right one is the 2nd
A: OK! I trust you
Figure 4.8: Example of use of the chat under the competitive scheme
A: In this case the 4th is the best answer
B (replies): Why do you pass me this solution? Are you trying to screw me?
C: I know that you are going to pass me the wrong answers.
D: I’m not sure...probably the right answer is the 1st [ she choses the 3rd ]
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